Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

408 detections

Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP) associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure, specifically looking for malicious domains like boegl-krysl.eu and coppietersrecherche.eu, as well as Cloudflare workers.dev domains used for beaconing and lures.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
19 days ago
003
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP) associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure, specifically looking for malicious domains like boegl-krysl.eu and coppietersrecherche.eu, as well as Cloudflare workers.dev domains used for beaconing and lures.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
19 days ago
003
This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
20 days ago
003
This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
20 days ago
003
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP) associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure, specifically looking for malicious domains like boegl-krysl.eu and coppietersrecherche.eu, as well as Cloudflare workers.dev domains used for beaconing and lures.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
19 days ago
002
Detects outbound network connections (HTTPS/TLS) to known malicious domains used by TA419 for AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns. These domains are identified as part of a spoofed OneDrive document/file sharing theme intended to steal user credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
24 days ago
006
Detects outbound network connections (HTTPS/TLS) to known malicious domains used by TA419 for AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns. These domains are identified as part of a spoofed OneDrive document/file sharing theme intended to steal user credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
24 days ago
005
This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
20 days ago
002
Detects outbound network connections (HTTPS/TLS) to known malicious domains used by TA419 for AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns. These domains are identified as part of a spoofed OneDrive document/file sharing theme intended to steal user credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
24 days ago
004
Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
25 days ago
005
This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
20 days ago
001
Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
25 days ago
004
Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
25 days ago
003
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP) associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure, specifically looking for malicious domains like boegl-krysl.eu and coppietersrecherche.eu, as well as Cloudflare workers.dev domains used for beaconing and lures.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
19 days ago
000
This rule detects outbound TLS traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with Max Messenger covert telemetry beaconing behavior. The rule inspects the Server Name Indication (SNI) field in the TLS handshake for the specific domain string.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
0020
Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
25 days ago
002
This rule detects established TLS connections to external domains that exhibit characteristics often associated with phishing campaigns. Specifically, it looks for domain names in the SNI field that contain common brand names (e.g., microsoft, google, paypal) combined with typical login-related keywords (e.g., login, verify, auth) on high-churn or suspicious Top-Level Domains (TLDs) such as .top, .xyz, or .icu.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
27 days ago
004
This rule detects established TLS connections to external domains that exhibit characteristics often associated with phishing campaigns. Specifically, it looks for domain names in the SNI field that contain common brand names (e.g., microsoft, google, paypal) combined with typical login-related keywords (e.g., login, verify, auth) on high-churn or suspicious Top-Level Domains (TLDs) such as .top, .xyz, or .icu.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
27 days ago
004
This rule detects established TLS connections to external domains that exhibit characteristics often associated with phishing campaigns. Specifically, it looks for domain names in the SNI field that contain common brand names (e.g., microsoft, google, paypal) combined with typical login-related keywords (e.g., login, verify, auth) on high-churn or suspicious Top-Level Domains (TLDs) such as .top, .xyz, or .icu.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
27 days ago
204
Detects outbound network connections (HTTPS/TLS) to known malicious domains used by TA419 for AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns. These domains are identified as part of a spoofed OneDrive document/file sharing theme intended to steal user credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
24 days ago
001
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic to domains using file-sharing or cloud-sync themed keywords in combination with specific top-level domains (TLD) often associated with suspicious infrastructure. The rule specifically excludes well-known legitimate services such as OneDrive, SharePoint, Dropbox, Box, iCloud, and Google, and includes a detection threshold to minimize alerts for incidental traffic.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
24 days ago
001
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