Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

24 detections

Detects execution of a specific suspicious executable file masquerading in the Windows Temp directory, coupled with the access of an associated .ini configuration file. This behavior is indicative of AsyncRAT deployment, often involving initial execution or staging of configuration files within volatile user directories.
avatar
Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
107
Detects execution of a specific suspicious executable file masquerading in the Windows Temp directory, coupled with the access of an associated .ini configuration file. This behavior is indicative of AsyncRAT deployment, often involving initial execution or staging of configuration files within volatile user directories.
avatar
Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
101
This rule detects the execution of processes where the original file name contains 'autoit' but the current file name does not, which can indicate obfuscation or malicious use of AutoIt scripts.
avatar
F S@Fsdr
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
3010
Detects the execution of the SPECTRALVIPER binary or script, a core backdoor component in the Miasma toolkit used for persistent remote access and command execution. This rule specifically looks for process creation events where the filename or command line contains 'spectralviper'.
avatar
Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
avatar
Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects the execution of AutoIt3.exe (or renamed versions) from non-standard paths or with suspicious script extensions, which is indicative of CastleLoader activity. This rule specifically looks for AutoIt interpreter execution, including renamed files with .pif or .com extensions, originating from common temporary or user-writable directories like AppData or Temp, and executing suspicious script file extensions such as .a3x, .t, or .vstm, or very short command lines.
avatar
Ethan Andrews@eandrews
avatar
Federal Signal Detections
8 months ago
2040
This rule detects various stages of the CastleLoader malware activity, including C2 communication, process hollowing using AutoIt and jsc.exe, and known malware hashes. It correlates network traffic to a specific C2 server, identifies suspicious process creation patterns where AutoIt launches jsc.exe, and sweeps for known SHA256 hashes associated with CastleLoader.
avatar
Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
avatar
Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
1076
Matches published CastleLoader stage hashes from ANY.RUN analysis.
avatar
Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
avatar
Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
2041
Sleeper-style JSP backdoor: 403.jsp or similar with Runtime.getRuntime().exec or ProcessBuilder
avatar
Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
avatar
Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
0022
Detects outbound network connections to the OpenAI API from unusual processes, a TTP used by the SesameOp backdoor for command and control (C2).
avatar
Tim Peck@timpeck
avatar
Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
300143
This rule detects activity associated with the OilRig APT group, as detailed in Nyotron's March 2018 report. Specifically, it looks for the creation of a scheduled task named 'SC Scheduled Scan' that executes 'autoit3.exe' from a specific path, execution of executables within a '
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0026
KQL Query
avatar
Steven Lim@KQLWizard
avatar
SlimKQL
1 year ago
3168
This YARA rule detects the ResolverRAT backdoor by identifying specific bytecode patterns related to its execution, mixed executor functions, and network communication (write connection and read sorter enumerator functions). The rule looks for a combination of these distinct bytecode sequences within a file, indicating the presence of the ResolverRAT malware.
ReversingLabs Yara@ReversingLabsYara
avatar
ReversingLabs Yara
1 year ago
0035
KQL Query from file: CVSS 9.8 Rockwell Automation Impacted by High-Severity log4net Vulnerability
avatar
Steven Lim@KQLWizard
avatar
SlimKQL
1 year ago
2025
'Detects potentially malicious Visual Studio Code (VSCode) extensions installed on a users system, which threat actors might use to control devices and exfiltrate personal information.
Ref: https://blog.checkpoint.com/securing-the-cloud/malicious-vscode-extensions-with-more-than-45k-downloads-steal-pii-and-enable-backdoors/'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
avatar
AzureSentinel
1 year ago
20132
'This composite hunting query will highlight any HTTP traffic in CommonSecurityLog web proxies (such as ZScaler) that match known patterns used by red teaming tools potentially stolen from FireEye. Most FireEye red teaming tools are designed to mimic
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
avatar
AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0029
Backdoor processes associated with OceanLotus Mac malware backdoor dropper.
References:.
Https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/.
OS Platforms: Macintosh.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
avatar
AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0024
Jupyter, otherwise known as SolarMarker, is a malware family and cluster of components known for its info-stealing and backdoor capabilities that mainly proliferates through search engine optimization manipulation and malicious advertising in order to successfully encourage users to download malicious templates and documents. This malware has been popular since 2020 and currently is still active as of 2021.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
avatar
AzureSentinel
1 year ago
3017
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Motivated miners.
Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available.
The following query detects possible DoublePulsar execution events.
See Detect web server exploitation by DoublePulsar for a query that detects behaviors associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
avatar
AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0016
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Windows 7 zero-day for CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by finding suspicious file creation events associated with Nufsys.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
avatar
AzureSentinel
1 year ago
008
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Windows 7 zero-day for CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by reporting network communication associated with the Nufsys attacks.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
avatar
AzureSentinel
1 year ago
008
Detects the execution of a renamed AutoIt2.exe or AutoIt3.exe. AutoIt is a scripting language and automation tool for Windows systems. While primarily used for legitimate automation tasks, it can be misused in cyber attacks. Attackers can leverage AutoIt to create and distribute malware, including keyloggers, spyware, and botnets. A renamed AutoIt executable is particularly suspicious.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1027
Page 1 of 2