Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of binaries that are named similarly to legitimate Sysinternals tools but lack the expected digital signature or product information. Adversaries often rename their malicious tools to impersonate legitimate software like Sysinternals utilities to evade detection and appear less suspicious.
This rule detects suspicious parent processes for a set of well-known Windows system processes. It specifically looks for instances where `svchost.exe`, `taskhost.exe`, `lsm.exe`, `lsass.exe`, `services.exe`, `lsaiso.exe`, `csrss.exe`, `wininit.exe`, or `winlogon.exe` are spawned by a parent process that is not typically expected. The rule filters out legitimate parent processes such as those from security products (e.g., `SavService.exe`, `MsMpEng.exe`), common system directories (`System32`, `SysWOW64`), and cases where the parent process is null or empty.
Detects a network connection initiated by programs or processes running from suspicious or uncommon file system locations. This often indicates malware execution or persistence from areas not typically used by legitimate applications for network communication.
Detects Elise backdoor activity, specifically looking for the creation of a svchost.exe process in a suspicious path and the deletion of a NavShExt.dll file, which are indicators of the Elise malware used by APT32.
This rule detects unusual parent or child processes associated with 'ImagingDevices.exe' (Windows Contacts). Specifically, it looks for 'ImagingDevices.exe' being spawned by 'WmiPrvSE.exe', 'svchost.exe', or 'dllhost.exe', or for 'ImagingDevices.exe' spawning any child process. This activity has been observed in connection with Bumblebee malware operations, where adversaries might abuse legitimate processes for execution or defense evasion.
This rule detects specific file paths, command-line arguments, and PowerShell commands associated with the Greenbug espionage group's May 2020 campaign, as reported by Symantec. It looks for suspicious executables in ProgramData directories, the use of 'revshell.exe' and 'ncat.exe' (especially with '-e cmd.exe'), and various PowerShell command patterns indicative of malicious activity, including base64 encoded strings.
This rule detects instances where specific system binaries (msdtc.exe or gpsvc.exe) are executed from non-standard Windows system directories. This behavior is often indicative of masquerading, where malicious executables are named after legitimate system processes to evade detection, a tactic known to be used by the Lazarus Group.
Detects the creation of specific files associated with the Small Sieve malware. This includes files with a characteristic typo ('Microsift' instead of 'Microsoft') in their path or a specific filename ('MicrosoftWindowsOutlookDataPlus.txt') in the AppData\Local directory, which are indicators of the Small Sieve malware's activity.
Detects attempts to download a Flash Player update from a suspicious, non-official location. This rule specifically looks for requests containing '/flash_install.php' or ending with '/install_flash_player.exe' that do not originate from a legitimate Adobe domain.
This rule detects the creation of executable files (.exe) or dynamic link libraries (.dll) within the default Group Policy Object (GPO) storage folder. Adversaries may place malicious files in this location to leverage Group Policy for persistence, privilege escalation, or to distribute malware across a domain. The specific folder path targeted is '\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\' which corresponds to the Default Domain Policy GPO.
Detects the execution of 'MicroScMgmt.exe' as a sub-process of 'WINWORD.EXE', which is indicative of an exploit for CVE-2015-1641. This specific process creation pattern has been observed in attacks leveraging this vulnerability.
Detects a suspicious DLL load by an "svchost" process based on location and name that might be related to ColdSteel RAT. This DLL location and name has been seen used by ColdSteel as the service DLL for its persistence mechanism.
Detects the creation of a specific '.url' file named 'file001.url' within the 'Recent' folder of Microsoft Office. This activity has been observed in potential exploitation attempts related to CVE-2023-36884, where adversaries drop such files to achieve persistence or execute malicious code.
Detects the creation of an 'svchost.exe' process with specific command line flags ('-k msupdate', '-k msupdate2', or '-k alg') that have been observed in use by the ColdSteel RAT for persistence and defense evasion. This pattern indicates the RAT establishing itself as a service to maintain access on a compromised system.
This rule detects the creation of files with a '.dll' extension that have names matching known Windows system DLLs (e.g., 'secur32.dll', 'tdh.dll') but are created in unusual or non-standard system directories. The rule specifically excludes common legitimate system directories like 'System32' and 'SysWOW64' to reduce false positives. This behavior can indicate an attempt at DLL sideloading or other defense evasion techniques where an attacker places a malicious DLL with a legitimate system DLL name in a location that a legitimate application might load it from.
This rule detects instances where 'svchost.exe' is spawned by an uncommon parent process. It specifically filters out common and legitimate parent processes such as 'Mrt.exe', 'MsMpEng.exe', 'ngen.exe', 'rpcnet.exe', 'services.exe', and 'TiWorker.exe', as well as cases where the parent process is null or empty. This helps to identify potential masquerading or defense evasion attempts where an adversary might try to hide malicious activity by naming their process 'svchost.exe' and having it spawned by an unusual parent.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe from an uncommon directory, which can indicate an attempt to masquerade malicious activity by naming a malicious executable 'msiexec.exe' and placing it outside of its standard legitimate paths. This technique is often used for defense evasion.
This rule detects unusual parent or child processes associated with `wab.exe` (Windows Contacts) and `wabmig.exe` (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool). These processes are typically not involved in spawning other processes or being spawned by unusual parents. The rule specifically looks for `wab.exe` or `wabmig.exe` being spawned by `WmiPrvSE.exe`, `svchost.exe`, or `dllhost.exe`, or if `wab.exe` or `wabmig.exe` themselves spawn any child processes. This behavior has been observed in connection with Bumblebee loader activity, indicating potential malicious execution or defense evasion.
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