Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
695 detections
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Detects execution of Mimikatz or LSASS process memory credential theft techniques that are preceded by common discovery tools (such as nltest, net, adcmd, netexec, or kerbrute) on the same device within a 24-hour window.
Detects potential mimikatz-like tools accessing LSASS from non system account
Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask
Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags
Detects the execution of known credential theft tools such as Mimikatz, SharpDecryptPwd, and WebBrowserPassView via EDR process creation telemetry.
The following analytic detects the behavior of dumping credentials from memory by exploiting the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) using the comsvcs.dll and MiniDump via rundll32. This detection leverages process information from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on specific command-line executions. This activity is significant because it indicates potential credential theft, which can lead to broader system compromise, persistence, lateral movement, and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, leading to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other damaging outcomes.
The following analytic detects the creation of an lsass.exe process dump using Windows Task Manager.
It leverages Sysmon EventID 11 to identify file creation events where the target filename matches *lsass*.dmp.
This activity is significant because creating an lsass dump can be a precursor to credential theft, as the dump file contains sensitive information such as user passwords.
It leverages Sysmon EventID 11 to identify file creation events where the target filename matches *lsass*.dmp.
This activity is significant because creating an lsass dump can be a precursor to credential theft, as the dump file contains sensitive information such as user passwords.
The following analytic detects attempts to read LSASS memory, indicative of credential dumping.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for "PROCESS_VM_READ" with query information access on lsass.exe.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for "PROCESS_VM_READ" with query information access on lsass.exe.
The following analytic detects possible credential dumping by identifying suspicious process access to LSASS with credential-dumping-related call traces.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for access masks that combine PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION (0x1000) and PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x40).
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for access masks that combine PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION (0x1000) and PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x40).
The following analytic detects the use of CreateDump.exe to perform a process dump. This binary is not native to Windows and is often introduced by third-party applications, including PowerShell 7. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and complete command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to dump LSASS memory, which can be used to extract credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects attempts to dump the LSASS process memory, a common technique in credential dumping attacks. It leverages Sysmon logs, specifically EventCode 10, to identify suspicious call traces to dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll associated with lsass.exe. This activity is significant as it often precedes the theft of sensitive login credentials, posing a high risk of unauthorized access to systems and data. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to critical credentials, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the use of procdump.exe to dump the LSASS
process, specifically looking for the -mm and -ma command-line arguments. It leverages
data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names,
command-line executions, and parent processes. This activity is significant because
dumping LSASS can expose sensitive credentials, posing a severe security risk. If
confirmed malicious, an attacker could obtain credentials, escalate privileges,
and move laterally within the network, leading to potential data breaches and further
compromise of the environment.
process, specifically looking for the -mm and -ma command-line arguments. It leverages
data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names,
command-line executions, and parent processes. This activity is significant because
dumping LSASS can expose sensitive credentials, posing a severe security risk. If
confirmed malicious, an attacker could obtain credentials, escalate privileges,
and move laterally within the network, leading to potential data breaches and further
compromise of the environment.
The following analytic identifies non-SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs to monitor access attempts to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) by non-SYSTEM users. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping attempts or unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially extract credentials from memory, leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the access request and to mitigate any potential threats.
Detects command-line activity indicative of attempts to dump LSASS memory after performing in-memory unhooking or bypassing of security monitoring DLLs (ntdll.dll, amsi.dll, win32kbase.sys). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to harvest credentials while evading EDR/AV visibility.
This rule detects various methods used by adversaries to perform credential dumping from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for direct process access with suspicious handle permissions, the use of comsvcs.dll via rundll32.exe for MiniDump creation, the execution of memory dumping tools like procdump, and the creation of LSASS memory dump files by Task Manager.
Detects instances where a process contacts multiple distinct AI-provider domains within a short time frame while simultaneously performing suspicious operations, such as accessing the LSASS memory, executing process injection, or establishing WMI persistence. This pattern is indicative of a potential 'ClosedQuorum' adversary behavior involving data exfiltration or AI-assisted malicious activity.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows utility rundll32.exe to execute the MiniDump functionality within comsvcs.dll against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). This technique is a common method for attackers to bypass signature-based security tools and obtain sensitive credentials from memory.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash lateral movement by identifying NTLM network/remote-interactive logons from a single user account across three or more distinct destination hosts within a 15-minute window, correlated with the usage of common credential-dumping tools or commands on the source host.
Detects attempts to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory for credential harvesting. The rule monitors for unauthorized process access requests (e.g., PROCESS_VM_READ), suspicious file creation of memory dumps in common writeable directories, and command-line execution of tools or techniques commonly associated with LSASS dumping (e.g., Mimikatz, procdump, or abusing comsvcs.dll).
This rule detects potential identity-led lateral movement in two scenarios: 1) A single account performing RDP authentications to multiple distinct hosts within a short time frame (RDP Fan-Out), or 2) An RDP login occurring on a host shortly after evidence of LSASS process memory access on that same host, suggesting potential credential theft followed by immediate reuse.
Detects a sequence indicative of credential harvesting and subsequent lateral movement propagation (e.g., NotPetya-style activity). The rule identifies processes accessing LSASS memory (credential dumping) followed within a one-hour window by network activity via SMB (TCP 445) or remote process execution via WMI.
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