Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
252 detections
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Detects instances where the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) spawns common shell or script interpreter processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe). This behavior is often indicative of fileless remote code execution used for lateral movement across Windows environments, as WMI is frequently abused by attackers to remotely trigger malicious commands.
Detects potentially unauthorized or malicious behavior associated with the RustDesk remote access tool. The rule monitors for unsigned screen capture attempts, spawning of shell or scripting processes, cross-process input injection, and network communication over non-standard or unexpected ports.
Detects potential lateral movement via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) by monitoring for WMI processes spawning interactive shells (cmd, powershell) or executing remote process calls using the /node syntax. Includes exclusions for common administrative tools associated with Microsoft management platforms.
Detects potential lateral movement via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) by monitoring for WMI processes spawning interactive shells (cmd, powershell) or executing remote process calls using the /node syntax. Includes exclusions for common administrative tools associated with Microsoft management platforms.
Detects workstations establishing multiple connections to non-standard, internal management ports (SSH, Telnet, SNMP). This behavior is often associated with lateral movement or unauthorized network scanning using tools that leverage management protocols.
Detects inbound RPC Endpoint Mapper connections (TCP 135) to the Service Host process (svchost.exe). This connection acts as the necessary precursor to authenticating and instantiating remote COM objects for lateral movement.
This rule detects suspicious network connections, process activity, and file events related to Node.js or systemd-userdbd, potentially indicating C2 communication or the presence of malicious tools. Specifically, it looks for outbound TCP connections to port 4444, process command lines containing shell commands or 'node-pty', and file paths/names associated with 'apintergrationpost' or 'node-pty'.
Detects a potential multi-stage attack sequence where a file (archive or browser-related) is executed, followed by a script interpreter (wscript/cscript), and finally followed by a remote connection to common remote access ports (RDP, FTP, SMB, SSH). The rule correlates these events within a specific timeframe per device to identify likely lateral movement or remote command and control initialization.
This rule detects suspicious usage of remote execution tools like PsExec, WMIC, and PowerShell. It specifically looks for multiple executions of these tools within a 5-minute window, originating from non-system accounts and not from standard Windows system directories. This behavior can indicate lateral movement or other malicious activity within a network.
This rule detects network connections to common lateral movement ports (SMB, NetBIOS, RDP, FTP, Telnet, SSH) occurring within a 30-minute window before or a 60-minute window after the execution of known ransomware encryption binaries ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe'). This correlation aims to identify post-encryption lateral movement attempts by ransomware, potentially for further compromise or data exfiltration.
Detects WMI process creation on a remote node to run a batch file previously staged in ProgramData. This activity is often associated with adversaries using WMI for lateral movement and execution.
Detects T1021.001 "Disable NLA for RDP via Command Prompt" (Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol) using command-line and process indicators derived from executor behavior.
This rule detects post-VPN discovery or lateral movement activities by monitoring network connections initiated by specific command-line tools. It targets the use of utilities like PowerShell, cmd, net, nltest, adfind, ldapsearch, wmic, or winrs to interact with many internal systems, which could indicate an attacker performing reconnaissance or moving laterally within the network after gaining initial access, potentially via a compromised VPN.
Detects schtasks creating a one-time task on another host using supplied credentials and a batch file under Windows Temp, executed as SYSTEM. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or lateral movement by scheduling malicious code to run with high privileges on a remote system.
This rule detects network connections to common lateral movement ports (SMB, NetBIOS, RDP, FTP, Telnet, SSH) occurring within a 30-minute window before or a 60-minute window after the execution of known ransomware encryption binaries ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe'). This correlation aims to identify post-encryption lateral movement attempts by ransomware, potentially for further compromise or data exfiltration.
Detects unusual connections from IT subnets to known OT/ICS protocol ports (Modbus:502, DNP3:20000, EtherNet/IP:44818, S7Comm:102, OPC UA:4840, IEC 60870-5-104:2404, BACnet/IP:18245) within private IP ranges. This rule specifically looks for a high volume of connections (more than 5) from a single source IP to different destination IPs on these OT ports, excluding traffic from Rockwell devices, which might indicate lateral movement or reconnaissance by threat actors like TheGentlemen, who have historically targeted OT environments.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activities post-compromise by monitoring process creation events (EventID 4688, 4689) for common administrative tools like PsExec, WMIC, and commands related to scheduled tasks. It specifically looks for these tools being used to execute commands on multiple target computers from a single initiating account within a short timeframe (2 hours), indicating an adversary attempting to move across the network.
Detects T1021.001 "Disable NLA for RDP via Command Prompt" (Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol) using command-line and process indicators derived from executor behavior.
Detects cloud services being used to move laterally between cloud resources
This rule detects potential lateral movement activities post-compromise by monitoring process creation events (EventID 4688, 4689) for common administrative tools like PsExec, WMIC, and commands related to scheduled tasks. It specifically looks for these tools being used to execute commands on multiple target computers from a single initiating account within a short timeframe (2 hours), indicating an adversary attempting to move across the network.
This rule detects an account performing multiple interactive logons (LogonType 2) from at least 3 unique IP addresses within a 5-minute window. This behavior can indicate credential compromise or an adversary attempting to move laterally or access multiple systems using stolen credentials.
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