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This rule detects the creation of new Windows services where the executable path is suspicious. Suspicious paths include common temporary or user-writable directories like `Users\Public`, `ProgramData`, `AppData`, or `Windows\Temp`. Additionally, it flags services that directly execute `cmd.exe` or `powershell.exe` with suspicious arguments (e.g., encoded commands, hidden windows, or `/c` for command execution), or `rundll32.exe` from suspicious paths. It also identifies services with very short, alphanumeric names, which could indicate an attempt at masquerading.
Detects when a Group Policy Object (GPO) is modified to include Client-Side Extensions (CSEs) for managing local group memberships or user rights assignments. While this can be a legitimate administrative action, attackers can abuse this capability to escalate privileges by adding accounts to sensitive local groups (e.g., Administrators) or granting powerful user rights. This alert serves as an early warning to investigate the specific changes made within the GPO.
Detects a successful NTLM network logon from a NULL SID (S-1-0-0). This pattern is a strong indicator of an NTLM relay attack, where an attacker intercepts an authentication attempt and relays it to a target service, such as LDAP on a Domain Controller, to perform actions on behalf of the relayed user. This is often used to modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs).
This rule detects activities associated with the RomCom threat group, including exploitation of CVE-2025-8088 (WinRAR path traversal), COM hijacking for persistence, anti-analysis techniques (RecentDocs check), C2 communication, and suspicious WMIC execution, potentially linked to a Mythic agent.
Detects various Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with UAT-7237 activity, including file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and URLs. This rule identifies suspicious process executions based on known malicious file hashes and network connections to malicious IP addresses or URLs.
Detects when an application or service principal performs sensitive configuration changes, likely via the Microsoft Graph API. This can indicate an attacker using a compromised or malicious application for persistence (adding credentials), privilege escalation (adding owners), or defense evasion (modifying Conditional Access policies). This aligns with the "Consent & Compromise" research where attackers abuse application permissions.
This rule detects successful network connections from external (internet) IP addresses to common Industrial Control System (ICS) ports, such as Modbus (502) and EtherNet/IP (44818). This activity could indicate unauthorized access attempts, reconnaissance, or exploitation of internet-exposed ICS assets. The rule specifically filters for allowed/accepted/permitted connections and excludes connections from RFC 1918 private IP addresses and a configurable list of authorized external IPs.
Detects reflective loading of .NET assemblies from memory within PowerShell. This technique is often used to execute malicious code while bypassing file-based detections and some AMSI features, as the assembly is loaded directly from a byte array rather than from a file on disk.
Detects attempts to modify Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) ladder logic or firmware. Such modifications can indicate a high-impact attack aimed at disrupting physical processes, damaging equipment, or establishing persistence within the Operational Technology (OT) network.
This rule consolidates multiple detections related to a widespread malspam campaign delivering the Nova infostealer. It hunts for activity across email, network, DNS, and firewall logs associated with known malicious domains, IPs, and specific TTPs like suspicious archive attachments from impersonated brands.
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