Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
23 detections
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Detects lateral movement via PsExec (PSEXESVC) followed by mass file encryption/rename activities and the creation of ransom note files, characteristic of Wizard Spider's deployment of Conti ransomware.
Detects the creation of processes with command-line arguments containing keywords associated with Conti ransomware, such as 'conti', 'conti-drop', or 'conti-payload'. This rule monitors Windows Security Event ID 4688, which logs process creation.
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
Detects the creation of processes with command-line arguments containing keywords associated with Conti ransomware, such as 'conti', 'conti-drop', or 'conti-payload'. This rule monitors Windows Security Event ID 4688, which logs process creation.
The following analytic detects the execution of suspicious command-line arguments commonly associated with Conti ransomware, specifically targeting local drives and network shares for encryption. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential ransomware attack, which can lead to widespread data encryption and operational disruption. If confirmed malicious, the impact could be severe, resulting in data loss, system downtime, and potential ransom demands.
Instead of running several queries separately, you can also use a comprehensive query that checks for multiple signs of ransomware activity to identify affected devices. The following consolidated query:
Looks for both relatively concrete and subtle signs of ransomware activity
Weighs the presence of these signs
Identifies devices with a higher chance of being targets of ransomware
When run, this consolidated query returns a list of devices that have exhibited multiple signs of attack. The count of each type of ransomware activity is also shown.
Looks for both relatively concrete and subtle signs of ransomware activity
Weighs the presence of these signs
Identifies devices with a higher chance of being targets of ransomware
When run, this consolidated query returns a list of devices that have exhibited multiple signs of attack. The count of each type of ransomware activity is also shown.
Detects a specific command used by the Conti ransomware group
Detects a specific command used by the Conti ransomware group
This rule detects the successful installation of the Atera Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) agent by looking for specific Event ID 1033 from the MsiInstaller provider, where the message content includes 'AteraAgent'. This activity has been associated with threat actors, specifically Conti operators, using the Atera agent for command and control.
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place. The rule specifically looks for signatures containing common ransomware family names and keywords.
This rule detects the execution of 'esentutl' with the '/p' parameter. This command-line utility is used for database utilities, and its use with '/p' (repair mode) can be leveraged by adversaries to access or repair Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) databases, including the NTDS.dit file which contains Active Directory credential information. This technique has been observed in use by threat actors like Conti ransomware and Trickbot to gather credentials or other sensitive information from compromised systems.
This analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell script block logs (EventCode 4104) containing the string "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*". This activity is significant because adversaries and malware, such as Conti ransomware, commonly use COM object creation via PowerShell for purposes like privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). Successful exploitation of this technique could lead to elevated privileges or persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
This analytic detects the execution of the rundll32.exe command with the user32.dll,LockWorkStation parameter. This specific command is used to lock the workstation via the command line, which is an uncommon method. This activity has been observed in CONTI ransomware tooling for defense evasion purposes. If confirmed malicious, this technique could indicate an attempt to evade detection and hinder incident response efforts.
This rule detects when the 'RstrtMgr.dll' (Restart Manager) library is loaded by a process that is not part of the common legitimate Windows processes or typical software installation paths. Adversaries, particularly ransomware and wiper malware, have been observed using this DLL to terminate processes that might interfere with their operations, such as file encryption or data destruction. This can include killing processes that lock files, preventing encryption, or for anti-analysis purposes.
Detects the loading of the Windows Restart Manager (RstrtMgr.dll) by a process executing from a suspicious directory. This DLL has been observed in ransomware campaigns (e.g., Conti, Cactus) and wipers (e.g., BiBi) to terminate processes that might lock files, facilitating encryption or data destruction. It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes.
Detects the execution of `sqlcmd.exe` with command-line arguments indicative of database enumeration or backup activities, specifically targeting common system databases and processes. This pattern has been associated with Conti ransomware for dumping database contents.
Detects the execution of the Rclone utility, which is often used by ransomware strains like REvil, Conti, and FiveHands for data exfiltration to cloud storage services. The rule looks for specific command-line arguments and image names associated with Rclone.
Detects a command used by the Conti ransomware group to list volume shadow copies and redirect the output to a log file. This activity is often a precursor to deleting shadow copies to prevent system recovery.
Detects a command line pattern used by the Conti ransomware group to archive and stage the NTDS.dit database for exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for the execution of '7za.exe' (7-Zip archiver) with a command line that includes '\C$\temp\log.zip', indicating the creation of a zip archive in a temporary location, a common step before exfiltration.
Detects specific command-line arguments used by the Conti ransomware during its execution phase. The rule looks for a combination of arguments including '-m ', '-net ', '-size ', '-nomutex ', and '-p \\', which are characteristic of Conti's encryption process. This pattern indicates the ransomware is likely attempting to encrypt files on the system or network shares.
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