Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
379 detections
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Detects Bluetooth OBEX protocol data transfers used for physical data exfiltration
Detects the execution of the MinIO client (mc) with insecure connection parameters, indicating potential automated data exfiltration to S3-compatible storage by threats like BLUERABBIT. The rule specifically looks for the 'alias', 'set', and '--insecure' arguments in the process command line.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
Detects network connections over common exfiltration ports (80, 443, 53) to external IP addresses originating from executables running out of uncommon, temporary, or public directories. This behavior frequently indicates custom or unrecognized malware binaries conducting data exfiltration or establishing Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects network connections over common exfiltration ports (80, 443, 53) to external IP addresses originating from executables running out of uncommon, temporary, or public directories. This behavior frequently indicates custom or unrecognized malware binaries conducting data exfiltration or establishing Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects network connections over common exfiltration ports (80, 443, 53) to external IP addresses originating from executables running out of uncommon, temporary, or public directories. This behavior frequently indicates custom or unrecognized malware binaries conducting data exfiltration or establishing Command and Control (C2) communication.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration attempts over non-standard network ports. It identifies devices that establish more than 5 network sessions to external (non-private IP) destinations on ports other than common ones like 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS), 21 (FTP), 22 (SSH), 25 (SMTP), 110 (POP3), 143 (IMAP), 993 (IMAPS), and 995 (POP3S) within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass network monitoring by using less common ports for data transfer.
This rule detects a high volume of DNS TXT queries originating from the home network to any destination on port 53. This behavior is indicative of potential DNS exfiltration, where data is encoded and transmitted via DNS TXT records. The rule triggers an alert if 30 or more TXT queries are observed from a single source within a 60-second window.
Detects network connections over common exfiltration ports (80, 443, 53) to external IP addresses originating from executables running out of uncommon, temporary, or public directories. This behavior frequently indicates custom or unrecognized malware binaries conducting data exfiltration or establishing Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects DNS queries commonly associated with Local LLM (Large Language Model) frameworks or AI-related domains. This activity may indicate unauthorized AI usage or potential data exfiltration channels.
Box SaaS Suspicious File Upload
Cortex XDR
Detects suspicious file uploads to Box indicating potential data staging, tool upload, or exfiltration via shared folders. This rule specifically looks for the 'UPLOAD' operation within Box SaaS audit logs and extracts various file and user-related details.
Box SaaS Suspicious File Download
Cortex XDR
Detects file downloads from Box which could indicate potential data exfiltration by insiders or compromised accounts. This rule specifically looks for 'DOWNLOAD' operations within Box SaaS audit logs.
Detects Microsoft 365 access attempts where the ClientAppId masquerades as Microsoft Office (d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c) to bypass conditional access policies, but the UserAgent string reveals the use of a programmatic script (e.g., Python, PowerShell). This mismatch is a known tactic utilized by UNC6671 (BlackFile) during automated data exfiltration operations.
Detects programmatic file access in Microsoft 365/SharePoint environments where the operation is logged as 'FileAccessed' but the UserAgent indicates a scripting library like python-requests or PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration techniques used by actors like UNC6671 (BlackFile) who stream file content directly to bypass traditional 'FileDownloaded' monitoring.
Detects network connections to the Session P2P exfiltration infrastructure used by the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign.
Detects outbound network connections to known C2 domains associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain worm, used to exfiltrate stolen credentials from developer machines and CI/CD pipelines.
Detects DNS queries to attacker-controlled infrastructure used by the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign.
The domain git-tanstack.com is attacker-controlled. The filev2.getsession.org endpoint is used
for credential exfiltration via the Session protocol.
The domain git-tanstack.com is attacker-controlled. The filev2.getsession.org endpoint is used
for credential exfiltration via the Session protocol.
Detects multiple threat behaviors associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain worm campaign. This includes memory scraping for secrets, execution of malicious Node/Bun payloads, connection to known C2 domains, and file operations related to persistence.
Detects the execution of the Windows Bluetooth File Transfer Wizard (fsquirt.exe), which may be abused for data exfiltration or payload delivery over Bluetooth. The rule identifies execution of fsquirt.exe and flags potentially suspicious indicators like specific transfer arguments or execution from non-standard paths.
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known PhantomRaven command and control (C2) infrastructure, including specific domains and IP addresses. The rule also specifically identifies potential data exfiltration attempts to the '/mozbra.php' endpoint.
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