Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential phishing or HTML smuggling attempts by identifying a burst of anomalously large SVG file attachments delivered via email to multiple recipients, followed by a correlation with web browser process network activity from the same recipients shortly after the email delivery.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe is used to invoke shell32.dll with the SHCreateLocal function, or where a web browser process (msedge.exe, chrome.exe, or firefox.exe) is spawned by rundll32.exe to open an HTML file. This pattern is often indicative of malicious activity such as HTML smuggling or local file execution attacks where rundll32 is used as a proxy to open files via the browser.
Detects HTML files that employ FlipBook branding as a lure for password-gated smuggling. The detection identifies client-side JavaScript logic that uses PBKDF2 and AES-GCM to decrypt a hidden redirect URL after user interaction with a password prompt.
Detects inbound emails containing malicious QR codes (quishing) or HTML smuggling payloads designed to facilitate credential harvesting (AiTM). The rule identifies suspicious attachments, HTML-based obfuscation (e.g., atob, Blob) in email bodies, and QR-code-themed image attachments, filtering out internal communications.
This rule detects potential HTML smuggling activity by identifying a browser process writing an executable file named 'config.exe' to the user's Downloads folder without a traditional network download event, followed immediately by Microsoft Defender SmartScreen or Antivirus reporting a warning or scan failure on the file. This behavior is indicative of a payload being reconstructed on the client-side via JavaScript blobs or data URLs, which is a common characteristic of HTML smuggling delivery chains.
This rule detects potential HTML smuggling activity by identifying a browser process writing an executable file named 'config.exe' to the user's Downloads folder without a traditional network download event, followed immediately by Microsoft Defender SmartScreen or Antivirus reporting a warning or scan failure on the file. This behavior is indicative of a payload being reconstructed on the client-side via JavaScript blobs or data URLs, which is a common characteristic of HTML smuggling delivery chains.
Detects the creation of files on disk by a browser process where the Zone.Identifier metadata indicates the origin was a blob:, data:, or about:blank URI. This behavior is indicative of HTML smuggling, where malicious payloads are reconstructed client-side from within an HTML document, bypassing network-based security controls.
This rule detects mass phishing campaigns by identifying HTML/HTM email attachments that contain embedded URLs. It monitors for a pattern where the same sender distributes these attachments to multiple recipients, a common behavior for HTML smuggling delivery vectors where malicious payloads are constructed client-side to bypass static email gateway inspection.
Detects HTML smuggling files identified as 'FlipBook' lures, commonly used in device-code phishing campaigns. These lures utilize client-side JavaScript for AES-GCM decryption, extensive comment-based obfuscation, and specific junk-padding techniques to bypass security controls and trick users into providing credentials.
Detects HTML files utilizing the 'GhostCode' technique to hide malicious phishing redirects. The technique involves a password-protected HTML lure that uses JavaScript (Web Crypto API) to derive an AES-256-GCM key from a user-provided password via PBKDF2, decrypt an embedded ciphertext payload, and dynamically redirect the user to a concealed phishing URL.
Detects SVG image files that contain embedded HTML or script payloads, often used as an initial delivery vector to smuggle malicious code (such as downloaders or web redirects) into a target environment. This technique has been associated with the delivery of various remote access trojans (RATs).
This rule detects mass phishing campaigns by identifying HTML/HTM email attachments that contain embedded URLs. It monitors for a pattern where the same sender distributes these attachments to multiple recipients, a common behavior for HTML smuggling delivery vectors where malicious payloads are constructed client-side to bypass static email gateway inspection.
Detects phishing emails associated with the Mirage2FA campaign, which utilize HTML smuggling via .htm, .xhtml, or .svg attachments, often disguised as voicemail or contract-related documents. The rule also accounts for social engineering lures involving QR codes.
Detects the SourTrade browser-side build-pipeline setup sequence: a ServiceWorker registered at /sw.js immediately followed, within the same page load, by a SharedWorker instantiated from an in-page Blob URL carrying an application/javascript MIME type — restricted to domains flagged as newly-registered or low-reputation — consistent with the pre-download preparation stage of browser-assembled malware.
This rule detects the use of HTML tables to render QR codes without external image files. This technique, often referred to as 'imageless QR codes', involves creating a grid using HTML table cells (td) with CSS background colors (white and black) to form the QR pattern. Attackers use this method in phishing emails to embed QR codes that redirect victims to malicious websites, bypassing simple image-based security filters.
This rule detects HTTP/1.1 requests containing an Upgrade header (specifically targeting WebSocket upgrades) accompanied by a non-zero Content-Length header. This pattern is characteristic of a request smuggling primitive targeting the nghttpx reverse proxy, where the provided body may be misinterpreted by the backend as a separate, smuggled request due to improper request queue handling.
Detects HTML smuggling technique using JavaScript Blob objects
Detects inbound emails containing attachments with file extensions commonly used for HTML/SVG smuggling (.html, .htm, .svg, .shtml, .xhtml). This technique is often used to bypass email security filters by assembling malicious payloads client-side after the email has been delivered. The rule specifically looks for inbound emails where the attachment has not been blocked or junked by the email gateway.
This rule detects execution patterns associated with the Gamaredon (Shuckworm) group's Ptero-family of malware. It specifically monitors for encoded PowerShell commands, the use of Invoke-Expression, and the execution of mshta.exe or wscript.exe spawned by Office applications or email clients, which is characteristic of Gamaredon's HTML smuggling and malicious document delivery techniques.
This rule detects an HTML file being served to a client that contains an embedded Base64 encoded executable payload. It specifically looks for the HTML download attribute (<a download=), the 'base64,' string, and the 'TVQAA' string, which is a common signature for the beginning of a Base64 encoded Windows executable (MZ header). The detection is performed on HTTP traffic flowing to the client.
Detects SVG files embedding base64 executables for HTML smuggling
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