Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
181 detections
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Detects the correlation of two or more distinct discovery tools or artifacts (such as SharpShares, NetScan, NetExec, ShareFinder, and specific nltest.exe domain trust commands) executed on the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects PowerShell processes spawned by common managed file transfer (MFT) or web service processes (such as Serv-U, GoAnywhere, MOVEit, Cleo, Tomcat, etc.) performing remote system discovery or ingress tool transfer activities.
The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell scripts to query Active Directory for domain computers. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific script blocks containing `adsisearcher` and `objectcategory=computer` with methods like `findAll()` or `findOne()`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to perform Active Directory discovery and gain situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further reconnaissance and potential lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-AdComputer` PowerShell commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages script block text to identify when this commandlet is run. The `Get-AdComputer` commandlet is significant as it can be used by adversaries to enumerate all domain computers, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the network, identify targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-DomainController` command, which is used to discover remote systems within a Windows domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an attempt to enumerate domain controllers, a common tactic in Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain situational awareness, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet to discover remote systems, specifically targeting the `DS_Computer` parameter.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain computers and gather situational awareness within Active Directory.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain computers and gather situational awareness within Active Directory.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
The following analytic identifies the execution of `adfind.exe` standalone or with specific command-line arguments related to Active Directory queries. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent Processes. This activity is significant because `adfind.exe` is a powerful tool often used by threat actors like Wizard Spider and FIN6 to gather sensitive AD information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the AD environment, facilitating further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Detects the execution of common enumeration tools and commands often associated with ransomware-precursor behavior. This includes the use of AdFind, dsquery, net.exe, and nltest for domain account, group, and trust discovery, as well as the execution of BloodHound/SharpHound collection activities.
Detects behavioral patterns associated with the Everest ransomware loader, specifically the execution of a .NET host process from a non-standard parent, potentially indicating process injection, combined with network activity indicative of lateral movement or discovery, such as Wake-on-LAN packets or SMB scanning.
Detects a single host or account generating a high volume of LDAP queries (typical of reconnaissance tools like BloodHound/SharpHound) within a 10-minute time window. The rule specifically looks for more than 500 LDAP queries targeted at a limited number of Domain Controllers.
Detects the execution of Grixba, a reconnaissance and inventory tool used by Play ransomware operators. The tool is designed to enumerate domain accounts, security software, backup solutions, and remote systems to facilitate reconnaissance prior to deploying encryption.
Detects the manual enablement of network discovery services (fdrespub, fdPHost, SSDPSRV, upnphost) and the associated Windows Firewall rules. This activity is a known tactic used by Gentlemen ransomware to facilitate lateral movement and network share enumeration by making the compromised host visible to others and allowing it to discover peers.
Detects ClickFix-style browser or explorer spawned command execution using clipboard-paste patterns, or subsequent ransomware-related discovery and inhibit-system-recovery commands such as net.exe, nltest.exe, and vssadmin.exe used after initial access.
Detects network discovery activities including ICMP sweeps, ARP cache checks, and SMB share/session enumeration, which are common tactics used for internal reconnaissance by the threat group APT36 (Transparent Tribe).
Detects common Windows command-line utilities used for internal network reconnaissance, including ARP cache queries, NetBIOS enumeration, SMB share/session discovery, and subnet ping sweeps. These techniques are frequently employed by adversaries for lateral movement preparation and internal network mapping.
Detects anomalous sequential SMB scanning patterns across a /24 subnet and subsequent SMB share enumeration attempts (NetShareEnum) from a single host, consistent with reconnaissance activities associated with the DragonForce threat actor group.
Detects host-based network reconnaissance behaviors commonly associated with the threat group APT36 (Transparent Tribe). The rule identifies the execution of various built-in Windows network discovery commands including arp, nbtstat, net view/share/session, and automated ping sweeps or PowerShell-based subnet enumeration scripts, which are used to map reachable hosts and network shares.
Detects non-standard processes loading the iphlpapi.dll library and subsequently executing commands related to ARP network discovery, such as GetBSSID, SendARP, GetDefaultGateway, or GetAllNetworkInterfaces. This behavior is characteristic of network reconnaissance and fingerprinting activities often employed by information stealers like Hannibal Stealer.
Detects the execution of SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan.exe), a tool frequently utilized by threat actors such as Ransom Busters for internal network reconnaissance and host discovery activities prior to lateral movement or data exfiltration.
This rule detects rapid, repetitive TCP connection attempts to port 445 (SMB) originating from a single source within a 30-second window. Such activity is indicative of automated network scanning and enumeration, often used for discovery of vulnerable SMB shares or lateral movement preparation.
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities used for network reconnaissance and discovery, such as arp, nbtstat, net, and ping. These commands are frequently used by adversaries to map network infrastructure, identify active hosts, and discover shared resources on a target network.
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