Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell commands that incorporate execution policy bypass and hidden window styling. This pattern is commonly observed in malware loaders and persistence mechanisms to minimize visual indicators during execution.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Photo Studio' or the execution of a VBScript file named 'PhotoStudio.vbs' located within a 'PhotoStudioVBS' folder, which are artifacts associated with the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) threat group to maintain persistence.
This rule monitors for the creation of a scheduled task named 'Autoupdate' that executes a python.exe script. This pattern is commonly used by attackers for persistence mechanisms to ensure their malicious Python scripts run periodically on the host. It correlates both process creation logs for schtasks.exe and security event logs (Event ID 4698) for task creation.
Detects the creation of Windows Scheduled Tasks that follow the 'PythonLauncher-' naming convention, often associated with Starland RAT, using PowerShell commands such as Register-ScheduledTask. The rule monitors for persistence mechanisms configured to run at logon or with highest privileges.
Detects the creation of Windows Scheduled Tasks that follow the 'PythonLauncher-' naming convention, often associated with Starland RAT, using PowerShell commands such as Register-ScheduledTask. The rule monitors for persistence mechanisms configured to run at logon or with highest privileges.
Detects the creation of a hidden scheduled task using the Schedule.Service COM object, where the author field is explicitly set to 'Microsoft Corporation' to masquerade as a legitimate system task.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Photo Studio' or the execution of a VBScript file named 'PhotoStudio.vbs' located within a 'PhotoStudioVBS' folder, which are artifacts associated with the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) threat group to maintain persistence.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell commands that incorporate execution policy bypass and hidden window styling. This pattern is commonly observed in malware loaders and persistence mechanisms to minimize visual indicators during execution.
Detects potential persistence mechanisms that mimic or leverage the Microsoft OneDrive update process. This includes the creation or modification of scheduled tasks containing 'OneDrive Update' in the command line using tools like schtasks or PowerShell, as well as modifications to the HKCU OneDrive environment registry key, a behavior associated with the GigaWiper malware.
Detects various stages of the Armored Likho APT campaign using the BusySnake stealer, including lure archive delivery, NSIS droppers, LNK shortcut abuse, PowerShell-based staging, VBScript persistence, scheduled task creation, reverse SSH tunneling, and exfiltration of browser and communication artifacts.
Detects the creation of Windows Scheduled Tasks that follow the 'PythonLauncher-' naming convention, often associated with Starland RAT, using PowerShell commands such as Register-ScheduledTask. The rule monitors for persistence mechanisms configured to run at logon or with highest privileges.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using specific, suspicious task names associated with the CURP threat campaign. This rule monitors for 'schtasks.exe' command line executions involving the creation of tasks with names 'brokerhost' or 'net_queue_32', which are identified as indicators of persistent threat activity.
Detects potential persistence mechanisms that mimic or leverage the Microsoft OneDrive update process. This includes the creation or modification of scheduled tasks containing 'OneDrive Update' in the command line using tools like schtasks or PowerShell, as well as modifications to the HKCU OneDrive environment registry key, a behavior associated with the GigaWiper malware.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell commands that incorporate execution policy bypass and hidden window styling. This pattern is commonly observed in malware loaders and persistence mechanisms to minimize visual indicators during execution.
Detects the creation or registration of scheduled tasks involving the suspicious artifact 'SolidPDFPcl2Bmp'. This monitoring covers process executions using schtasks.exe or reg.exe, registry modifications to the Windows Task Scheduler cache, and file drops within the Windows System32 Tasks directory, which are common indicators of persistence establishment via scheduled tasks.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via PowerShell using 'Register-ScheduledTask' configured to run as the SYSTEM account at system startup. The detection specifically identifies tasks with dynamically generated hexadecimal names (8-20 characters), a technique associated with the persistence mechanism of Banana RAT.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the command line includes a specific security descriptor string '(A;;GA;;;WD)' indicating full access (GA) is granted to everyone (WD). This is a known technique used to ensure the created task has broad permissions for persistence or privilege escalation, often associated with bypassing security controls.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe that involves the string 'CrysomeLoader' in the command line, which is indicative of persistence or execution mechanisms associated with the CrysomeLoader malware.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task named 'WindowsHelper' that is configured to execute a 'run.vbs' script via wscript.exe every five minutes. This behavior is associated with the persistence mechanism used by the Armored Likho BusySnake Stealer malware.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe where the command line includes indicators associated with potential malicious binaries or tools. Monitoring for these specific filenames in task creation can identify persistence mechanisms or authorized task scheduling abuse.
Detects instances where the FortiClient scheduler executable (scheduler.exe) spawns FortiTray.exe as a child process. While typically a legitimate operational behavior for the FortiClient application, this pattern is monitored to identify potential abuse where a trusted binary is leveraged as a proxy to execute secondary processes.
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