Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects persistence mechanisms used by the HoneyMyte APT group's CoolClient backdoor. The rule looks for the creation of a specific scheduled task ('ComboxResetTask') or the modification of a registry run key to include the 'work' parameter, which are characteristic of the backdoor's 'passuac' and 'install' routines.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task configured to execute a VBScript from a user's AppData folder. This technique is used by adversaries, including the Dead#Vax campaign, to establish persistence via an indirect execution flow, often to evade detections focused on direct PowerShell or cmd.exe task actions.
This detection is designed to help you find activity related to COLDRIVER new ROBOT malware chain (NOROBOT/YESROBOT/MAYBEROBOT). It is based on the specific threat intelligence in the reference, so it focuses on concrete, easy-to-verify signals rather than vague patterns. It uses exact indicators and tightly scoped behaviors described in the referenced threat intelligence. A match does not automatically prove a compromise, and it does not prove the activity was successful, but it is a strong reason to investigate because the signal lines up with published reporting. When this fires, start by confirming which host, account, or server produced the event and whether the behavior is expected for that system. If it is not expected, preserve the relevant logs and files, check for repeated attempts over time, and look for nearby signs such as new admin accounts, unusual remote access, or suspicious downloads. Treat a match as a scoping signal and pivot to other telemetry around the same host, account, and time window. Use the reference link to document why you treated the alert as significant and to support incident notes.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks (`schtasks.exe /create`) where the command line arguments contain suspicious executables or paths commonly associated with malicious activity. This indicates a potential persistence mechanism being established by an adversary.
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'Batteries' pointing to the AppData Roaming directory, which is a specific persistence mechanism for the ValleyRAT campaign. This rule identifies the creation of the scheduled task via 'schtasks.exe', the creation of the legacy '.job' file for the task, or the execution of the payload 'WavesSvc64.exe' from its persistence location.
Detects scheduled tasks created on remote systems using explicit credentials.
OysterLoader stage 3 creates a scheduled task (every 13 min) running rundll32 with a DLL from AppData. Task names include COPYING3, VisualUpdater, AlphaSecurity, DetectorSpywareSecurity. Sekoia report.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe that is triggered by a network connection event (Event ID 10000 from the NetworkProfile provider). This is an unusual persistence technique used by the CRESCENTHARVEST malware to ensure execution only when the machine is online.
Detects scheduled task creation where the task action executes files from Windows Startup folders. This layered persistence combines scheduled tasks (flexible triggers, potential privilege escalation) with startup folder execution for redundancy and resilience.
This rule detects the execution of a specific command-line pattern associated with the KongTuke second-stage loader. It looks for 'conhost.exe' being run with '--headless', 'powershell', '-ep bypass', 'AzureRemove-NetNatStaticMapping.ps1', and 'AppActions' all present in the command line. This combination suggests the execution of a malicious PowerShell script, likely initiated via a scheduled task, as part of the KongTuke malware's persistence or execution mechanism.
Detects the dynamic creation of a scheduled task where cmd.exe first writes an XML task definition file to disk, which is then immediately used by schtasks.exe to create the task. This is a characteristic behavior of the APT28 "Operation MacroMaze" campaign.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task characteristic of OysterLoader persistence. The malware creates a task to execute its dropped DLL in the AppData\Roaming directory using rundll32.exe and the DllRegisterServer export.
This rule detects various activities associated with the 'CrashFix' variant of the 'Clickfix' malware, which deploys a Python-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The detection logic covers several stages of the attack:
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
This rule set detects the OysterLoader malware. The first rule, 'OysterLoader_Mutex_and_TaskNames', identifies the malware based on specific mutex names, scheduled task names, and user-agent strings ('WordPressAgent' and 'FingerPrint') used by OysterLoader. The second rule, 'OysterLoader_C2_Endpoint_Strings', focuses on identifying OysterLoader by detecting specific C2 API paths used for communication with its command and control server. Both rules require the presence of a valid PE file header (MZ magic bytes).
Detects suspicious creation of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe using elevated accounts (Administrator, SYSTEM, NT AUTHORITY), excluding local host targets.
OysterLoader uses a Windows scheduled task to keep itself running. It creates a task with a name that looks like a normal security or updater tool, so it blends in. The task runs repeatedly in the background, helping the malware come back even after a restart and making it harder to notice or remove.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task characteristic of OysterLoader's persistence mechanism. The malware creates a task set to run every 13 minutes, which executes a malicious DLL from the AppData\Roaming directory using rundll32.exe.
The rule detects the execution of 'run.exe' where its image path contains 'SoftwareProtectionPlatform' and its command line arguments include both 'SoftwareProtectionPlatform' and 'udp.pyw'. This specific combination is indicative of the KongTuke malware establishing persistence through a scheduled task named 'SoftwareProtection'.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'SoftwareProtection' that executes a Python script. This technique is used by the CrashFix variant to establish persistence for its Python-based RAT, mimicking a legitimate Windows service to blend in. The malware drops its components into a subfolder of AppData to masquerade as a legitimate platform component.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'SoftwareProtection' that executes a Python script. This is a persistence mechanism used by the CrashFix campaign to masquerade as a legitimate Windows service.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named "TPMProfiler" that executes QEMU ('qemu-system-x86_64.exe'). This technique was observed being used by threat actors to establish persistence after exploiting SolarWinds Web Help Desk vulnerabilities.
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