Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Windows PE executable files written to disk with company metadata matching Sysinternals (Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com). This detection identifies the presence of Sysinternals tools on endpoints for security monitoring and investigation.
Sysinternals tools are legitimate administrative utilities but may also be leveraged by threat actors for reconnaissance, process inspection, credential access, and lateral movement. Review the file path, SHA-256 hash, user context, and associated process activity to determine whether the file is authorized or potentially suspicious.
Note: The presence of a Sysinternals executable alone does not indicate malicious activity.
Sysinternals tools are legitimate administrative utilities but may also be leveraged by threat actors for reconnaissance, process inspection, credential access, and lateral movement. Review the file path, SHA-256 hash, user context, and associated process activity to determine whether the file is authorized or potentially suspicious.
Note: The presence of a Sysinternals executable alone does not indicate malicious activity.
Detects VNC and remote framebuffer sessions, including the authentication method
negotiated. RFB is frequently deployed without strong authentication on industrial
and legacy systems, and an attacker finding one has interactive desktop access to a
machine that often cannot run an endpoint agent at all.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-authentication-rfb where sourcename='NTA'
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, authmethod
negotiated. RFB is frequently deployed without strong authentication on industrial
and legacy systems, and an attacker finding one has interactive desktop access to a
machine that often cannot run an endpoint agent at all.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-authentication-rfb where sourcename='NTA'
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, authmethod
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a successful NetScaler VPN or gateway session is followed immediately by internal remote service logons (RDP, SSH, WinRM) or network connections from the same source IP. This pattern is indicative of potential exploitation of Citrix NetScaler vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772) or credential abuse to move laterally into the internal environment.
This rule monitors for a rapid sequence of TCP SYN packets directed towards common administrative ports (SSH/22, RDP/3389, SMB/445) within a short window, indicative of an automated lateral movement scanning attempt or a brute-force discovery phase originating from within the internal network.
This rule detects the execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) and remote access tools (e.g., ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, Atera, Splashtop, NinjaOne, Action1) when the command line includes silent install or installation flags. The detection correlates this activity with recent (within 72 hours) identity-related alerts (e.g., impossible travel, anomalous sign-in, credential compromise) for the same user, suggesting a potential high-risk scenario where an adversary is establishing remote access following a credential compromise.
Detects the use of administrative utilities (psexec.exe, wmic.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) initiating network connections over common remote management ports (135, 139, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986) to internal destinations. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement activity, particularly when initiated from a host that has recently engaged in credential harvesting or infostealer-related activity. The rule excludes common, expected sources to minimize noise.
Detects autonomous behavior where AI-driven processes attempt multiple network connections (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM) to diverse targets following failed access attempts. The rule correlates initial failure activity with subsequent credential-related events and new lateral movement traffic from the same agent process within a short window, suggesting adaptive adversary pivoting.
This rule monitors for process creation events where the parent process is identified as the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) or the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (wmic.exe) tool, executing a Win32_Process creation command. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for remote execution and lateral movement.
Detects anomalous activity where a single compromised AI agent identity attempts to connect to a high volume of internal agent, API, or RPC endpoints within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement across an interconnected agent mesh.
Detects autonomous behavior where AI-driven processes attempt multiple network connections (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM) to diverse targets following failed access attempts. The rule correlates initial failure activity with subsequent credential-related events and new lateral movement traffic from the same agent process within a short window, suggesting adaptive adversary pivoting.
Detects autonomous behavior where AI-driven processes attempt multiple network connections (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM) to diverse targets following failed access attempts. The rule correlates initial failure activity with subsequent credential-related events and new lateral movement traffic from the same agent process within a short window, suggesting adaptive adversary pivoting.
Detects autonomous behavior where AI-driven processes attempt multiple network connections (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM) to diverse targets following failed access attempts. The rule correlates initial failure activity with subsequent credential-related events and new lateral movement traffic from the same agent process within a short window, suggesting adaptive adversary pivoting.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes within 120 seconds of a Type 3 (Network) logon event. This behavior is a common indicator of remote command execution, frequently used by lateral movement tools like Impacket's wmiexec or similar WMI-based remote execution frameworks.
Detects successful remote authentication events (Network or Interactive) performed by AI agent orchestration service accounts. This rule monitors for atypical lateral movement patterns where an automated service account pivots to remote hosts using protocols such as RDP or WinRM, diverging from its standard operational context.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for lateral movement and remote code execution. The rule monitors for common WMI exploitation vectors, including the use of wmic.exe for process creation, PowerShell or C# invocations of WMI/CIM methods (such as Win32_Process Create), WMI event subscription registration for persistence, and the execution of mofcomp.exe.
Detects successful administrative logins to VMware ESXi, vCenter, or related VDI infrastructure (Horizon) by users who have recently performed a password or MFA reset. This pattern is indicative of a helpdesk-based social engineering attack (vishing) or credential compromise where the attacker regains account access and immediately pivots to critical virtualization management infrastructure to facilitate ransomware deployment.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Identify cases where privileged tokens appear in unexpected contexts (e.g., admin accounts logging into low-tier devices, unusual logon types, or rare hosts).
Detects successful administrative logins to VMware ESXi, vCenter, or related VDI infrastructure (Horizon) by users who have recently performed a password or MFA reset. This pattern is indicative of a helpdesk-based social engineering attack (vishing) or credential compromise where the attacker regains account access and immediately pivots to critical virtualization management infrastructure to facilitate ransomware deployment.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
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