Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
27 detections
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Detects command-line activity indicative of DNS tunneling, often used by OilRig (APT34) for C2 communication via BONDUPDATER. The rule monitors PowerShell or nslookup commands executing DNS TXT record queries paired with long, base64-encoded subdomains, a technique used for exfiltrating data or receiving commands.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the OilRig threat group's BONDUPDATER/ALMA Communicator malware. It identifies suspicious, highly regular DNS TXT record queries (QueryType 16) originating from common system tools like nslookup.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe. The detection logic calculates the statistical regularity of query intervals to identify automated beaconing patterns, which is a hallmark of C2 communication using DNS tunneling or data exfiltration via DNS.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the OilRig threat group's BONDUPDATER/ALMA Communicator malware. It identifies suspicious, highly regular DNS TXT record queries (QueryType 16) originating from common system tools like nslookup.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe. The detection logic calculates the statistical regularity of query intervals to identify automated beaconing patterns, which is a hallmark of C2 communication using DNS tunneling or data exfiltration via DNS.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the OilRig threat group's BONDUPDATER/ALMA Communicator malware. It identifies suspicious, highly regular DNS TXT record queries (QueryType 16) originating from common system tools like nslookup.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe. The detection logic calculates the statistical regularity of query intervals to identify automated beaconing patterns, which is a hallmark of C2 communication using DNS tunneling or data exfiltration via DNS.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks originating from processes executing out of temporary or download directories. This behavior aligns with the persistence mechanisms of the SilverGorilla .NET dropper, which is typically delivered via recruitment-themed phishing archives.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks with specific names ('SC Scheduled Scan' or 'UpdatMachine') that have been associated with the OilRig APT group for persistence, as reported by Nyotron in March 2018.
This rule detects activity associated with the OilRig APT group, as detailed in Nyotron's March 2018 report. Specifically, it looks for the creation of a scheduled task named 'SC Scheduled Scan' that executes 'autoit3.exe' from a specific path, execution of executables within a '
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
Detects the creation of specific Windows services ('SC Scheduled Scan' or 'UpdatMachine') that have been associated with the OilRig APT group for persistence, as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report. This rule monitors EventID 7045 from the 'Service Control Manager' provider.
Detects registry persistence used by the OilRig APT group, specifically looking for modifications to the 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UMe' or 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UT' registry keys. This activity was reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report.
Detects a suspicious Microsoft certutil execution with sub commands like 'decode' sub command, which is sometimes used to decode malicious code
Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Detects a suspicious Microsoft certutil execution with sub commands like 'decode' sub command, which is sometimes used to decode malicious code
OilRig APT Activity
Sigma
Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
OilRig APT Activity
Sigma
Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
'Identifies a match across various data feeds for hashes and IP IOC related to Europium
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government'
Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Detects tools and process executions used by Greenbug in their May 2020 campaign as reported by Symantec
' The query below identifies creation of unusual identity by the Europium actor to mimic Microsoft Exchange Health Manager Service account using Exchange PowerShell commands
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/'
This query looks for identity add through exchange PowerShell
Detects OilRig registry persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Detects tools and process executions used by Greenbug in their May 2020 campaign as reported by Symantec
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