Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40 detections
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Detects bursts (3+ in 60s) of octet-stream POSTs to URI paths ending in .cs/.go/.rs, matching Mir0Auth XOR-obfuscated C2. Path must be a single short segment and the threshold is raised to cut noise from dev/API traffic.
Detects bursts (3+ in 60s) of octet-stream POSTs to URI paths ending in .cs/.go/.rs, matching Mir0Auth XOR-obfuscated C2. Path must be a single short segment and the threshold is raised to cut noise from dev/API traffic.
Detects bursts (3+ in 60s) of octet-stream POSTs to URI paths ending in .cs/.go/.rs, matching Mir0Auth XOR-obfuscated C2. Path must be a single short segment and the threshold is raised to cut noise from dev/API traffic.
Detects bursts (3+ in 60s) of octet-stream POSTs to URI paths ending in .cs/.go/.rs, matching Mir0Auth XOR-obfuscated C2. Path must be a single short segment and the threshold is raised to cut noise from dev/API traffic.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to external destinations containing a specific, hard-coded User-Agent string (firefox/21.0). This behavior is characteristic of the NeedyMantis malware family, which utilizes this string to identify its own C2 communications, and is a strong indicator of compromise.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards the suspicious domain 'corp.tripswithengine.com', which is associated with the NeedyMantis malware C2 infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with the NeedyMantis malware, specifically identifying C2 beaconing behavior. The rule looks for HTTPS GET requests to specific URI paths ('/library/zip/') with a WebSocket upgrade header and suspicious cookie patterns, as well as TLS SNI traffic targeting the hardcoded domain 'corp.tripswithengine.com'.
Detects anomalous WebSocket upgrade requests using a suspicious Firefox/21.0 User-Agent followed by a C2 buffer containing 'google.com' associated with the NeedyMantis threat actor group.
Detects network traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with the 'Max Messenger' malware's concealed telemetry and C2 channel. The rules monitor for TLS connections to this domain, including instances where the certificate subject contains 'VK LLC' and 'Moscow'.
Detects network traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with the 'Max Messenger' malware's concealed telemetry and C2 channel. The rules monitor for TLS connections to this domain, including instances where the certificate subject contains 'VK LLC' and 'Moscow'.
Detects network traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with the 'Max Messenger' malware's concealed telemetry and C2 channel. The rules monitor for TLS connections to this domain, including instances where the certificate subject contains 'VK LLC' and 'Moscow'.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
Detects network traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with the 'Max Messenger' malware's concealed telemetry and C2 channel. The rules monitor for TLS connections to this domain, including instances where the certificate subject contains 'VK LLC' and 'Moscow'.
Detects the CastleRAT intermediate loader, which acts as a secondary stage before deploying SloppyRAT. The rule identifies the malicious payload by scanning for unique embedded strings, specific user-agent strings, and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns (domains and URI paths) within executable files.
Detects DNS queries matching the pattern used by the CAV3RN C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies specific subdomains under 'cloudlanecdn.com' that follow a structured format consistent with C2 configuration recovery and heartbeat beacons, specifically looking for a hex-encoded timestamp pattern.
Detects anomalous activity in Microsoft 365 calendar events where potential C2 data is exfiltrated or synchronized. This is identified by the creation or modification of calendar events containing suspicious file names (e.g., File0.txt, File1.txt) or specific command-and-control markers within the event subject.
Detects anomalous activity in Microsoft 365 calendar events where potential C2 data is exfiltrated or synchronized. This is identified by the creation or modification of calendar events containing suspicious file names (e.g., File0.txt, File1.txt) or specific command-and-control markers within the event subject.
Detects anomalous activity in Microsoft 365 calendar events where potential C2 data is exfiltrated or synchronized. This is identified by the creation or modification of calendar events containing suspicious file names (e.g., File0.txt, File1.txt) or specific command-and-control markers within the event subject.
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