Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

49 detections

Detects unexpected crashes or restarts of the Windows Defender service (MsMpEng.exe) occurring in temporal proximity to activities associated with the ShieldCrash PoC or tampering within the Windows Defender object manager namespace. This rule aims to identify potential exploitation attempts targeting Windows Defender, specifically correlating security service instability with known malicious indicators.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
7028
Detects the suspicious registration of a Cloud Filter provider callback using staging paths and naming conventions associated with the ShieldCrash (CVE-2026-69414) exploit. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for cloud provider activity that originates from unsigned or untrusted binaries, excluding known-legitimate cloud synchronization clients.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
24053
Detects Microsoft Defender (MsMpEng) performing scan or remediation actions against non-standard filesystem paths, specifically NT object-manager namespace paths or CLFS-driver-prefixed paths. This behavior is indicative of an exploitation attempt (e.g., CVE-2026-69414) where an attacker uses symbolic links and CLFS driver namespaces to redirect the Defender scanning engine to arbitrary files on the system, potentially allowing file reads as SYSTEM.
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Georgios Maragos@Gmarak
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
6135
Detects the creation of Object Manager symbolic links that redirect the Windows Defender 'WD_SCAN' object to a loopback UNC share path. This behavior is indicative of a symlink exploitation technique (ShieldCrash/CVE-2026-69414) used to manipulate Windows Defender or associated scan operations by redirecting them to an adversary-controlled or loopback-hosted target.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
7015
Detects the suspicious registration of a Cloud Filter provider callback using staging paths and naming conventions associated with the ShieldCrash (CVE-2026-69414) exploit. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for cloud provider activity that originates from unsigned or untrusted binaries, excluding known-legitimate cloud synchronization clients.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
6014
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to the SyncRootManager registry keys. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts, such as the ShieldCrash zero-day, which abuse the Windows CFAPI sync-root mechanisms to achieve privilege escalation or bypass security features. Legitimate synchronization software is explicitly excluded from this detection.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
27027
Detects the creation of specific Object Manager namespace directories and objects used by the ShieldCrash proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414) to hijack the Microsoft Defender scan process.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
309
Detects rapid deletion and creation cycles of the WD_SCAN object manager link, a behavioral pattern associated with a Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) exploit chain targeting Windows Defender (referenced as CVE-2026-69414). The rule monitors for at least three cycle events occurring within a 5-second window, specifically involving the 'WD_SCAN' object identifier.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
509
Detects the suspicious registration of a Cloud Filter provider callback using staging paths and naming conventions associated with the ShieldCrash (CVE-2026-69414) exploit. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for cloud provider activity that originates from unsigned or untrusted binaries, excluding known-legitimate cloud synchronization clients.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
3017
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to the SyncRootManager registry keys. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts, such as the ShieldCrash zero-day, which abuse the Windows CFAPI sync-root mechanisms to achieve privilege escalation or bypass security features. Legitimate synchronization software is explicitly excluded from this detection.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
2 months ago
17017
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
2 months ago
6017
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
5014
Detects the ShieldCrash CVE-2026-69414 exploit PoC binary/PDB via multiple corroborating distinguishing strings and file size
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
3011
Detects the suspicious registration of a Cloud Filter provider callback using staging paths and naming conventions associated with the ShieldCrash (CVE-2026-69414) exploit. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for cloud provider activity that originates from unsigned or untrusted binaries, excluding known-legitimate cloud synchronization clients.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
3010
Detects unexpected crashes or restarts of the Windows Defender service (MsMpEng.exe) occurring in temporal proximity to activities associated with the ShieldCrash PoC or tampering within the Windows Defender object manager namespace. This rule aims to identify potential exploitation attempts targeting Windows Defender, specifically correlating security service instability with known malicious indicators.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
1209
Detects the suspicious registration of a Cloud Filter provider callback using staging paths and naming conventions associated with the ShieldCrash (CVE-2026-69414) exploit. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for cloud provider activity that originates from unsigned or untrusted binaries, excluding known-legitimate cloud synchronization clients.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
404
Detects unexpected crashes or restarts of the Windows Defender service (MsMpEng.exe) occurring in temporal proximity to activities associated with the ShieldCrash PoC or tampering within the Windows Defender object manager namespace. This rule aims to identify potential exploitation attempts targeting Windows Defender, specifically correlating security service instability with known malicious indicators.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
508
Detects the ShieldCrash CVE-2026-69414 exploit PoC binary/PDB via multiple corroborating distinguishing strings and file size
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
207
Detects the creation of Object Manager symbolic links that redirect the Windows Defender 'WD_SCAN' object to a loopback UNC share path. This behavior is indicative of a symlink exploitation technique (ShieldCrash/CVE-2026-69414) used to manipulate Windows Defender or associated scan operations by redirecting them to an adversary-controlled or loopback-hosted target.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
307
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Hunters
2 months ago
107
Detects the creation of specific Object Manager namespace directories and objects used by the ShieldCrash proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414) to hijack the Microsoft Defender scan process.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
306
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