Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
408 detections
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Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to the known MoneroOcean mining pool over TLS (port 443). This behavior is indicative of XMRig or other cryptomining software communicating with a mining pool to exchange job data, often a sign of unauthorized resource hijacking.
Detects network activity associated with SilkParasite infrastructure, including the use of specific self-signed TLS certificates (swarm ca, proxy.local, 127.0.0.1) and connections to known malicious pivot domains such as socket.ayakliborsa.net or certificate subjects like *.scalefast.ninja.
Detects network activity associated with the HEAVYGRAM PowerShell implant, specifically identifying outbound traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org). The rule looks for established connections and HTTP requests containing Telegram bot-specific URI patterns ('/bot', '/getUpdates') coupled with a 'WindowsPowerShell' user agent, indicating an automated beaconing mechanism used for command and control.
Detects network activity (DNS lookups, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with proxy infrastructure (iproyal.com and lightningproxies.net) known to be used by the HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK threat actors to mask Telegram-based command and control traffic.
Detects TLS connections using suspicious certificates identified as belonging to the SilkParasite threat actor. The rule monitors for specific certificate issuer strings paired with either malicious subject domain patterns (targeting Central Asian entities) or specific JA4X fingerprints associated with known malicious activity.
This rule detects established outbound network connections to 'devtunnels.ms', which is a legitimate service often abused by adversaries to tunnel RDP traffic and bypass network security controls or firewall restrictions. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup.
Detects network traffic directed to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) characterized by TLS SNI indicators or specific HTTP URI structures (e.g., /bot). This behavior is indicative of malware or automated tools using the Telegram platform as a command-and-control (C2) channel for beaconing, command delivery, or data exfiltration.
Detects TLS connections to known CHOSEN BRICK cloud object-storage exfiltration endpoints (VultrObjects, StorjShare, Backblaze B2) and repeated Telegram Bot API document-upload calls consistent with data exfiltration. An earlier revision attempted to chain a Telegram-session flowbit to a later cloud-storage upload, but Suricata flowbits are scoped to a single flow and cannot correlate across the two separate connections involved here, so that cross-flow pair was removed as not functionally valid; each remaining rule fires independently on direct traffic to a known exfil channel.
Detects DNS queries and established TLS connections to free.pinggy.io, a service often used to establish unauthorized reverse tunnels to internal networks, bypassing perimeter security controls.
Detects network traffic (DNS queries, HTTP requests, and TLS SNI) directed towards the domain 'htlwub00klocate.blogspot.com', which is associated with adversary staging activity.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections to suspicious domain names characteristic of the Koktevrat malware's DGA. The rule identifies SNI strings that match a specific regex pattern (8-16 alphanumeric characters followed by .icu or .cfd TLDs), which is indicative of automated C2 communication.
Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
Detects anomalous TLS traffic characterized by an empty Server Name Indication (SNI) field in the TLS handshake, combined with a high frequency of such connections. This behavior is indicative of certain proxy protocols like Xray VLESS with REALITY, which are often used to evade Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and traffic shaping policies by disguising C2 or tunneling traffic as legitimate-looking TLS connections.
Detects outbound TLS traffic behavior consistent with the WaterPlum RAT, characterized by periodic, low-volume connections to non-CDN/cloud providers. The rule identifies potential beaconing activity by monitoring TLS SNI fields against a list of known legitimate service providers and applying a frequency threshold.
Detects Odyssey Stealer malware communicating with a known C2 infrastructure using TLS and performing data exfiltration via HTTP requests to raw-IP destinations using disguised file names such as analytics.gif, pixel.png, and content.js.
Detects network beaconing and communications associated with the NetSupport Manager remote access tool. The rules monitor for outbound connections to a known actor-controlled IP/domain and identify unauthorized client responses containing a specific license serial number.
Detects network activity associated with the HEAVYGRAM PowerShell implant, specifically identifying outbound traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org). The rule looks for established connections and HTTP requests containing Telegram bot-specific URI patterns ('/bot', '/getUpdates') coupled with a 'WindowsPowerShell' user agent, indicating an automated beaconing mechanism used for command and control.
Detects network beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the HEAVYGRAM backdoor, which utilizes the Telegram Bot API for remote interaction. This rule monitors for encrypted SNI traffic directed at api.telegram.org, as well as specific HTTP polling and command execution patterns (e.g., /getUpdates, /bot<token>/) indicating automated interaction with a Telegram bot controlled by an adversary.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections from server-role assets to 'devtunnels.ms', a service that facilitates temporary public tunnels to internal services. This behavior is flagged as a potential indicator of unauthorized command-and-control (C2) tunneling, particularly when originating from critical infrastructure like Domain Controllers or Exchange OWA servers.
Detection of suspicious network traffic directed toward Slack APIs, characterized by the use of hardcoded Slack bot tokens and specific communication patterns associated with the 'indexed-btree' npm malware family, indicating potential C2 communication or data exfiltration.
Detects network traffic associated with the malicious npm package 'indexed-btree', which uses the Telegram Bot API to exfiltrate data. The rules monitor for connections to api.telegram.org via HTTPS and identify specific hardcoded bot tokens and chat IDs associated with the malicious campaign.
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