Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects execution of BlackX UEFI bootkit installer components, renamed helper binaries acting as payloads (such as jcef_helper.exe renamed to googleupdate.exe), or known malicious file hashes associated with BlackX campaigns.
Detects execution of BlackX UEFI bootkit installer components, renamed helper binaries acting as payloads (such as jcef_helper.exe renamed to googleupdate.exe), or known malicious file hashes associated with BlackX campaigns.
Detects the trusted .NET host used in Blinder Tunnel to run an attacker-supplied AppDomainManager: a renamed signed Visual Studio hosting binary as RuntimeBroker.exe, or vshost32.exe for the Blackwood tunneling tool. The attacker’s <host>.exe .config names the malicious DLL, which loads before any host code. The genuine RuntimeBroker.exe only runs from System32, and the \Microsoft\RuntimeBrokers\ install folder does not exist on a clean Windows install. The path arm therefore still fires if the actor renames the host. A LaunchContext field separates first execution (MSBuild/devenv .csproj trigger or Inno Setup installer) from Explorer autostart.
Detects the WinLol Rust dropper staging a DLL sideload by writing a copy of Microsoft OneDrive.exe and a proxy version.dll into a user temp directory by a non-OneDrive, non-installer process.
Detects the persistence mechanism used by ShelbyLoader V2 (RuntimeBroker.dll), the loader in the Iran-nexus Blinder Tunnel campaign (CL-STA-1178). The implant writes HKCU\...\Run\MicrosoftRuntime pointing at %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\RuntimeBrokers\RuntimeBroker.exe, then re-asserts it hourly. The genuine RuntimeBroker.exe is a System32 COM broker that is never autostarted from a Run key, so matching either the implant’s value name or RuntimeBroker.exe in Run data gives a near-binary signal with no allow-list. Covers both the Unit 42 and Nextron variants.
Detects a renamed PSF-signed pythonw.exe (with an original file name of pythonw.exe but a different on-disk name) launched from a user-writable path under Users. The command line consists only of its own path, which is consistent with ._pth based path configuration abuse for loading attacker code stealthily.
Detects the Blinder Tunnel C2 loop. The loader beacons about every 63 seconds to the GitHub Contents API (profile upload, one-time license read). The newer variant can instead go through a Cloudflare Workers relay that mirrors the GitHub API paths. Both platforms are legitimate, so the signal is the client: the implant install directory, a non-System32 RuntimeBroker.exe, or any binary under AppData\Local\Microsoft\, none of which are real GitHub clients. Known implant hosts and the known relay alert on a single hit. The lookalike-path arm needs 10 or more connections per hour (a 63-second loop produces 100+), which suppresses incidental noise. Depends on RemoteUrl being populated for TLS connections.
Detects an uncommon svchost parent process
Detects outbound network traffic matching XMRig Monero cryptocurrency miner stratum login behavior originating from an internal host.
Detects outbound network traffic matching XMRig Monero cryptocurrency miner stratum login behavior originating from an internal host.
Detects outbound network traffic matching XMRig Monero cryptocurrency miner stratum login behavior originating from an internal host.
Detects outbound network traffic matching XMRig Monero cryptocurrency miner stratum login behavior originating from an internal host.
The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, privilege escalation, password dumping or data exfiltration.
It leverages process activity data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on known attacker tool names.
This activity is significant because it serves as an early warning system for potential security incidents, enabling prompt response. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise, posing a severe threat to the organization's security infrastructure.
It leverages process activity data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on known attacker tool names.
This activity is significant because it serves as an early warning system for potential security incidents, enabling prompt response. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise, posing a severe threat to the organization's security infrastructure.
Detects the modification of the wsl.exe binary from its installed location.
Attackers can replace the legitimate wsl.exe binary with a malicious payload in its place, which is then executed when the user runs WSL, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Attackers can replace the legitimate wsl.exe binary with a malicious payload in its place, which is then executed when the user runs WSL, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Detects execution of masqueraded wsl.exe binary.
Attackers can rename a malicious payload to wsl.exe to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Subsystem for Linux binary,
bypassing detection based on image name alone and abusing user trust in the WSL process name.
Attackers can rename a malicious payload to wsl.exe to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Subsystem for Linux binary,
bypassing detection based on image name alone and abusing user trust in the WSL process name.
Detects the execution of MSP360 or generic RMM-labeled binaries originating from common user download directories (Downloads or Temp folders) when the filename mimics common phishing lures such as invoice, e-card, RSVP, or document-related naming conventions. This activity indicates a potential social engineering attempt to execute remote monitoring and management tools.
The following analytic identifies a LOLBAS process being executed outside of it's expected location.
Processes being executed outside of expected locations may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code.
Processes being executed outside of expected locations may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code.
Detects C:\Windows\System32\wsl.exe spawning a child wsl.exe process from outside the legitimate WSL install locations.
When WSL or bash is invoked, the System32 stub (wsl.exe) looks up the InstallLocation registry key and executes the wsl.exe found there.
An attacker who modifies InstallLocation to a controlled path causes the stub to transparently proxy execution to a malicious payload,
which then appears as a wsl.exe child of the legitimate System32 stub.
When WSL or bash is invoked, the System32 stub (wsl.exe) looks up the InstallLocation registry key and executes the wsl.exe found there.
An attacker who modifies InstallLocation to a controlled path causes the stub to transparently proxy execution to a malicious payload,
which then appears as a wsl.exe child of the legitimate System32 stub.
Detects a .ps1-named file being loaded as an executable image or created as a process's own file name (both anomalous under normal Windows semantics, since PowerShell always runs scripts via powershell.exe/pwsh.exe as the process image, never as the .ps1 itself). Anchored to the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders to exclude unrelated developer/test tooling elsewhere on disk that might trip a similar anomaly.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service using common administrative tools like sc.exe or PowerShell's New-Service cmdlet that masquerades as the legitimate Windows Time service (w32time). The rule specifically flags service creation commands that use relevant service names but point to non-standard, suspicious executable paths or configurations, potentially indicating persistence or malicious activity by RemotePanel.
Detects the AgtaBackup RAT keylogger process, which masks itself as a legitimate Windows service ('Window Security Health Services.exe'), running with SYSTEM privileges and lacking a valid digital signature.
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