Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
408 detections
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Detects network traffic patterns indicative of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rule identifies suspicious TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) strings matching common SaaS login portals (Microsoft, Okta, Google) paired with SSL/TLS certificates issued by 'Let's Encrypt' that contain suspicious subject names, suggesting a freshly generated infrastructure for credential harvesting.
Detects network traffic associated with the SilkParasite threat actor, specifically identifying the use of typosquatted domain names in TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields and a suspicious TLS CA certificate subject.
Detects network communication with infrastructure identified as SilkParasite command and control by matching specific TLS certificate subjects and SHA-256 fingerprints associated with SpiceRAT.
Detects outbound network traffic directed to Bitbucket (via TLS/443) or using the git protocol (via port 9418). Such connections from internal systems to unverified or unauthorized external Git repositories may indicate malicious activity, including the potential installation of malicious plugins or code via supply chain compromises (e.g., Plugin4Shell).
Detects network traffic indicating the use of Slack APIs as a command and control (C2) channel or for exfiltration. The rules monitor for specific TLS SNI strings, hardcoded Slack bot tokens, and specific channel IDs associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign, which utilizes Slack as a C2 platform.
Detects network activity associated with the NPM Btree malware campaign, specifically TLS/HTTP communication with Ethereum Sepolia RPC endpoints (Alchemy and Infura) and requests containing a hardcoded malicious contract address.
Detects network traffic exhibiting beaconing patterns to 'dl.google.com' that may be indicative of Xray-core C2 tunneling disguised as legitimate Google traffic. The rule uses a threshold to identify consistent connection attempts.
Detection of suspicious network traffic directed toward Slack APIs, characterized by the use of hardcoded Slack bot tokens and specific communication patterns associated with the 'indexed-btree' npm malware family, indicating potential C2 communication or data exfiltration.
Detects outbound network traffic, including DNS lookups, TLS connections, and HTTP requests, directed towards IPRoyal or LightningProxies. These services are commonly used as residential or datacenter proxies and may be leveraged by adversaries for command-and-control (C2) communication, including traffic tunneling for services like Telegram.
This rule detects outbound TLS traffic to the Solana mainnet beta RPC API endpoint (api.mainnet-beta.solana.com). Attackers may abuse legitimate public blockchain infrastructure as a command-and-control channel to bypass traditional network defenses or obfuscate communication.
Detects outbound network traffic matching TLS SNI patterns associated with the Sauron Loader malware, indicating command-and-control (C2) communication. The rule monitors for frequent connections to specific domains (namsb-show, quinlantours, virtual-magic, lahaina-shores) following a defined threshold.
Detects network beaconing activity associated with the Sauron Loader malware. The rule monitors HTTPS traffic for specific domain patterns and suspicious TLV (Type-Length-Value) protocol structures, as well as recurring beaconing cadence to identified C2 infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with the Sauron Loader, including TLS connections to specific C2 domains and repeated HTTPS POST requests to api.* subdomains indicating beaconing or polling behavior.
Detects outbound TLS traffic where the Server Name Indication (SNI) matches known command-and-control (C2) domains associated with the Sauron Loader malware. This indicates a compromised host attempting to communicate with malicious infrastructure.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards known domain names associated with the Sauron Loader command-and-control infrastructure. This rule identifies outbound communication attempts using hardcoded beaconing domains.
This rule detects known command-and-control (C2) domains associated with the Sauron Loader malware family, specifically by inspecting TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields. It also monitors for patterns of repeated connections to domains prefixed with 'api.' over established TLS sessions, which may indicate beaconing behavior characteristic of C2 activity.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known domains associated with the Sauron Loader malware family. These alerts monitor for TLS connections where the Server Name Indication (SNI) matches domains identified as part of the malware's C2 infrastructure.
Detects Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic occurring over non-standard high ports (64350, 64330, 65535, 65111, 61256), which is indicative of SilkParasite C2 activity or potentially malicious lateral movement attempting to bypass standard port monitoring.
Detects network traffic involving TLS certificates that impersonate the Uzbekistan state railway authority, specifically using certificates issued by 'TLC DV TLS CA' or specific known malicious certificate fingerprints. This activity is attributed to the threat actor SilkParasite.
Detects a sequence of events where a host connects to 'speedtest.net' followed by a burst of outbound SYN packets to TCP port 37777. This pattern may indicate an adversary using legitimate web traffic to calibrate their scanning rate or bypass network controls before performing a targeted scan.
Detects network traffic and DNS queries associated with the SilkParasite command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. This rule monitors for established RDP-over-TLS connections using non-standard, high-numbered ports and identifies associated DNS lookups for known C2 hostnames.
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