Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential lateral movement activities by monitoring for the execution of 'psexec', 'wmiexec', or 'schtasks' commands within a short timeframe on the same computer. A count of 2 or more such command executions within an hour is flagged as suspicious, indicating potential adversary activity.
Detects the creation or modification of a scheduled task named 'OneDrive Update', which is known to be used by the BLUERABBIT backdoor for persistence. The rule looks for Windows Security Events (EventID 4698 for task creation, 4702 for task modification) and process execution events where command lines contain 'OneDrive Update' along with scheduled task registration utilities like 'Register-ScheduledTask', 'New-ScheduledTask', or 'schtasks'.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that use `schtasks.exe` to execute `rundll32.exe`. This is a common technique used by attackers for persistence and to execute malicious DLLs, often to bypass application whitelisting or other security controls.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that use `schtasks.exe` to execute `rundll32.exe`. This is a common technique used by attackers for persistence and to execute malicious DLLs, often to bypass application whitelisting or other security controls.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
Detects scheduled tasks created with embedded PowerShell XOR decoding logic, ReadAllBytes, and Invoke-Expression techniques that may be used to establish persistence and execute obfuscated payloads. The rule specifically looks for 'schtasks.exe' creating a task with '/create', containing 'OneDrive', 'Startup', 'Task' in the command line, and also includes '-bxor', 'ReadAllBytes', 'iex', and '[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes' which are indicative of obfuscated PowerShell execution via XOR decoding.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to execute a VBScript (.vbs). This technique is notably used by a North Korean-linked npm infostealer RAT to establish login persistence via a hidden VBS launcher.
This rule detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks (EventID 4698 or 4699) where the command line for the task contains references to scripting languages like PowerShell, cmd, or VBScript. It then groups these events by computer and user, flagging if two or more such tasks are created by the same user on the same computer, which could indicate malicious activity.
Detects execution and persistence mechanisms associated with the
MicrosoftSystem64 payload observed in malicious npm supply-chain
campaigns. The rule focuses on stable post-compromise artifacts
including execution, scheduled tasks, services, registry Run keys,
and startup folder persistence.
MicrosoftSystem64 payload observed in malicious npm supply-chain
campaigns. The rule focuses on stable post-compromise artifacts
including execution, scheduled tasks, services, registry Run keys,
and startup folder persistence.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
This rule detects attempts to modify the Zoom update scheduled task using `schtasks.exe /change`. This activity is indicative of potential scheduled task hijacking, as legitimate Zoom updaters typically do not use this command to modify their own tasks. The detection specifically looks for command lines containing both `/change` and `ZoomUpdateTaskUser-`.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using `schtasks.exe` or `at.exe` with specific command-line arguments (`/create`, `/tn`, and either `/ru` or `/tr`). It then correlates these process events with registry events related to Task Scheduler keys or values containing "Task" to identify potential persistence mechanisms.
This rule detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks (EventID 4698 or 4699) where the command line for the task contains references to scripting languages like PowerShell, cmd, or VBScript. It then groups these events by computer and user, flagging if two or more such tasks are created by the same user on the same computer, which could indicate malicious activity.
Detects the execution of an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) payload located in the %TEMP% directory via wscript.exe, a critical persistence mechanism used by Gamaredon's GammaLoad.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks originating from processes executing out of temporary or download directories. This behavior aligns with the persistence mechanisms of the SilverGorilla .NET dropper, which is typically delivered via recruitment-themed phishing archives.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named '\MicrosoftSystem64', which is a specific Indicator of Compromise (IoC) associated with the Windows variant of the FAMOUS CHOLLIMA / MicrosoftSystem64 RAT malware for persistence. The rule identifies this activity through Windows Event Log (Event ID 4698 for task creation), command-line execution of 'schtasks.exe' with '/create' and the specific task name, and Defender EDR telemetry for scheduled task creation.
Detects suspicious scheduled task creation using schtasks.exe with XML task imports from user-writable directories such as AppData\Local. This behavior is associated with malware families like JustAskJacky, which establish persistence by creating GUID-named scheduled tasks that execute malicious payloads such as node.exe and obfuscated JavaScript files.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'SystemUpdate' using 'schtasks.exe', which is a persistence mechanism observed in the Phantom Bot malware distributed via malicious npm packages. The rule specifically looks for the 'create' action and the 'SystemUpdate' task name in the command line.
This rule detects various suspicious activities associated with a cryptojacking campaign, including the execution of 'RuntimeHost.exe' from unusual directories, creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, DLL side-loading followed by silent MSI execution, process hollowing into .NET utilities, Windows Defender exclusion attempts, and persistence mechanisms via startup folder shortcuts and registry run keys. These activities are indicative of an attacker establishing persistence and evading defenses to perform unauthorized cryptocurrency mining.
Detects scheduled tasks created with embedded PowerShell XOR decoding logic, ReadAllBytes, and Invoke-Expression techniques that may be used to establish persistence and execute obfuscated payloads. The rule specifically looks for 'schtasks.exe' creating a task with '/create', containing 'OneDrive', 'Startup', 'Task' in the command line, and also includes '-bxor', 'ReadAllBytes', 'iex', and '[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes' which are indicative of obfuscated PowerShell execution via XOR decoding.
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