Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
48 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
31
14
2
1
Contributors
21
14
8
4
1
Categories
21
15
12
9
5
Platforms
48
2
2
Products / Services
18
14
9
5
4
MITRE Techniques
18,115
15,635
12,576
8,388
6,215
CVEs
1
The following analytic detects the execution of JScript using the cscript.exe process.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry.
This behavior is significant because JScript files are typically executed by wscript.exe, making cscript.exe execution unusual and potentially indicative of malicious activity, such as the FIN7 group's tactics.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts, leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry.
This behavior is significant because JScript files are typically executed by wscript.exe, making cscript.exe execution unusual and potentially indicative of malicious activity, such as the FIN7 group's tactics.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts, leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the execution of an XSL script using the WMIC process, which is often indicative of malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving WMIC and XSL files. This behavior is significant as it has been associated with the FIN7 group, known for using this technique to execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious actions within the environment.
Detects msiexec.exe spawned from explorer.exe, consistent with a user double-clicking a malicious .lnk shortcut, where the command line triggers the installation of an MSI package hosted on a remote HTTP/HTTPS server. This behavior is a known initial access technique used by FIN7 to deliver malicious payloads.
This rule detects instances where Microsoft Word (winword.exe) or Microsoft Excel (excel.exe) initiate a PowerShell (powershell.exe) process containing command-line arguments typical of downloader stagers, such as 'IEX', 'DownloadString', or hidden execution flags. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based delivery of malware, frequently observed in campaigns associated with FIN7/Carbanak and other threat actors utilizing Cobalt Strike or similar offensive frameworks.
Detects the transfer of executable or script files to remote administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) between hosts, a behavior frequently observed in SystemBC staging operations and lateral movement activities associated with ransomware actors.
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
Detects the installation of new shim databases that attempt to patch sections of known processes for potential process injection or persistence. This rule specifically looks for modifications to the AppCompatFlags\Custom registry key where shims are typically registered, targeting common system processes.
Detects the installation of a new shim database where the file is located in a non-default location. This can be an indicator of persistence or privilege escalation attempts using application shimming.
The following analytic detects a non-Chrome process accessing files in the Chrome user default folder. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify unauthorized access attempts. This activity is significant because the Chrome default folder contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information, often associated with RATs, trojans, and advanced persistent threats like FIN7. Such access could lead to data theft and further compromise of the affected system.
Detects the use of curl.exe to download files from known file-sharing or code-hosting domains. This activity is often associated with adversaries staging or retrieving malicious tools and scripts. The rule specifically looks for curl.exe executing with command-line arguments indicating a download operation ('-O', '--remote-name', '--output') from a list of suspicious domains, and targeting common executable or script file extensions.
Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from known file-sharing domains using `wget.exe`. This rule looks for `wget.exe` execution where the command line includes common file-sharing or code-hosting domains, an HTTP/HTTPS URL, and flags indicating an output file (e.g., `-O` or `--output-document`). It also specifically looks for downloads of common executable or script file extensions, such as `.exe`, `.dll`, `.ps1`, `.bat`, `.vbs`, `.hta`, and `.msi`.
This detection identifies the installation of developer-signed MSIX packages that lack Microsoft Store signatures. All malicious MSIX packages observed in recent threat campaigns (including those from FIN7, Zloader/Storm-0569, and FakeBat/Storm-1113) were developer-signed rather than Microsoft Store signed. Microsoft Store apps have specific publisher IDs containing '8wekyb3d8bbwe' or 'cw5n1h2txyewy', while developer-signed packages lack these identifiers. This detection focuses on EventID 855 from the Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server/Operational logs, which indicates a completed package installation.
This hunting query detects user interactions with MSIX packages by monitoring EventCode 171 in the Microsoft-Windows-AppXPackaging/Operational logs. These events are generated when a user clicks on or attempts to interact with an MSIX package, even if the package is not fully installed. This information can be valuable for security teams to identify what MSIX packages users are attempting to open in their environment, which may help detect malicious MSIX packages before they're fully installed. Monitoring these interactions can provide early warning of potential MSIX package abuse, which has been leveraged by threat actors such as FIN7, Zloader (Storm-0569), and FakeBat (Storm-1113).
Detects PowerShell script file creation with specific name or suffix which was seen being used often by FIN7 PowerShell scripts
Detects execution of renamed paexec via imphash and executable product string
Detects specific command line execution used by FIN7 as reported by WithSecureLabs for reconnaissance and POWERTRASH execution
Detects execution of the POWERHOLD script seen used by FIN7 as reported by WithSecureLabs
Detects potential execution of the PowerShell script POWERTRASH
Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
Page 1 of 3