Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
690 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
264
186
49
46
40
Contributors
172
97
71
63
41
Categories
370
145
94
90
85
Platforms
589
49
20
14
8
Products / Services
197
179
89
34
27
MITRE Techniques
18,108
15,613
12,573
8,384
6,203
CVEs
5
4
4
3
3
IDS Classtypes
14
4
1
IDS Protocols
6
6
4
3
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDrive KeepAlive' or a task set to execute every 5 minutes, in conjunction with the execution of 'taskhostw.exe' containing 'exec hide' in its command line. This pattern is indicative of the Kimsuky threat group using a renamed version of the NirCmd utility to maintain persistence and execute commands silently.
This rule detects DNS queries for domains associated with the SilkParasite campaign, which leverages typosquatting to impersonate Central Asian government, energy, and telecommunications entities for potential malicious activity.
Detects suspicious PE files that masquerade as Mozilla Firefox by using Firefox-related product names and metadata, but lack valid Mozilla Corporation code-signing signatures and are located within the ProgramData directory.
Detects the Microsoft Edge browser executable running from an anomalous path (C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\) or exhibiting suspicious network behavior (to a known malicious domain 'deadhub.org' or IP address '193.23.118.155'). This behavior is indicative of a masquerading attempt to hide malicious activity by mimicking a trusted browser binary.
This rule detects internal hosts initiating outbound SSH connections to known public tunneling services (e.g., pinggy.io). Attackers frequently use these services to bypass network firewalls and create persistent reverse SSH tunnels for remote command-and-control access. The detection logic focuses on the identification of SSH protocol traffic headers combined with specific domain targeting or repetitive connection behavior.
Detects execution of 'codeflush.exe' or attempts to rename files involving 'codeflush.exe' and 'pythonw.exe' within 'MusicLibrariesPackage' directories. This activity often indicates the execution of potentially malicious scripts or tools masquerading as legitimate software.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as 'php-fpm' or 'postgres' that match known SHA-256 hashes associated with the RedTail malware family. The rule identifies processes attempting to hide their identity using techniques similar to prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to rename themselves while running malicious code.
Detects the execution of 'wkspbroker.exe' or the loading of 'radcui.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory path ('AppData\Local\Microsoft\RemoteApp\Gateway'). This behavior is indicative of DLL sideloading or execution of potentially malicious or unauthorized binaries masquerading as legitimate Windows remote connectivity components.
Detects suspicious PE files that masquerade as Mozilla Firefox by using Firefox-related product names and metadata, but lack valid Mozilla Corporation code-signing signatures and are located within the ProgramData directory.
Detects Microsoft Edge executable (msedge.exe) being created, deleted, or renamed within the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. This path is often used by adversaries to masquerade malicious files or persistence mechanisms as legitimate telemetry components.
Detects HTTP connections between internal hosts and suspected C2 infrastructure associated with the Operation SilkParasite campaign. The rule specifically monitors for connections to known malicious IPs and identifies the retrieval of a cloned RTX Corporation homepage content, which acts as a decoy for the SpiceRAT malware.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and TLS certificate attributes associated with the SilkParasite threat actor. The rule specifically targets domains that impersonate Central Asian government entities and monitors for suspicious TLS certificate issuers and subjects, indicating potential C2 infrastructure or phishing activity.
Detects the creation or renaming of files within the '\ProgramData\doxc' directory, and correlates this with the execution of 'mklink /H' commands that point to that directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or hiding files by creating hard links.
Detects the creation or renaming of files within the '\ProgramData\doxc' directory, and correlates this with the execution of 'mklink /H' commands that point to that directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or hiding files by creating hard links.
Detects DNS queries and HTTP Host header traffic to known SilverFox malware impersonation domains. These domains utilize .com.cn TLDs and typosquatting techniques to masquerade as legitimate software or service providers.
Detects instances where a process named msedge.exe is running from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. This is a common location used by attackers to hide malicious executables by masquerading them as legitimate browser processes, particularly when the process command line includes arguments like 'preview' or 'thumbnail' which are often used to blend in with background system activity.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with command-line arguments that reference VLC-themed filenames or presentations. This behavior is indicative of a malicious HTA file being used as a lure to drop the Lightlife RAT loader, leveraging the mshta.exe utility to bypass standard application execution controls.
Detects the execution of processes named 'UpdateAssistant.exe', 'AppUpdateHelper.exe', or 'SysMaintenance.exe' from specific common application directories that are either unsigned or lack a valid Microsoft digital signature. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to masquerade malicious binaries as legitimate system update components to evade detection.
Detects suspicious PE files that masquerade as Mozilla Firefox by using Firefox-related product names and metadata, but lack valid Mozilla Corporation code-signing signatures and are located within the ProgramData directory.
Detects the MovieReaper Stage-3 module which masquerades as Microsoft Edge (msedge.exe) within the C:\ProgramData\Windows\Telemetry directory. The detection focuses on suspicious process execution from this directory and identifies instances where the process respawns itself, suggesting malicious activity post-UAC bypass.
Detects instances of the Hannibal Stealer module that attempt to masquerade as the legitimate 'CefSharp.BrowsersSubprocess.dll' by spoofing publisher metadata ('LLC Windows'). The detection triggers when this process is identified initiating network connections shortly after execution, which aligns with the malware's known behavior of performing geolocation-based checks before continuing activity.
Page 4 of 33