Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects specific command line execution used by FIN7 as reported by WithSecureLabs for reconnaissance and POWERTRASH execution
Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
This rule detects suspicious process creation patterns that may indicate FIN7 exploitation activity. Specifically, it looks for `cmd.exe` being spawned by `notepad++.exe` or `notepad++.exe` being spawned by `rdpinit.exe`. These process relationships are indicative of potential post-exploitation actions after initial access, possibly via compromised RDP credentials as described in the referenced Google blog.
The following analytic identifies instances where `ipconfig.exe`, `systeminfo.exe`, or similar tools are executed by a non-standard shell parent process, excluding CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to monitor process creation events. Such behavior is significant as it may indicate adversaries using injected processes to perform system discovery, a tactic observed in FIN7's JSSLoader. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gather critical host information, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of an XSL script using the WMIC process, which is often indicative of malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving WMIC and XSL files. This behavior is significant as it has been associated with the FIN7 group, known for using this technique to execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious actions within the environment.
This analytic detects excessive usage of the nslookup application, which may indicate potential DNS exfiltration attempts. It monitors process executions, specifically focusing on nslookup.exe, and identifies outliers by comparing the frequency of nslookup executions against a calculated threshold. This activity is significant as it can reveal attempts by malware or APT groups to exfiltrate data via DNS queries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to stealthily transfer sensitive information out of the network, bypassing traditional data exfiltration defenses.
This analytic identifies the execution of the "whoami" command with the "/group" flag, where the results are passed to the "find" command to look for the string "12288". This string represents the SID of the group "Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level", effectively checking if the current process is running as a "High" integrity process or with Administrator privileges. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by attackers, such as FIN7, to perform reconnaissance on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker is assessing their privilege level, potentially leading to further privilege escalation or persistence within the environment.
This analytic detects when Microsoft scripting processes, specifically wscript.exe or cscript.exe, load dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This activity is identified using Sysmon EventCode 7. The loading of WMI modules by scripting engines can be indicative of malicious behavior, such as that observed in FIN7 implant campaigns, where JavaScript is used to execute WMI queries for host information gathering and subsequent exfiltration to a command and control server. Successful exploitation could lead to system information collection and persistence within the environment.
This analytic detects Microsoft Office applications dropping or creating executables or scripts on a Windows OS. It leverages process creation and file system events from the Endpoint data model to identify Office applications like Word or Excel generating files with extensions such as ".exe", ".dll", or ".ps1". This behavior is significant as it is often associated with spear-phishing attacks where malicious files are dropped to compromise the host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
This analytic detects the execution of Microsoft scripting processes (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) when they load LDAP-related modules (Wldap32.dll, adsldp.dll, adsldpc.dll). This activity is identified using Sysmon EventCode 7, which logs module loads. Such behavior can indicate an attempt to query LDAP for host information, a technique observed in implants used by threat groups like FIN7. If malicious, this could lead to attackers gathering Active Directory information for further exploitation or data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of JScript using the cscript.exe process. This behavior is significant because JScript files are typically executed by wscript.exe, making cscript.exe execution unusual and potentially indicative of malicious activity, such as the FIN7 group's tactics. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary scripts, leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Detects the creation of specific files within the SysAidServer Tomcat webapps directory, which are indicators associated with the Lace Tempest threat group (also known as FIN7). The rule looks for specific filenames and suffixes that have been observed in attacks involving PowerShell scripts by this group.
This rule detects the use of 'curl.exe' to download files from an IP address directly specified in the command line. It specifically looks for curl.exe execution, a command line containing an IP address pattern, the 'http' protocol, and common download flags such as '-O', '--remote-name', or '--output'. This activity is often associated with adversaries transferring tools or malware onto a compromised system.
Detects potentially suspicious SQL queries executed via sqlcmd.exe targeting Veeam backup databases. The rule specifically looks for commands that attempt to query sensitive tables such as BackupRepositories, Backups, Credentials, HostCreds, SmbFileShares, Ssh_creds, and VSphereInfo, which could indicate an attempt to steal information from the Veeam backup infrastructure.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell script known as POWERHOLD, which has been attributed to the FIN7 threat group. The rule specifically looks for the presence of '$env:APPDATA', 'function MainPayload', '::WriteAllBytes', and 'wscript.exe' within the PowerShell script block text, indicating the execution of this specific malicious script.
This rule detects the potential execution of the POWERTRASH PowerShell script by looking for a specific combination of strings within the PowerShell script block text. These strings include .NET framework components related to compression (IO.Compression.DeflateStream), memory manipulation (IO.MemoryStream), base64 decoding (::FromBase64String), and reflection/code execution (GetDelegateForFunctionPointer, .Invoke(), GlobalAssemblyCache). The presence of these indicators together suggests a highly obfuscated or advanced PowerShell script, often used for malicious purposes like in-memory execution or bypassing detection.
This rule detects the creation of PowerShell script files with specific filenames or suffixes that have been observed in campaigns attributed to the FIN7 threat group. Specifically, it looks for files ending with '_64refl.ps1' or named 'host_ip.ps1'. These patterns are indicative of PowerShell scripts used by FIN7 for various malicious activities, including execution and potentially reflective loading.
This rule detects specific command-line patterns associated with FIN7's reconnaissance and POWERTRASH execution, as reported by WithSecureLabs. It looks for PowerShell commands that include '-noni -nop -exe bypass -f \\' and 'ADMIN$' or '-ex bypass -noprof -nolog -nonint -f' and 'C:\Windows\Temp\'. These patterns indicate attempts to execute PowerShell scripts, potentially for remote access or privilege escalation, often targeting administrative shares or temporary directories.
Detects the execution of ADRecon.ps1, a PowerShell script used for Active Directory reconnaissance. The rule identifies specific function names and a default report filename commonly found within the ADRecon script. This tool has been reported to be actively used by the FIN7 threat group.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell scripts where the script path explicitly includes or references the "C:\Users\Public" directory. This directory is often used by adversaries to store and execute malicious scripts due to its default write permissions for all users, making it a common location for staging and executing payloads.
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