Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
33 detections
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Detects the self-deletion pattern used by the Supper backdoor, which involves a specific 'ping' command delay structure followed by a 'Del /f /q' command to remove itself from disk after execution. This pattern has been associated with Interlock and Rhysida ransomware.
Detects network traffic associated with the Meow backdoor's beaconing activity. Specifically, it looks for outbound network connections on port 666 initiated by 'rundll32.exe'. This pattern is indicative of malware using a common system utility to establish command and control communications.
Detects the execution of the SPECTRALVIPER binary or script, a core backdoor component in the Miasma toolkit used for persistent remote access and command execution. This rule specifically looks for process creation events where the filename or command line contains 'spectralviper'.
Keenadu Backdoor
YARA
Matches published Keenadu-related MD5 hashes from the report.
Sleeper-style JSP backdoor: 403.jsp or similar with Runtime.getRuntime().exec or ProcessBuilder
This rule detects activity related to the Chrysalis Backdoor, which is associated with the Lotus Blossom threat group. It identifies malicious activity through three main components: 1. File and process events matching a list of known malicious SHA256 hashes. 2. Network connections to known malicious IP addresses or domains. 3. Suspicious execution of 'svchost.exe' from non-standard Windows directories with specific command-line arguments, indicating potential masquerading or malicious execution.
Chrysalis Backdoor SHA256 Hash Detection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the presence or execution of the Chrysalis Backdoor by matching known SHA256 hashes of its components. It monitors file and process events for these specific hashes.
Detects outbound network connections to the OpenAI API from unusual processes, a TTP used by the SesameOp backdoor for command and control (C2).
Detects post-exploitation execution technique of the Serpent backdoor. This involves creating a temporary scheduled task using an unusual method: creating a fictitious Windows event and a trigger that executes a payload once the event is created. The detection specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of this behavior when executed by cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
This YARA rule detects the Veaty backdoor by identifying specific bytecode patterns related to fetching commands, reading mailbox folders, and adding inbox rules. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns within a file that also has a valid MS-DOS executable header (MZ header).
This YARA rule detects the ResolverRAT backdoor by identifying specific bytecode patterns related to its execution, mixed executor functions, and network communication (write connection and read sorter enumerator functions). The rule looks for a combination of these distinct bytecode sequences within a file, indicating the presence of the ResolverRAT malware.
'Detects potentially malicious Visual Studio Code (VSCode) extensions installed on a users system, which threat actors might use to control devices and exfiltrate personal information.
Ref: https://blog.checkpoint.com/securing-the-cloud/malicious-vscode-extensions-with-more-than-45k-downloads-steal-pii-and-enable-backdoors/'
Ref: https://blog.checkpoint.com/securing-the-cloud/malicious-vscode-extensions-with-more-than-45k-downloads-steal-pii-and-enable-backdoors/'
'This composite hunting query will highlight any HTTP traffic in CommonSecurityLog web proxies (such as ZScaler) that match known patterns used by red teaming tools potentially stolen from FireEye. Most FireEye red teaming tools are designed to mimic
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
Backdoor processes associated with OceanLotus Mac Malware Backdoor.
References:.
Https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/.
OS platforms: Macintosh.
References:.
Https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/.
OS platforms: Macintosh.
Backdoor processes associated with OceanLotus Mac malware backdoor dropper.
References:.
Https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/.
OS Platforms: Macintosh.
References:.
Https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/.
OS Platforms: Macintosh.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, ShadowHammer supply chain attack
Operation ShadowHammer was an attack against ASUS computer hardware, using the company's own update infrastructure to deliver malware to the company's products. The campaign ran from June to November, 2018. ASUS has since responded with updates that protect their Live Update system, and diagnostic tools to check affected systems.
The following query checks for activity associated with the ShadowHammer implant or container over the past 30 days.
References:
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pan9wn/hackers-hijacked-asus-software-updates-to-install-backdoors-on-thousands-of-computers
https://www.asus.com/News/hqfgVUyZ6uyAyJe1
Operation ShadowHammer was an attack against ASUS computer hardware, using the company's own update infrastructure to deliver malware to the company's products. The campaign ran from June to November, 2018. ASUS has since responded with updates that protect their Live Update system, and diagnostic tools to check affected systems.
The following query checks for activity associated with the ShadowHammer implant or container over the past 30 days.
References:
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pan9wn/hackers-hijacked-asus-software-updates-to-install-backdoors-on-thousands-of-computers
https://www.asus.com/News/hqfgVUyZ6uyAyJe1
Jupyter, otherwise known as SolarMarker, is a malware family and cluster of components known for its info-stealing and backdoor capabilities that mainly proliferates through search engine optimization manipulation and malicious advertising in order to successfully encourage users to download malicious templates and documents. This malware has been popular since 2020 and currently is still active as of 2021.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Motivated miners.
Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available.
The following query detects possible DoublePulsar execution events.
See Detect web server exploitation by DoublePulsar for a query that detects behaviors associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title
Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available.
The following query detects possible DoublePulsar execution events.
See Detect web server exploitation by DoublePulsar for a query that detects behaviors associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Windows 7 zero-day for CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by finding suspicious file creation events associated with Nufsys.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by finding suspicious file creation events associated with Nufsys.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Windows 7 zero-day for CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by reporting network communication associated with the Nufsys attacks.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by reporting network communication associated with the Nufsys attacks.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
This YARA rule detects the Linux AutoColor backdoor by identifying specific byte patterns related to its core functionalities. These functionalities include installing library implants, self-deletion mechanisms, executing local files, and network proxy communication. The rule specifically targets ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) files, indicating it's designed for Linux executables.
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