Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
71 detections
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Detects a web server process (apache2, httpd, php-fpm) spawning a Unix shell (dash/sh) that executes discovery commands such as id, whoami, hostname, or find. This is the durable post-exploitation signature of the wp2shell WordPress pre-auth RCE chain (CVE-2026-63030, CVE-2026-60137), where a malicious plugin or webshell executes commands through the web stack.
Detects a PHP file being written into a WordPress content directory
that has no legitimate reason to hold executable code. The wp2shell chain against
CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137 stages its payload through wp-content/uploads/
and wp-content/upgrade/ before it lands as a plugin under
wp-content/plugins/wp2shell_/, so both the staging directories and the
campaign's plugin directory shape are matched. uploads/ is the durable half:
WordPress serves user media from it and nothing there should ever be a .php file,
which makes a PHP write there a strong webshell indicator independent of this
campaign.
that has no legitimate reason to hold executable code. The wp2shell chain against
CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137 stages its payload through wp-content/uploads/
and wp-content/upgrade/ before it lands as a plugin under
wp-content/plugins/wp2shell_/, so both the staging directories and the
campaign's plugin directory shape are matched. uploads/ is the durable half:
WordPress serves user media from it and nothing there should ever be a .php file,
which makes a PHP write there a strong webshell indicator independent of this
campaign.
Detects HTTP requests to the WordPress REST batch endpoint (/wp-json/batch/v1 or /?rest_route=/batch/v1) carrying user agents associated with public wp2shell proof-of-concept tooling. This targets the pre-auth route confusion and SQL injection primitive in WordPress Core (CVE-2026-63030, CVE-2026-60137) that leads to full remote code execution.
Threat actors are exploiting the recently Discovered WordPress Vulnerability. Vulnerability Management platform like defender not fully capable of identifying the vulnerable WordPress Core Application being installed on the organizations Servers. If you are using Defender XDR, here's the KQL to hunt for WordPress Installed Linux and Windows Servers.
Threat actors are exploiting the recently Discovered WordPress Vulnerability. Vulnerability Management platform like defender not fully capable of identifying the vulnerable WordPress Core Application being installed on the organizations Servers. If you are using Defender XDR, here's the KQL to hunt for WordPress Installed Linux and Windows Servers.
Threat actors are exploiting the recently Discovered WordPress Vulnerability. Vulnerability Management platform like defender not fully capable of identifying the vulnerable WordPress Core Application being installed on the organizations Servers. If you are using Defender XDR, here's the KQL to hunt for WordPress Installed Linux and Windows Servers.
Detects malicious SQL injection attempts targeting WordPress REST API endpoints that attempt to forge post parameters by injecting self-referential cycles. The pattern specifically looks for 'UNION SELECT' combined with 'author_exclude' and manipulated 'post_parent' values, matching known exploitation patterns for the wp2shell vulnerability (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137).
Detects malicious SQL injection attempts targeting WordPress REST API endpoints that attempt to forge post parameters by injecting self-referential cycles. The pattern specifically looks for 'UNION SELECT' combined with 'author_exclude' and manipulated 'post_parent' values, matching known exploitation patterns for the wp2shell vulnerability (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137).
Detects malicious SQL injection attempts targeting WordPress REST API endpoints that attempt to forge post parameters by injecting self-referential cycles. The pattern specifically looks for 'UNION SELECT' combined with 'author_exclude' and manipulated 'post_parent' values, matching known exploitation patterns for the wp2shell vulnerability (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137).
Detects the execution of sendmail via a shell (sh, bash, dash) spawned by a web server process (Apache, Nginx, httpd) where the process working directory matches the wp2shell plugin pattern (wp2shell_<hex>). This is indicative of remote code execution or web shell activity associated with the wp2shell vulnerability, where the attacker uses sendmail for exfiltration or command output delivery.
Detects the wp2shell unauthenticated SQL injection chain (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137) abusing the REST API batch-route confusion via author_exclude/author__not_in parameters against wp-json/wp/v2/posts or wp-json/batch/v1, where the extraction result reflects the WordPress 6.9 $wp$2y$ bcrypt-over-HMAC-SHA384 hash marker in the request query or response body. Requires both the specific unauthenticated REST SQLi vector AND the hash-format marker to fire, excluding legitimate authenticated admin export/reporting tools that reference wp_users through normal means.
Detects attempts to exploit the WordPress wp2shell vulnerability (CVE-2026-63030/CVE-2026-60137) by correlating the identification of a vulnerable WordPress version (6.9.0-6.9.4 or 7.0.0-7.0.1) via response banners with anomalous Batch REST API requests utilizing the 'author__not_in' parameter.
Detects PHP files and their containing directories that follow the wp2shell_<hex> naming convention under WordPress wp-content subdirectories (plugins/upgrade/uploads), as dropped by the wp2shell WordPress Core RCE chain (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137). Requires the strict wp-content/<plugins|upgrade|uploads>/...wp2shell_<8-hex> path structure rather than any new plugin directory creation, to avoid flagging legitimate plugin installs. Correlate with process-creation telemetry confirming a web-server process (e.g. apache2) as the creator of the matched path.
Detects the creation of a WordPress administrator account via the REST API using username prefixes associated with the 'wp2shell' exploit (e.g., 'wp2_' or 'w2s_'). This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence on a compromised WordPress site.
Detects creation of a PHP file under a WordPress wp-content/cache directory attributed either to the mysqld process or to a web-server process (apache2) whose command line contains an INTO OUTFILE-style SQL pattern. In the wp2shell exploit chain, SQL injection reaching author__not_in can be abused to write a webshell via SQL INTO OUTFILE directly into wp-content/cache instead of the plugin-install path, bypassing plugin-directory-focused detections. Requiring database-process or INTO OUTFILE attribution reduces false positives from legitimate caching plugins that generate PHP cache files under this same directory.
Detects the wp2shell unauthenticated SQL injection chain (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137) abusing the REST API batch-route confusion via author_exclude/author__not_in parameters against wp-json/wp/v2/posts or wp-json/batch/v1, where the extraction result reflects the WordPress 6.9 $wp$2y$ bcrypt-over-HMAC-SHA384 hash marker in the request query or response body. Requires both the specific unauthenticated REST SQLi vector AND the hash-format marker to fire, excluding legitimate authenticated admin export/reporting tools that reference wp_users through normal means.
Detects attempts to perform error-based SQL injection against WordPress instances associated with the wp2shell exploit chain. The rule monitors for the use of MySQL functions EXTRACTVALUE or UPDATEXML within query parameters that are typically targeted by the exploit (author_exclude, author__not_in) or when interacting with the batch REST endpoint.
Detects the wp2shell post-exploitation cleanup pattern where a shell spawned by a web server process determines its current working directory, matches it against a wp-content/plugins path using the specific `case "$d" in */wp-content/plugins/*) cd / && rm -rf "$d";; esac` one-liner shape, and recursively deletes that directory to remove the deployed web shell plugin. This is tightened to require the exact case-statement/one-liner construction executed by a shell that is a child of a web server process, rather than any generic recursive delete under wp-content/plugins, which would also fire on legitimate WordPress plugin uninstall hooks that remove their own plugin directory. Absence of the plugin directory afterward should not be treated as evidence the host is clean.
Detects creation of PHP web shell files or plugin directories under WordPress wp-content/plugins using the wp2shell_<hex> naming convention, associated with the wp2shell WordPress Core RCE exploitation chain.
Detects a rapid sequence of blind boolean SQL injection probes against the author_exclude parameter using ASCII/SUBSTRING syntax and the X-WP-Total header oracle (CVE-2026-60137).
Detects HTTP request attempts to exploit WordPress vulnerabilities (associated with 'wp2shell' activity) targeting the 'author_exclude' or 'author__not_in' parameters with SQL injection payloads, such as sleep() functions or comment injection characters.
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