Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the loading of an unsigned or invalidly signed DLL from commonly abused user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Public). This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading techniques, often used by threat actors like the Lazarus Group to execute malicious code via a legitimate, trusted application.
Detects HTTP traffic containing the 'User-token' header, which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the curlRAT backdoor, often attributed to North Korean threat actors such as APT37, Lazarus, or Kimsuky.
Detects incoming HTTP GET requests containing a specific URI path '/favorite_list_2x_m500_ico.jpg' associated with the Ted Backdoor, commonly used by North Korean state-sponsored threat actors including APT37, Lazarus Group, and Kimsuky for Command and Control (C2) beaconing.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
Detects anomalous HTTP traffic patterns identified in the 'Ted' backdoor used by North Korean-affiliated threat actors (APT37/Kimsuky/Lazarus). The rule specifically monitors the 'Accept-Language' HTTP header for a specific construction containing 'mrt=' followed by 'msc=' or 'mst=', which is used as a covert mechanism for authentication or command signaling.
Detects the execution of potentially malicious processes mimicking cryptocurrency or wallet applications (e.g., 'wallet', 'coin', 'crypto', 'exchange') that are launched from user-accessible directories like Downloads or Temp. The detection specifically looks for these processes spawning command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or proxy execution binaries (rundll32.exe), a behavior pattern characteristic of the AppleJeus campaign associated with Lazarus Group (Diamond Sleet).
Detects file, process, and network activity associated with the TraderTraitor/KelpDAO malware campaign based on known hashes, filenames, paths, and C2 infrastructure.
Detects file, process, and network activity associated with the TraderTraitor/KelpDAO malware campaign based on known hashes, filenames, paths, and C2 infrastructure.
Detects file, process, and network activity associated with the TraderTraitor/KelpDAO malware campaign based on known hashes, filenames, paths, and C2 infrastructure.
Detects file, process, and network activity associated with the TraderTraitor/KelpDAO malware campaign based on known hashes, filenames, paths, and C2 infrastructure.
Detects network connections to known FLATROOF and ROOFDECK C2 infrastructure used by Jade Sleet/TraderTraitor (UNC4899, Lazarus) in campaigns targeting IT services and DevOps engineers.
Detects file, process, and network activity associated with the TraderTraitor/KelpDAO malware campaign based on known hashes, filenames, paths, and C2 infrastructure.
Detects network connections to known FLATROOF and ROOFDECK C2 infrastructure used by Jade Sleet/TraderTraitor (UNC4899, Lazarus) in campaigns targeting IT services and DevOps engineers.
Detects network connections to known FLATROOF and ROOFDECK C2 infrastructure used by Jade Sleet/TraderTraitor (UNC4899, Lazarus) in campaigns targeting IT services and DevOps engineers.
Detects network connections to known FLATROOF and ROOFDECK C2 infrastructure used by Jade Sleet/TraderTraitor (UNC4899, Lazarus) in campaigns targeting IT services and DevOps engineers.
msiexec.exe running as SYSTEM, spawned by a script/task host, with no installer package.
Procedure is currently being used by Lazarus group in conjunction with CVE-2026-68820
Ref https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/lazarus-exploits-windows-zero-day-to.html
Procedure is currently being used by Lazarus group in conjunction with CVE-2026-68820
Ref https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/lazarus-exploits-windows-zero-day-to.html
Detects the execution of child processes from common Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, Outlook) where the command line contains keywords associated with 'job offer' themes. This pattern is consistent with known spearphishing lures used by the Lazarus Group to initiate infection chains.
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