Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
13 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
4
2
2
2
1
Contributors
13
Categories
8
3
3
3
3
Platforms
8
5
2
1
Products / Services
6
5
2
1
1
MITRE Techniques
8
8
4
3
2
CVEs
71
71
64
58
49
IDS Classtypes
1
IDS Protocols
1
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns targeting FortiClient EMS systems, specifically on port 8013. This pattern is indicative of exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-35616, where an external entity communicates with a vulnerable FortiClient EMS instance multiple times in a short window.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts targeting vulnerabilities in FortiClient EMS. It specifically looks for indicators such as requests lacking proper certificate headers or suspicious requests to 'service/save.php' on the FortiClient EMS server, which are commonly associated with CVE-2026-35616.
Detects potential exploitation attempts against FortiClient EMS versions 7.4.5-7.4.6, specifically targeting the administration API on port 8013. The detection identifies unauthorized access attempts indicated by the log entry 'Certificate not found in request header', which correlates with exploit behavior for CVE-2026-35616.
Detects anomalous PowerShell activity associated with the EKZ Stealer, characterized by a multi-stage chain involving file download, hidden process execution, temporary file staging, base64 encoding, and exfiltration via HTTP POST requests, followed by cleanup of logs.
Detects network requests targeting port 8013 that generate an error message indicating a missing certificate in the request header. This pattern is associated with attempts to exploit vulnerability CVE-2026-35616.
This rule detects attempts to exploit an unauthenticated administration API vulnerability (CVE-2026-35616) in FortiClient EMS versions 7.4.5 and 7.4.6, commonly referred to as FortiBleed. This vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker to gain unauthorized access to the administration interface.
Detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2026-35616 targeting Fortinet FortiClient EMS versions 7.4.5 and 7.4.6. The rule identifies suspicious indicators such as API authentication bypass attempts marked by missing certificate headers, unauthorized modifications to remote access VPN profiles, and unauthenticated administrative API access on port 8013.
Detects the post-exploitation behavior associated with EKZ Stealer, specifically the creation of a credential-containing log file in ProgramData, followed by the rapid deletion of the file and the source stealer binary. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic cleanup steps often used to conceal credential harvesting activities.
Detects potential exploitation attempts against management interfaces of SOHO network devices (Cisco, Ubiquiti, Draytek) by monitoring for suspicious web request activity, specifically targeting paths like /admin, /cgi-bin, or /setup.cgi. The rule identifies high-volume or systematic scan patterns from external sources, which may indicate automated exploitation attempts (e.g., related to CVE-2026-35616).
Detects the presence and execution of 'FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe' from non-standard locations (C:\ProgramData) used for masquerading, or the invocation of the ElevationKatz command-line tool (runhlp.exe --v20-decrypt) used to perform credential decryption.
Detects high-velocity port scanning bursts from a single source IP address targeting multiple destinations, often indicative of botnet reconnaissance activity such as the JDY botnet used to identify edge devices vulnerable to specific exploits like CVE-2026-35616.
Detects malicious shell script execution on Linux edge/IoT devices associated with the JDY botnet exploitation of CVE-2026-35616. The rule identifies processes checking for MIPS-based architectures, using download utilities (wget, curl) for payload retrieval, and subsequent file deletion activity indicative of post-exploitation cleanup.
Detects a suspected exploitation of CVE-2026-35616 on edge/SOHO devices, followed within 5 minutes by the download of an architecture-specific MIPS dropper via curl or wget, a behavior consistent with known threat activity such as the Volt Typhoon/JDY Botnet.