Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
64 detections
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Detects SLAPSHOT Python proxy daemon and tunneling tool deployed alongside WHIPSHOT on compromised NetScaler appliances
Detects suspicious exploitation activity against NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances, including requests to CGI, VPN, or authentication endpoints with command execution, webshell, or encoded payload behavior associated with CVE-2026-88771.
Detects SLAPSHOT Python proxy daemon and tunneling tool deployed alongside WHIPSHOT on compromised NetScaler appliances
Hunts for NetScaler Pitboss packet engine messages where the text after NSPPE carries shell syntax such as separators, command substitution or ${IFS}. Security vendors observed this pattern during exploitation of the NetScaler pre authentication command injection flaw patched in September 2026.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
This detection identifies potential Citrix NetScaler persistence and anti-forensic activity associated with CVE-2026-88772. It monitors for suspicious modifications within VPN-related directories and execution of commands indicative of SUID root backdoor creation or Apache web server restart activity, which may indicate efforts to establish persistence, conceal attacker activity, or activate malicious web content.
Hunts for NetScaler Pitboss packet engine messages where the text after NSPPE carries shell syntax such as separators, command substitution or ${IFS}. Security vendors observed this pattern during exploitation of the NetScaler pre authentication command injection flaw patched in September 2026.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
Hunts for NetScaler Pitboss packet engine messages where the text after NSPPE carries shell syntax such as separators, command substitution or ${IFS}. Security vendors observed this pattern during exploitation of the NetScaler pre authentication command injection flaw patched in September 2026.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
This detection identifies potential Citrix NetScaler persistence and anti-forensic activity associated with CVE-2026-88772. It monitors for suspicious modifications within VPN-related directories and execution of commands indicative of SUID root backdoor creation or Apache web server restart activity, which may indicate efforts to establish persistence, conceal attacker activity, or activate malicious web content.
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting unpatched Citrix NetScaler ADC or Gateway devices, specifically looking for unauthenticated requests to management or sensitive endpoints that contain command execution indicators. This rule is designed to identify activity associated with vulnerabilities similar to CVE-2026-88771.
Detects anomalous unauthenticated HTTP requests targeting Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway, characterized by suspicious URI patterns, non-standard HTTP methods, and malformed request parameters. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts consistent with CVE-2026-88771.
This rule monitors NetScaler ADC logs for indicators associated with the PitScaler campaign, specifically targeting exploitation of CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772. It detects exploitation artifacts (DTLS handshake errors, NSPPE crashes), deployment of WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT malware, web shell installation, httpd.conf configuration tampering, persistence mechanisms involving privilege escalation (chmod), and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events involving NetScaler ADC or Gateway appliances: anomalous account authentication, followed by the establishment of a VPN or remote access session, and subsequent unusual outbound network activity indicating potential lateral movement or C2 communication from the appliance.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes (shells, interpreters, or system reconnaissance tools) directly spawned by critical Citrix NetScaler service binaries (nsppe, httpd, nsaaad). This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation activity, such as command injection or lateral movement following the exploitation of a public-facing NetScaler application vulnerability.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events involving NetScaler ADC or Gateway appliances: anomalous account authentication, followed by the establishment of a VPN or remote access session, and subsequent unusual outbound network activity indicating potential lateral movement or C2 communication from the appliance.
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting unpatched Citrix NetScaler ADC or Gateway devices, specifically looking for unauthenticated requests to management or sensitive endpoints that contain command execution indicators. This rule is designed to identify activity associated with vulnerabilities similar to CVE-2026-88771.
Detects a multi-stage compromise sequence involving anomalous authentication followed by VPN session establishment and a burst of outbound connections from Citrix ADC/Gateway appliances. Tightened to reduce false positives from legitimate admin access, routine VPN sessions, and authorized appliance telemetry/updates.
This rule detects indicators of the PitScaler campaign targeting Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances, exploiting vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772). It identifies the full attack chain including initial DTLS heap corruption exploitation, WHIPSHOT web shell C2 patterns, SLAPSHOT tunneling artifacts, web shell deployment files, httpd.conf PHP configuration tampering for persistence, privilege escalation via setuid /bin/sh modification, and anti-forensic log tampering.
This rule monitors NetScaler Syslog events for file creation or modification actions targeting web-accessible directories (/netscaler/, /var/vpn/, /var/netscaler/logon/) involving common web shell scripting extensions (.php, .pl, .sh, .py). It is designed to detect post-exploitation activity such as the manual deployment of backdoors following a vulnerability compromise.
Detects HTTP requests directed at NetScaler AAA or Gateway authentication endpoints that exhibit characteristics indicative of exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-88771. The rule monitors for anomalies such as excessive Content-Length headers, unusually large URI query parameters, or the presence of duplicated HTTP headers, which may be leveraged to bypass security controls or trigger buffer-related vulnerabilities during the authentication process.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation behaviors on Citrix NetScaler appliances, specifically tracking the modification of file permissions to grant setuid/setgid bits to the shell and the termination of httpd processes often associated with webshell persistence or manipulation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events involving NetScaler ADC or Gateway appliances: anomalous account authentication, followed by the establishment of a VPN or remote access session, and subsequent unusual outbound network activity indicating potential lateral movement or C2 communication from the appliance.
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