Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
85 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
43
24
11
4
2
Contributors
16
14
11
9
9
Categories
40
18
17
17
15
Platforms
73
25
18
5
1
Products / Services
17
16
8
8
6
MITRE Techniques
18,113
15,640
12,591
8,389
6,208
CVEs
6
IDS Classtypes
3
1
IDS Protocols
4
Detects the execution of npm install commands that include known malicious package names associated with a supply chain attack linked to the Lazarus Group. These packages are designed to impersonate the legitimate 'rollup-plugin-polyfill-node' package.
Detects the creation of unrecognized Go-compiled binaries by common developer tools (e.g., node.exe, code.exe) in user-writable or temporary directories, followed shortly by outbound network connections to known C2 infrastructure (e.g., vercel.app, jsonkeeper.com). This behavior is consistent with the 'Contagious Interview' campaign attributed to the Lazarus Group.
Detects the installation of known malicious npm packages designed to impersonate the legitimate 'rollup-plugin-polyfill-node' dependency. This pattern is associated with Lazarus Group supply chain attacks targeting developer environments and CI/CD pipelines.
Detects the execution of known malicious or hijacked npm and Go packages associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' supply chain campaign. The rule monitors for node.exe or go.exe spawning unexpected child processes like shells or download utilities (e.g., curl, powershell) and the presence of specific malicious package names in command lines.
Detects a Python loader process spawned by VS Code or Node.js environments that exhibits suspicious network activity indicative of fetching the InvisibleFerret infostealer, correlated with the installation of Python dependencies via 'pip' within a 10-minute window. This behavior is associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' campaign.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns where VS Code (code.exe) spawns interpreter processes (node.exe, python.exe) followed by network connections to known staging infrastructure (e.g., jsonkeeper.com, vercel.app). This behavior is characteristic of the 'Contagious Interview' campaign attributed to the Lazarus Group, used to deploy BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware following social engineering lures.
This rule detects the execution of specific malicious npm packages (jsonwebauth, fake-font) and associated script files (lserver.js, errorHandler.js) linked to Lazarus Group activity. It monitors node.exe processes for suspicious command lines, child processes originating from associated directories, and npm installation activities involving these packages.
Detects the installation of known malicious npm packages designed to impersonate the legitimate 'rollup-plugin-polyfill-node' dependency. This pattern is associated with Lazarus Group supply chain attacks targeting developer environments and CI/CD pipelines.
Detects Visual Studio Code or Cursor IDE spawning interpreter processes like node.exe or python.exe. This behavior is indicative of a malicious .vscode/tasks.json configuration leveraging the 'runOn': 'folderOpen' feature to achieve automatic execution of code upon opening a workspace, a technique associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' campaign.
Detects rapid post-exploitation activity where a developer's workstation, upon executing VS Code (Code.exe), initiates outbound network connections to major cloud service or CI/CD provider APIs (GitHub, AWS, Azure, GCP) within 60 minutes. This behavior is indicative of the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' campaign, where stolen credentials from developer environments are used to pivot into cloud infrastructure or CI/CD pipelines.
Identifies Node.js or Python processes attempting to download configuration-like files (e.g., .env, .env.example) from GitHub's raw content domain. This pattern is characteristic of the second-stage payload delivery in the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo campaign.
Detects the creation or modification of VS Code tasks.json files outside of normal IDE or version control operations. Threat actors, such as North Korean groups, are weaponizing the "runOn: folderOpen" feature in tasks.json for auto-execution when a cloned repository is opened.
Detects Graph API or SharePoint activity interacting with specific lists or a site GUID used by the jupyter-powerdev backdoor for Command and Control (C2) operations. This activity is indicative of the jupyter-powerdev malware leveraging SharePoint as a C2 channel.
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
Detects the creation or modification of files with specific names known to be associated with Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. This rule identifies potential APT activity by monitoring for the presence of these highly suspicious file names on endpoints.
Detects the creation or modification of files with specific names known to be associated with Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. This rule identifies potential APT activity by monitoring for the presence of these highly suspicious file names on endpoints.
Detects DNS queries for domains that match the pattern used by the PLASMAGRID malware's Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA). This malware, delivered by the Coruna iOS exploit kit, uses a DGA seeded with "lazarus" to generate 15-character domains with a ".xyz" TLD for command and control fallback.
Identifies Node.js or Python processes attempting to download configuration-like files (e.g., .env, .env.example) from GitHub's raw content domain. This pattern is characteristic of the second-stage payload delivery in the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo campaign.
Detects the modification or deletion of specific JavaScript or Python files shortly after a Node.js or Python interpreter starts. This behavior is characteristic of the 'self-patching' and 'evidence removal' techniques used by the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo malware.
Detects the creation of a 'startup.js' file in specific, non-standard subdirectories used by the Lazarus Group's 'Graphalgo' campaign to stage malicious payloads. These paths mimic legitimate application folders to evade detection.
Page 2 of 5