Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of the DsGetNCChanges (opnum 3) function on the DRSUAPI interface. This RPC method is commonly abused in DCSync attacks to replicate domain controller data, including sensitive password hashes, from an Active Directory environment.
This rule detects unauthorized directory replication requests (DRSUAPI) using Active Directory Event ID 4662. It specifically monitors for access requests to sensitive directory replication object GUIDs (Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All) where the requesting user account is not a domain controller computer account. This behavior is a common indicator of DCSync credential dumping attacks performed by tools like Mimikatz or Impacket.
The following analytic detects the addition of permissions required for a DCSync attack, specifically DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set. It leverages EventCode 5136 from the Windows Security Event Log to identify when these permissions are granted. This activity is significant because it indicates potential preparation for a DCSync attack, which can be used to replicate AD objects and exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to Active Directory, leading to severe data breaches and privilege escalation.
Detects Active Directory DCSync replication requests by monitoring for Event ID 4662 associated with DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights. The rule triggers when these rights are requested by an entity (subject) originating from a host that is not recognized as a Domain Controller.
Detects Windows Event 4662 indicating the use of DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights from a host that is not a known domain controller. This behavior is highly indicative of credential dumping via DCSync, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz.
Detects the invocation of Active Directory replication rights by monitoring Event 4662 for specific directory service replication GUIDs (DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All). This behavior is characteristic of adversary techniques such as DCSync used by tools like Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump to extract domain password hashes.
Detects potential DCSync attacks by monitoring for Windows Event ID 4662 (Directory Service Access) associated with specific Directory Replication Service (DRS) extended rights GUIDs. The rule identifies accounts attempting to perform replication tasks against a Domain Controller, filtering out events originating from recognized Domain Controllers to isolate unauthorized access.
Detects a hybrid identity attack sequence where an anomalous or high-risk cloud sign-in (e.g., AD FS, Azure AD Connect) is followed within 24 hours by suspicious on-premise Active Directory activity, specifically DCSync replication requests or Kerberoasting (high volume of TGS requests). This pattern is indicative of an attacker leveraging stolen cloud session tokens to pivot into on-premise infrastructure.
This rule monitors for known suspicious RPC interface and function calls indicative of post-exploitation activities. It specifically targets RPC patterns used for lateral movement (e.g., PsExec, wmiexec, dcomexec), authentication coercion (e.g., PetitPotam, PrinterBug), and credential theft (e.g., DCSync, SAMR enumeration) by filtering on specific interface UUIDs and operation numbers.
Detects potential credential dumping activity via DCSync, identified by a non-DC computer account performing directory replication (DRS GetNCChanges), correlated with subsequent suspicious Kerberos ticket requests (Event ID 4769) that utilize weak encryption (RC4 or legacy DES), which is often associated with Golden Ticket abuse.
This rule detects unauthorized directory replication requests (DRSUAPI) using Active Directory Event ID 4662. It specifically monitors for access requests to sensitive directory replication object GUIDs (Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All) where the requesting user account is not a domain controller computer account. This behavior is a common indicator of DCSync credential dumping attacks performed by tools like Mimikatz or Impacket.
Detects Active Directory replication requests (GetNCChanges) directed at a Domain Controller. This is identified by monitoring Windows Event ID 4662 for specific Directory Service Object GUIDs associated with replication rights. The rule attempts to filter out legitimate traffic from other Domain Controllers by excluding machine accounts ending in the '$' character.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to perform a DCSync attack by monitoring for Active Directory Event ID 4662. It triggers when an account that is not a recognized domain controller (which typically end with a '$' sign) successfully requests replication data using the Directory Replication Service (DRS) GetNCChanges rights. This behavior is a common indicator of credential dumping via tools like Mimikatz.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects the request for DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights on domain objects, which are highly sensitive Active Directory permissions required to perform DCSync attacks to harvest credentials from Domain Controllers.
Detects unauthorized usage of the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights, which are required for the DCSync technique. The rule monitors for Windows Event ID 4662 (Object Access) where a non-domain controller account attempts these replication operations, typically indicative of credential dumping and domain compromise.
Detects unauthorized directory replication requests (DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) made against Active Directory by a user or computer account that is not a domain controller. This behavior is indicative of a DCSync attack, typically performed by tools like Mimikatz to extract password hashes for all domain accounts.
Detects DCSync attacks by monitoring for EventID 4662 where Active Directory replication extended rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) are requested. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized replication attempts used to extract sensitive data, such as password hashes, directly from a Domain Controller.
Detects DCSync attacks by monitoring for EventID 4662 where Active Directory replication extended rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) are requested. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized replication attempts used to extract sensitive data, such as password hashes, directly from a Domain Controller.
Detects unauthorized Active Directory replication requests (DCSync) by monitoring Event ID 4662 for specific directory replication GUIDs originating from computers not identified as domain controllers or by accounts not pre-approved for replication tasks.
Detects command-line activity indicative of attempts to perform a DCSync attack, a method used to simulate the replication process of a Domain Controller to extract sensitive Active Directory credentials, including password hashes, using tools like Mimikatz or DSInternals.
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