Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
379 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
170
71
34
34
18
Contributors
89
76
55
21
16
Categories
283
178
76
67
52
Platforms
222
84
83
61
34
Products / Services
92
66
57
37
33
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
CVEs
5
1
1
1
1
IDS Classtypes
23
6
3
1
1
IDS Protocols
13
11
4
3
2
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for PNG files from github.com with a minimal set of HTTP headers. Specifically, it looks for requests where the total size of HTTP header names is less than 30 bytes and explicitly excludes common headers like 'user-agent', 'referer', 'accept', 'x-auth', and 'cookie'. This pattern could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data or perform other covert communication using a simplified HTTP client, potentially to evade detection by security tools that expect full browser-like headers.
Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote
Detects the execution of the Restic backup tool, which can be used for data exfiltration. Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services. If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
Detects the execution of WinSCP with the "-command" and "open" flags to establish an FTP or SFTP connection. This technique has been observed in use by the Akira ransomware group for data exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of WinSCP from any directory other than its standard installation path, 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WinSCP\'. This behavior can indicate the use of a portable version of WinSCP, which might be employed by adversaries for data exfiltration or other malicious activities to avoid detection by standard software inventory or whitelisting solutions. The rule specifically looks for process creation events where the image name ends with 'WinSCP.exe' or the original filename is 'winscp.exe', and then filters out executions originating from the legitimate installation directory.
The analytic detects FTP connections initiated by processes located in non-standard installation paths on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify network connections where the process image path does not match common directories like "Program Files" or "Windows\System32". This activity is significant as FTP is often used by adversaries and malware, such as AgentTesla, for Command and Control (C2) communications to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer, exposing sensitive information and compromising the integrity of the affected host.
Detects data leakage and exfiltration attempts targeting Ollama model metadata and configuration endpoints. Adversaries repeatedly query /api/show, /api/tags, and /api/v1/models to systematically extract sensitive model information including architecture details, fine-tuning parameters, system paths, Modelfile configurations, and proprietary customizations. Multiple inspection attempts within a 15-minute window indicate automated exfiltration of valuable intellectual property such as custom model configurations, system prompts, and internal model specifications. This activity represents unauthorized data disclosure that could enable competitive intelligence gathering, model replication, or preparation for advanced attacks against the AI infrastructure.
Detects the use of the rclone tool with data transfer commands (copy, move, sync, copyto, moveto) originating from a GoAnywhere server process or common interactive shell processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This activity is highly suspicious and could indicate data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of the Restic backup tool, which can be used for data exfiltration.
Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services.
If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services.
If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
This rule identifies DNS lookups associated with common Tor proxies and services. It detects queries for domains ending in '.onion' and various Tor gateway domains (e.g., '.hiddenservice.net', '.tor2web.com', '.tor-gateways.de'). This activity can indicate the use of the Tor network for anonymization, which adversaries may leverage for command and control, data exfiltration, or to obscure their malicious activities.
This analytic detects the configuration of TFTP services on Cisco IOS devices that could be used to exfiltrate sensitive configuration files. Threat actors like Static Tundra have been observed configuring TFTP servers to make device configuration files accessible for exfiltration after gaining initial access. The detection specifically looks for commands that expose critical configuration files such as startup-config, running-config, and other sensitive system information through TFTP. This activity is particularly concerning as it may represent an attempt to steal credentials, network topology information, and other sensitive data stored in device configurations.
Base64 Website Access
YARA-L
Detects a user accessing multiple websites commonly used for Base64 encoding and decoding within a short time frame. This activity could be a precursor to data exfiltration or an attempt to obfuscate malicious commands.
Detects scenarios where an attacker downloads a payload by abusing BITS software. For more precise information, inspect "Bits-client" event log and search for ID 59 and 60.
Detects scenarios where an attacker downloads a payload by abusing BITS software. For more precise information, inspect "Bits-client" event log and search for ID 59 and 60.
This rule detects suspicious file write and network activity that may indicate data exfiltration from a Windows Server using common tools like curl, ftp, or powershell. It correlates file creation/modification events with outbound network connections made by known exfiltration tools within a 5-minute window. This is useful for identifying insider threats, compromised servers, and automated exfiltration scripts.
Detects the execution of legitimate file transfer or backup utilities like FileZilla (fzsftp.exe), Restic, or BackBlaze (b2.exe) that have been observed being abused by threat actors for data exfiltration.
This detection identifies repeated outbound email events where large files are sent multiple times within a specific time window. It helps uncover potential data exfiltration attempts or misuse of corporate email for transferring large files externally.
Thresholds for file size, frequency, and time window can be adjusted to fit organizational context.
Thresholds for file size, frequency, and time window can be adjusted to fit organizational context.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration attempts via email by monitoring internal users sending emails to external domains. It flags suspicious activity based on three criteria: a high volume of emails sent (over 100) combined with a large total data size (over 50 MB), a significant number of emails sent to personal domains (over 20), or a notable count of emails with sensitive subjects (over 5). The rule aggregates these metrics over a 1-day window for each user.
Detects large data transfers over SSH/SCP (port 22) to or from an ESXi host. This activity is highly suspicious and could indicate an attacker delivering a ransomware payload to the hypervisor or exfiltrating sensitive data (like VMDK files).
KQL Query from file: Sentinel - Threat Hunting DNS Tunneling
KQL Query from file: DefenderXDR Weekly OSINT Indicators Scan
Page 16 of 19