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Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory.
These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
This rule detects remote RPC calls to the Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR) originating from hosts that are not designated as Domain Controllers. Such activity is highly indicative of potential DCSync or DCShadow attacks, where an attacker attempts to replicate Active Directory data, including sensitive credentials, by impersonating a Domain Controller. The rule specifically looks for RPC Firewall logs (EventLog: RPCFW, EventID: 3) where the InterfaceUuid matches 'e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2' (MS-DRSR) and the operation number (OpNum) is not 0, 1, or 12, as these are considered 'dangerous' opcodes when initiated from non-DC hosts.
This analytic identifies unexpected Active Directory replication traffic originating from non-domain controller sources. It specifically looks for network traffic associated with AD replication protocols (ms-dc-replication, drsr, ad drs). Such traffic should typically only occur between legitimate domain controllers. Detection of this activity from other sources may indicate malicious activities like DCSync or DCShadow, which are commonly used for credential dumping and could lead to unauthorized access and potential domain-wide compromise.
The following analytic detects the addition of permissions required for a DCSync attack, specifically DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set. It leverages EventCode 5136 from the Windows Security Event Log to identify when these permissions are granted. This activity is significant because it indicates potential preparation for a DCSync attack, which can be used to replicate AD objects and exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to Active Directory, leading to severe data breaches and privilege escalation.
The analytic detects processes loading the samlib.dll or samcli.dll modules, which are often abused to access Security Account Manager (SAM) objects or credentials on domain controllers. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify these DLLs being loaded outside typical system directories. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate attempts to gather sensitive identity information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to obtain credentials, escalate privileges, or further infiltrate the network.
This rule detects Mimikatz DCSync activity by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4662. Specifically, it looks for access attempts to replicate directory changes (identified by specific GUIDs) with an AccessMask of '0x100'. To reduce false positives, it filters out activity from 'Window Manager' and service accounts starting with 'NT AUT', 'MSOL_', or ending with '$'.
This rule detects the use of Mimikatz by looking for specific keywords associated with its modules and functionalities within Windows Event Logs. These keywords cover various Mimikatz features, including credential dumping (LSASS, SAM, LSA secrets), Kerberos ticket manipulation (golden ticket, pass-the-ticket), DPAPI masterkey extraction, and other miscellaneous functions. Some keywords may be more prevalent in older Mimikatz versions but are still used by threat actors.
This rule detects the execution of well-known credential dumping tools by monitoring Windows System event logs for Service Control Manager events (EventID 7045) indicating service creation. The rule specifically looks for service image paths containing keywords associated with common credential dumping utilities such as 'cachedump', 'dumpsvc', 'fgexec', 'gsecdump', 'mimidrv', 'pwdump', and 'servpw'. This helps identify attempts to install and run these tools as services for credential theft.
This rule detects the execution of the `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet from the DSInternals PowerShell module with specific parameters (`-All` and `-Server`). This cmdlet is used to perform a DCSync attack, which allows an attacker to retrieve password hashes and other sensitive Active Directory information by simulating a domain controller replication. The DSInternals module provides advanced capabilities for Active Directory manipulation and auditing, and its use in this manner is highly suspicious and indicative of credential access attempts.
Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials.
Detects the use of Cobalt Strike commands entered into the command shell. This rule specifically looks for common Cobalt Strike post-exploitation commands such as 'psinject', 'spawnas', 'make_token', 'remote-exec', 'rev2self', 'dcsync', 'logonpasswords', 'execute-assembly', and 'getsystem' when executed via cmd.exe. This often indicates an operator error where Cobalt Strike commands are mistakenly typed directly into a compromised system's command prompt instead of the Cobalt Strike beacon console.
Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments
Mimikatz Use
Sigma
This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different threat groups)
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