Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
597 detections
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'Detects anomalous IP address usage by user accounts and then checks to see if a suspicious Teams action is performed.
Query calculates IP usage Delta for each user account and selects accounts where a delta >= 90% is observed between the most and least used IP.
To further reduce results the query performs a prevalence check on the lowest used IP's country, only keeping IP's where the country is unusual for the tenant (dynamic ranges).
Please note, if the initial logic of prevalence to find suspicious logon activity is noisy then consider adding filtering based on Location.
Finally the user accounts activity within Teams logs is checked for suspicious commands (modifying user privileges or admin actions) during the period the suspicious IP was active.'
Query calculates IP usage Delta for each user account and selects accounts where a delta >= 90% is observed between the most and least used IP.
To further reduce results the query performs a prevalence check on the lowest used IP's country, only keeping IP's where the country is unusual for the tenant (dynamic ranges).
Please note, if the initial logic of prevalence to find suspicious logon activity is noisy then consider adding filtering based on Location.
Finally the user accounts activity within Teams logs is checked for suspicious commands (modifying user privileges or admin actions) during the period the suspicious IP was active.'
This query looks for local admin account used to logon into the computer.
This can help to detect malicious insiders that were able to add a local account to the local admin group offline.
This can help to detect malicious insiders that were able to add a local account to the local admin group offline.
'This query could identify critical user management operations like user registration(Microsoft Entra ID Multi-Factor Authentication & self-service password reset (SSPR)) authentication by admin account followed by attempts to stop System Restore activity. Stopping system restore prevents from recovering data by going back to a restore point. The operations could be an indication of attackers trying to maintain persistence, move laterally with attempts to stop system restore point that could point to a potential ransomware attack.'
'This script identifies password changes or resets across multiple host and cloud sources. Account manipulation, including password changes and resets, may help adversaries maintain access to credentials and permission levels.'
'Identifies when a new user is granted access and starts creating resources in Azure. This can help you identify rogue or malicious user behavior.'
'This query examines Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins and identifies anomalous changes in a user's location profile. A variation joins results back onto the original sign-in data to review the location set with each identified user in tabular form.'
'Query for new sign-ins from stale/inactive accounts. UEBA filters based on ActivityInsights. Results for accounts created in the last 7 days are filtered out.'
Author: alex verboon @alexverboon.
Blogpost: https://www.verboon.info/2020/09/hunting-for-local-group-membership-changes.
Blogpost: https://www.verboon.info/2020/09/hunting-for-local-group-membership-changes.
'Identifies when a recently created Group was added to a privileged built in domain local group or global group such as the Enterprise Admins, Cert Publishers or DnsAdmins. Be sure to verify this is an expected addition.
References: For AD SID mappings - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups.'
References: For AD SID mappings - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups.'
'Identifies IPs with failed attempts to sign in to one or more disabled accounts signed in successfully to another account.
This analytic will additionally identify the successful signed in accounts as the mapped account entities for investigation.
References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes
50057 - User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator.'
This analytic will additionally identify the successful signed in accounts as the mapped account entities for investigation.
References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes
50057 - User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator.'
'Looks for multiple users that had their admin role removed by a single user within a certain period.
The default threshold is 5 removals, this can be edited in the query.'
The default threshold is 5 removals, this can be edited in the query.'
'Compares the current day to last 14 days of audits to identify new audit activities. Useful for tracking malicious activity related to user/group additions/removals by Azure Apps and automated approvals.'
'This query look for accounts that have not been successfully logged into recently who then add or update an MFA method before logging in.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed. This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel UEBA features.
Ref: [LINK TO BLOG]'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed. This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel UEBA features.
Ref: [LINK TO BLOG]'
'Identifies modifications to user's MFA settings. An attacker could use access to modify MFA settings to bypass MFA requirements or maintain persistence.
'Compares current day to last 14 days of audits to identify new audit activities. Useful for tracking malicious activity related to user/group additions/removals by specific users.'
' This query will detect when an attempt is made to update an existing user and link it to an guest or external identity. These activities are unusual and such linking of external
identities should be investigated. In some cases you may see internal Entra ID sync accounts (Sync_) do this which may be benign'
identities should be investigated. In some cases you may see internal Entra ID sync accounts (Sync_) do this which may be benign'
'Identifies when a user account is enabled and then disabled within 10 minutes. This can be an indication of compromise and an adversary attempting to hide in the noise.'
'Detects when a guest account in a tenant is converted to a member of the tenant.
Monitoring guest accounts and the access they are provided is important to detect potential account abuse.
Accounts converted to members should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
Monitoring guest accounts and the access they are provided is important to detect potential account abuse.
Accounts converted to members should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
This query lists Active Directory accounts lockout and unlock events
'Identifies where Privileged Accounts have updated passwords or security information. This is joined with UEBA alerts to filter to only those accounts with a high investigation priority.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor'
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor'
'Detects a privileged role being added to a Service Principal.
Ensure that any assignment to a Service Principal is valid and appropriate - Service Principals should not be assigned to very highly privileged roles such as Global Admin.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
Ensure that any assignment to a Service Principal is valid and appropriate - Service Principals should not be assigned to very highly privileged roles such as Global Admin.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
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