Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
63 detections
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Detects the execution of the rclone.exe utility with copy, sync, move, or copyto command-line arguments, correlated with outbound network connections to Wasabi S3 or MEGA cloud storage domains.
Detects the sequential relationship of data staging using tools like WinRAR and subsequent exfiltration using tools like Rclone, WinSCP, or FileZilla on a single host within a 24-hour window.
Detects the execution of known cloud synchronization utilities like rclone, megasync, or megacmd, which are frequently leveraged by ransomware operators to exfiltrate data to public cloud storage providers. The rule monitors both local process execution with typical command-line arguments and subsequent outbound network connections to common cloud storage domains.
Detects the use of legitimate data transfer utilities (s5cmd, rclone) configured to exfiltrate sensitive document types (.doc, .pdf, .sql, etc.) to S3-compatible cloud storage. The rule correlates this activity with recent access to files containing sensitive credentials or configuration data, a pattern observed in double-extortion campaigns.
This detection identifies execution of the file synchronization utility "rclone".
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs, specifically flow data in order to capture process executions
initiating network connections.
While rclone is a legitimate command-line tool for syncing data to cloud storage providers, it has been widely abused by threat actors for data exfiltration.
This analytic inspects process name and arguments for rclone and flags usage of suspicious flags.
If matched, this could indicate malicious usage for stealthy data exfiltration or cloud abuse.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs, specifically flow data in order to capture process executions
initiating network connections.
While rclone is a legitimate command-line tool for syncing data to cloud storage providers, it has been widely abused by threat actors for data exfiltration.
This analytic inspects process name and arguments for rclone and flags usage of suspicious flags.
If matched, this could indicate malicious usage for stealthy data exfiltration or cloud abuse.
Detects the use of cloud synchronization utilities such as rclone (including renamed binaries) or Mega command-line tools to interact with cloud storage services. The rule correlates this execution with preceding mass file enumeration or access activity on the same host, which is a common pattern in ransomware double-extortion scenarios.
Detects the execution of rclone.exe or a renamed rclone binary using common command-line arguments (copy, sync, config, --progress). Rclone is a popular tool for ransomware double-extortion, as it allows attackers to exfiltrate data to various cloud storage providers while blending into legitimate network traffic.
Detects usage of the Rclone utility (or renamed binaries) to transfer data to various cloud storage backends (S3, Mega, pCloud, SFTP, WebDAV). The detection correlates this activity with the execution of common archival tools (7-Zip, WinRAR, TAR) within one hour prior to the data transfer, which is a common behavior of adversaries preparing data for exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of common command-line cloud synchronization and file transfer utilities (such as rclone, rsync, and MEGAcmd) when invoked with flags or patterns indicative of data staging or exfiltration, such as copy, sync, or targeting remote cloud storage locations.
Detects the execution of rclone.exe or renamed binaries with command-line flags indicative of data exfiltration to cloud storage providers such as S3, Mega, OneDrive, or Google Drive. This behavior is frequently associated with ransomware actors, including Akira, Qilin, and Storm-2570, who use Rclone to perform mass exfiltration of sensitive file share data prior to encryption (double extortion).
Detects network traffic indicating the use of Rclone to exfiltrate data to MEGA cloud storage, a technique associated with Akira ransomware campaigns.
Detects the initialization of cloud synchronization tools like rclone or MEGAsync, accompanied by the creation of configuration files and subsequent high-volume network activity directed toward common cloud storage providers, indicative of unauthorized data exfiltration.
Detects the use of legitimate data transfer utilities (s5cmd, rclone) configured to exfiltrate sensitive document types (.doc, .pdf, .sql, etc.) to S3-compatible cloud storage. The rule correlates this activity with recent access to files containing sensitive credentials or configuration data, a pattern observed in double-extortion campaigns.
Detects the use of legitimate data transfer utilities (s5cmd, rclone) configured to exfiltrate sensitive document types (.doc, .pdf, .sql, etc.) to S3-compatible cloud storage. The rule correlates this activity with recent access to files containing sensitive credentials or configuration data, a pattern observed in double-extortion campaigns.
Detects the execution of the rclone utility (including renamed binaries) using command-line arguments consistent with data exfiltration or synchronization (copy, sync, move) that is followed by network communication to known cloud storage providers commonly abused for staging and exfiltration in ransomware attacks.
Detects the use of legitimate data transfer utilities (s5cmd, rclone) configured to exfiltrate sensitive document types (.doc, .pdf, .sql, etc.) to S3-compatible cloud storage. The rule correlates this activity with recent access to files containing sensitive credentials or configuration data, a pattern observed in double-extortion campaigns.
Detects high-frequency S3 object upload activity (PutObject/CompleteMultipartUpload) originating from the Rclone tool, a common indicator of potential data exfiltration to cloud storage.
Detects high-frequency S3 object upload activity (PutObject/CompleteMultipartUpload) originating from the Rclone tool, a common indicator of potential data exfiltration to cloud storage.
Detects high-frequency S3 object upload activity (PutObject/CompleteMultipartUpload) originating from the Rclone tool, a common indicator of potential data exfiltration to cloud storage.
Detects high-frequency S3 object upload activity (PutObject/CompleteMultipartUpload) originating from the Rclone tool, a common indicator of potential data exfiltration to cloud storage.
Detects high-frequency S3 object upload activity (PutObject/CompleteMultipartUpload) originating from the Rclone tool, a common indicator of potential data exfiltration to cloud storage.
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