Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
690 detections
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Detects a two-stage behavior characteristic of the SonicCrypt crypter: 1) A process creates a suspicious executable in a Windows system directory. 2) The newly created executable is then launched by the Windows Task Scheduler.
The following analytic identifies processes running from file paths within the ProgramData directory, a common location abused by adversaries for executing malicious code while evading detection. Threat actors often drop and execute payloads from this directory to bypass security controls, as it typically has write permissions for standard users. While this behavior can indicate malware execution or persistence techniques, it is important to note that some legitimate software, installers, and update mechanisms also run from ProgramData, leading to potential false positives. Security teams should validate detections by correlating with other indicators, such as unusual parent processes, unsigned binaries, or anomalous network activity.
The following analytic detects the loading of drivers from suspicious paths, which is a technique often used by malicious software such as coin miners (e.g., xmrig). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify drivers loaded from non-standard directories. This activity is significant because legitimate drivers typically reside in specific system directories, and deviations may indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code at the kernel level, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further system compromise.
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in suspicious file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in uncommon directories (e.g., \windows\fonts\, \users\public\). This activity is significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
The following analytic identifies processes running from file paths not typically associated with legitimate software. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process paths within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because adversaries often use unconventional file paths to execute malicious code without requiring administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, leading to unauthorized software execution, potential system compromise, and further malicious activities within the environment.
The following analytic identifies processes running from %temp% directory file paths. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process paths within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because adversaries often use unconventional file paths to execute malicious code without requiring administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, leading to unauthorized software execution, potential system compromise, and further malicious activities within the environment.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-41244, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in VMware Tools and Aria Operations.
An attacker can stage a malicious binary in a world-writable directory (e.g., /tmp) which is then executed with root privileges by the VMware service discovery mechanism when it attempts to determine the binary's version.
An attacker can stage a malicious binary in a world-writable directory (e.g., /tmp) which is then executed with root privileges by the VMware service discovery mechanism when it attempts to determine the binary's version.
Detects the creation of executable files with names identical to legitimate Windows system processes in directories other than their standard system locations (e.g., System32, SysWOW64). This technique is often used by adversaries for defense evasion and masquerading to blend malicious executables with legitimate system files.
Detects potential exploitation of VMware CVE-2025-41244, where a privileged VMware service discovery script executes a binary from a world-writable directory like /tmp. This behavior is consistent with the local privilege escalation technique used by UNC5174.
Detects potential DLL side-loading of the Turla Kazuar backdoor using legitimate executables launched from unusual, actor-specific file paths.
This analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, or data exfiltration. It leverages process activity data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on known attacker tool names. This activity is significant because it serves as an early warning system for potential security incidents, enabling prompt response. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise, posing a severe threat to the organization's security infrastructure.
Detects the creation of keylogger output files by the WinMainSvc component, which is associated with the Crypto24 ransomware group. The keylogger runs as a service via svchost.exe and creates log files in the C:\Windows\tmp\ directory with a specific naming pattern.
The following analytic identifies a process writing a .txt file to a world writable path. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on file creation events within specific directories. This activity is significant as adversaries often use such techniques to deliver payloads to a system, which is uncommon for legitimate processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Summary
Sophisticated EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) killer tools are increasingly being used by various ransomware groups to disable security solutions, allowing them to operate undetected during multi-stage attacks. These tools, often packed with services like HeartCrypt, leverage compromised code-signing certificates and vulnerable drivers to gain kernel-level access and terminate security processes.
What's New
A significant new finding is the widespread adoption and apparent sharing of these EDR killer tools, often customized and packed with HeartCrypt, across numerous competing ransomware groups including RansomHub, Blacksuit, Medusa, Qilin, Dragonforce, Crytox, Lynx, and INC. This suggests a concerning trend of technical knowledge transfer and tool sharing within the ransomware ecosystem, making these attacks more pervasive and challenging to defend against.
Actionable Threat Data
T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools: Monitor for the creation of new services with randomly generated five-character names, especially those associated with .sys files, as these are indicative of malicious driver installation for EDR evasion.
T1036.005 - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location: Look for executables that masquerade as legitimate software (e.g., by injecting malicious code into legitimate utilities like Beyond Compare) and attempt to load drivers signed with revoked or expired certificates from entities like "Changsha Hengxiang Information Technology Co., Ltd." or "Fuzhou Dingxin Trade Co., Ltd.".
T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools: Detect attempts to terminate security-related processes such as MsMpEng.exe, SophosHealth.exe, SAVService.exe, sophosui.exe, sepwscsvc64Exe, sepagentExe, SophosOsqueryExtension.exe, SophosNetFilter.exe, SophosScanCoordinator.exe, SophosUpdate.exe, HitmanPro.Alert.exe, HitmanPro.exe, HmpschedExe, mpcmdrunExe, and NissrvExe.
T1055 - Process Injection: Identify instances of process hollowing
Sophisticated EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) killer tools are increasingly being used by various ransomware groups to disable security solutions, allowing them to operate undetected during multi-stage attacks. These tools, often packed with services like HeartCrypt, leverage compromised code-signing certificates and vulnerable drivers to gain kernel-level access and terminate security processes.
What's New
A significant new finding is the widespread adoption and apparent sharing of these EDR killer tools, often customized and packed with HeartCrypt, across numerous competing ransomware groups including RansomHub, Blacksuit, Medusa, Qilin, Dragonforce, Crytox, Lynx, and INC. This suggests a concerning trend of technical knowledge transfer and tool sharing within the ransomware ecosystem, making these attacks more pervasive and challenging to defend against.
Actionable Threat Data
T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools: Monitor for the creation of new services with randomly generated five-character names, especially those associated with .sys files, as these are indicative of malicious driver installation for EDR evasion.
T1036.005 - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location: Look for executables that masquerade as legitimate software (e.g., by injecting malicious code into legitimate utilities like Beyond Compare) and attempt to load drivers signed with revoked or expired certificates from entities like "Changsha Hengxiang Information Technology Co., Ltd." or "Fuzhou Dingxin Trade Co., Ltd.".
T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools: Detect attempts to terminate security-related processes such as MsMpEng.exe, SophosHealth.exe, SAVService.exe, sophosui.exe, sepwscsvc64Exe, sepagentExe, SophosOsqueryExtension.exe, SophosNetFilter.exe, SophosScanCoordinator.exe, SophosUpdate.exe, HitmanPro.Alert.exe, HitmanPro.exe, HmpschedExe, mpcmdrunExe, and NissrvExe.
T1055 - Process Injection: Identify instances of process hollowing
Detects components of the KimJongRAT PE variant, including the orchestrator (NetworkService.dll), loader (sys.dll/baby.dll), and stealer (dwm.dll), based on unique strings, PDB paths, and network communication artifacts.
Detects techniques used by the Dropping Elephant APT group to stage and execute a DLL side-loading attack using VLC Media Player. This includes the execution of VLC from suspicious paths, the use of PowerShell to download and rename payloads into those paths, and the specific scheduled task used for persistence.
Guildma malware (also known as Astaroth), has been observed abusing the legitimate Windows colorcpl.exe tool in a cunning way. According to SANS ISC, the malware first uses colorcpl.exe to silently copy bitsadmin.exe into the writable C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\ directory, avoiding the typical copy command that security tools might detect. Once relocated, Guildma executes this copy of bitsadmin.exe from the less-scrutinized path to download additional payloads, effectively sidestepping traditional detection mechanisms that monitor only the original binary location.
Detects the creation of a directory with a trailing space in its name (e.g., "C:\Windows \") using the NT path prefix `\\?\`. This technique was observed in a Remcos malware campaign in June 2025 to masquerade as a legitimate system directory like `C:\Windows\SysWOW64` to evade detection.
Detects Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) associated with a Havoc C2 variant. This includes specific file hashes, C2 network connections, and a unique command-line execution pattern involving a masqueraded conhost.exe creating a cmd.exe process for injection.
Detects post-exploitation techniques used by the GoldMelody Initial Access Broker (also tracked as TGR-CRI-0045 and UNC961). This activity includes the use of a specific staging directory 'C:\Windows\Temp\111t' for custom tooling like 'updf.exe' for privilege escalation and 'txp.exe'/'txpm.exe' for port scanning.
KQL Query
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