Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
52 detections
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This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
Detects credential-phishing attempts originating from Proton Mail addresses that result in a user clicking on a link. The rule correlates email delivery from known Proton Mail domains with subsequent URL click events to identify potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity, often associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) threat group.
Detects a multi-stage phishing pattern attributed to Star Blizzard (also known as Callisto Group or COLDRIVER). The attack involves an initial email containing no attachments to establish trust or initiate a thread, followed by a subsequent reply-thread email containing both an archive file (ZIP/RAR) and an image file. This technique is designed to bypass email security scanners by hiding the archive password within the image attachment or obscuring the malicious payload context.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where a file (in this case, a PDF) is downloaded using curl via conhost, followed shortly by a PowerShell command that searches the file for a specific marker ("cAB") and decodes/executes embedded Base64 content. This pattern aligns with known TTPs observed in Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaigns.
Detects the mounting of VHDX files via disk imaging tools or PowerShell, followed shortly (within 15 minutes) by the execution of a shell process with hidden window flags. This behavioral pattern is associated with the delivery of malicious payloads, such as those observed in Star Blizzard's RedFlick delivery chain for CosmicPulse.
Detects the creation of specific decoy scheduled tasks ('Internet Quality Test Connection', 'Network Configuration Manager', 'System Health Monitor') identified as part of the Star Blizzard actor's CosmicPulse delivery mechanism. The rule monitors for the creation of these tasks via schtasks.exe or system events, specifically when the task configuration references execution via rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, control.exe, or remote/UNC-based payloads.
Detects the startup or configuration of the WebClient service, commonly associated with WebDAV redirection, followed within 15 minutes by a process (e.g., control.exe, rundll32.exe, svchost.exe) interacting with a WebDAV-style UNC path. This behavioral pattern is indicative of attackers, such as the Star Blizzard group, abusing built-in Windows functionality to facilitate credential theft or remote file execution via malicious WebDAV shares.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
Detects the modification or creation of the registry key '.mollis' within Software\Classes, which is used by the Star Blizzard (RedFlick) CPL downloader to store an encrypted AES key. This activity is performed by common Windows processes such as control.exe, rundll32.exe, or regsvr32.exe.
Detects the modification or creation of the registry key '.mollis' within Software\Classes, which is used by the Star Blizzard (RedFlick) CPL downloader to store an encrypted AES key. This activity is performed by common Windows processes such as control.exe, rundll32.exe, or regsvr32.exe.
Detects phishing emails themed around Atlantic Council invitations that contain links attempting to lure users into installing iOS configuration profiles, often associated with malicious backdoors like DarkSword, attributed to the Star Blizzard (G1033) threat group.
Detects a specific multi-stage infection chain associated with Star Blizzard. The sequence begins with a command shell launched under conhost.exe executing SSH with PermitLocalCommand enabled, followed by the execution of a control panel (.cpl) file via control.exe within a two-hour window.
Detects the execution of a Control Panel (.cpl) item using control.exe or rundll32.exe. The rule specifically looks for CPL files that were recently written to suspicious directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads) and correlates this execution with subsequent suspicious behaviors, such as spawning Python processes, outbound network connections, or registry modifications consistent with key storage or payload persistence.
Detects credential-phishing attempts originating from Proton Mail addresses that result in a user clicking on a link. The rule correlates email delivery from known Proton Mail domains with subsequent URL click events to identify potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity, often associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) threat group.
Detects a multi-stage phishing pattern attributed to Star Blizzard (also known as Callisto Group or COLDRIVER). The attack involves an initial email containing no attachments to establish trust or initiate a thread, followed by a subsequent reply-thread email containing both an archive file (ZIP/RAR) and an image file. This technique is designed to bypass email security scanners by hiding the archive password within the image attachment or obscuring the malicious payload context.
COLDRIVER ROBOT chain - DNS lookup for TI delivery/C2 domains
Detects COLDDRIVER malware loading specific malicious DLLs (machinerie.dll, checkme.dll, iamnotarobot.dll) via rundll32.exe, or the loading of specific malicious DLLs identified by their SHA256 hashes.
This rule detects the execution of 'rundll32.exe' with suspicious DLL names in the command line, specifically 'machinerie.dll', 'checkme.dll', or 'iamnotarobot.dll'. Additionally, it identifies the loading of specific malicious DLLs by their SHA256 hashes, which have been associated with ColdRiver (Star Blizzard) activity. This behavior is indicative of potential malware execution or persistence mechanisms.
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