Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
33 detections
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Detects the WAV-based loader staging technique: a RIFF/WAVE file carrying a high-entropy appended blob, or a companion DLL chain (rdCore.dll/WMPCL.dll/WPFLocalizeExtension.dll) referencing the hidden audio payload and the encrypted monitor.raw container used to unpack the final RAT
Detects the WAV-based loader staging technique: a RIFF/WAVE file carrying a high-entropy appended blob, or a companion DLL chain (rdCore.dll/WMPCL.dll/WPFLocalizeExtension.dll) referencing the hidden audio payload and the encrypted monitor.raw container used to unpack the final RAT
Detects the WAV-based loader staging technique: a RIFF/WAVE file carrying a high-entropy appended blob, or a companion DLL chain (rdCore.dll/WMPCL.dll/WPFLocalizeExtension.dll) referencing the hidden audio payload and the encrypted monitor.raw container used to unpack the final RAT
Detects the WAV-based loader staging technique: a RIFF/WAVE file carrying a high-entropy appended blob, or a companion DLL chain (rdCore.dll/WMPCL.dll/WPFLocalizeExtension.dll) referencing the hidden audio payload and the encrypted monitor.raw container used to unpack the final RAT
Detection of network traffic associated with the delivery of the Rapuncel information stealer. The rules monitor for large ZIP archives masquerading as LastPass Authenticator installers and detect attempts to reach out to external domains for DLL sideloading artifacts (TitanStorage.dll and ProManager.dll).
Detects the delivery of Rapuncel infostealer via abnormally large ZIP archives that incorporate binary padding with junk DLL files (such as TitanStorage.dll or ProManager.dll). This technique is used to evade security scanners that have file size limitations. The rule tracks specific campaign filenames and junk file markers.
Detects PE files exhibiting combined structural anomalies consistent with Dolphin X's opt-in mutation engine tiers: altered PE compile timestamp, rewritten section padding (raw size vastly exceeding virtual size), and per-build re-encrypted embedded strings surfacing as high-entropy sections
Detects Inno Setup Installer executables carrying an appended/embedded payload overlay, consistent with the Inno Setup unpacking stage of the CURP campaign delivery chain
Detects the initial stage of the Meow RAT ClickFix campaign, specifically targeting fileless zsh loaders. This rule identifies command-line executions involving 'zsh', 'bash', or 'sh' that combine 'eval', 'base64', 'gzip', and either 'curl' or 'osascript', often with redirection to /dev/null. This pattern is indicative of a gzip+base64 encoded heredoc being fetched via curl and executed in memory, followed by osascript for further actions.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with HijackLoader delivered via ErrTraffic ClickFix lures. The rule identifies a sequence where a web browser spawns a PowerShell process that subsequently creates a large archive file (binary bloating), followed by the execution of suspicious processes (often associated with process injection/hollowing) from the extracted context.
Detects the initial stage of the Meow RAT ClickFix campaign, specifically targeting fileless zsh loaders. This rule identifies command-line executions involving 'zsh', 'bash', or 'sh' that combine 'eval', 'base64', 'gzip', and either 'curl' or 'osascript', often with redirection to /dev/null. This pattern is indicative of a gzip+base64 encoded heredoc being fetched via curl and executed in memory, followed by osascript for further actions.
This rule detects the creation or modification of files within the Windows Fonts directory that use specific naming conventions (starting with 'x1', 'kx1', or 'kw1') and have no file extension or a generic one. This pattern is often associated with malware attempting to hide encrypted data containers or malicious payloads by masquerading them as legitimate system files.
Detects process command lines that contain patterns indicative of obfuscated payload execution, specifically the combination of 'eval', 'base64', and '-d'. This technique is frequently used by adversaries to decode and execute memory-resident stages without dropping secondary payloads to disk.
Detects the loading of 'borlndmm.dll' from unusual directories, an activity associated with OnyxC2 stealer DLL side-loading techniques, where the malicious DLL is typically inflated via binary padding to evade detection.
Obfuscated VBScript Download
Suricata
This rule detects the download of potentially obfuscated VBScript files over HTTP. It specifically looks for the string 'Chr(' repeated multiple times within the first 200 bytes of the file data, which is a common obfuscation technique used in malicious VBScripts to hide their true content.
This rule detects the use of 'openssl' or 'base64' for decoding data piped into a shell (bash, sh, zsh) or scripting interpreter (python, perl). This pattern is often used by adversaries to decode obfuscated commands or payloads directly into memory for execution, bypassing disk-based detection.
Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware.
This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
Detects code integrity failures such as missing page hashes or corrupted drivers due unauthorized modification. This could be a sign of tampered binaries.
Detects a specific script execution pattern where a batch file, often named 'rEgX.cmd', is read by a PowerShell process (or a renamed variant like 'mbs.exe') to extract a hidden, encrypted payload from its own content. This self-parsing technique, used by the Dead#Vax malware, looks for lines starting with a specific marker (e.g., '@') to bypass traditional file-based detection.
Detects attempts to exploit a deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2025-40553) in SolarWinds Web Help Desk. Attackers use non-standard hex escape sequences (e.g., `\xNN`) in JSON payloads to bypass security filters and achieve remote code execution.
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