Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
Detects potential reflective DLL injection or process hollowing attempts by monitoring for high-privilege cross-process access (ProcessAccess EventID 10) or remote thread creation (CreateRemoteThread EventID 8). These methods are frequently used by attackers to execute malicious code within the memory space of a legitimate target process, thereby evading traditional signature-based detection.
This rule detects potential process injection or process hollowing attempts by correlating Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) events indicating process memory modification permissions (such as PROCESS_VM_WRITE and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD) with subsequent Sysmon Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) events targeting the same process. This behavior is indicative of an adversary injecting malicious code into a legitimate host process (e.g., svchost.exe, explorer.exe).
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
Detects the CLOSEDQUORUM implant communicating with multiple LLM providers (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral, or Gemini) for quorum-based decision making, followed by the same process spawning or injecting into a legitimate Windows system process (e.g., svchost, explorer) to conduct post-exploitation activities.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory access events, such as PROCESS_VM_WRITE and PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME, often indicative of process hollowing or Early Bird APC injection. The rule monitors for elevated granted access masks originating from non-system processes, a behavior associated with the CLOSEDQUORUM implant's post-compromise activities.
Detects PavokwiLoader behavior where a potentially malicious process spawns a browser or system process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) in a suspended state, followed by cross-process memory allocation and writing, and subsequent thread hijacking or execution resumption, indicating a process hollowing injection technique.
Detects instances where a suspected malicious loader initiates process hollowing or APC injection by launching trusted Windows binaries (e.g., LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, Magnify.exe) in a suspended state. The rule identifies suspicious post-injection behavior such as unexpected network connections or child process creation originating from these typically benign binaries, which is characteristic of the DeepLoad/ClickFix attack chain.
Detects the creation of a remote thread targeting the native Windows utility 'attrib.exe'. This behavior is characteristic of code injection techniques, such as those used by the Sauron loader, where malicious shellcode is executed within the context of a legitimate system process to evade detection and maintain persistence.
Detects suspicious cross-process access (Sysmon Event ID 10) and remote thread creation (Sysmon Event ID 8) targeting sensitive processes such as lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe, which are indicative of process injection or hollowing techniques used for evasion or persistence.
Detects OnyxC2 RunPE injection behavior where a process drops or loads a suspicious sideloaded DLL (specifically borlndmm.dll) and immediately initiates a secondary process instance, indicative of process hollowing or memory unpacking of a malicious payload.
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
Detects a specific privilege escalation and code execution chain attributed to the PUROSANGUE methodology. This activity involves using a COM Elevation Moniker (specifically with the 'Elevation:Administrator!new:' syntax) to bypass UAC, followed by process hollowing into ServiceModelReg.exe. The attack is initiated from unconventional parent processes such as vsdbg.exe or its associated DLL.
Detects instances where a process spawns a child process using the exact same executable image path, specifically when the executable is located in user-writable directories such as Downloads or AppData\Local\Temp. This behavior is a common indicator of process hollowing or self-injection techniques used by malware, such as loaders that decrypt payloads in memory and then spawn a new, hollowed instance of themselves to execute the malicious code, frequently observed during post-exploitation activities.
This rule monitors for suspicious process behaviors and module loads, specifically focusing on unusual explorer.exe parentage, the loading of common system DLLs (dbghelp.dll, Secur32.dll) in potentially anomalous contexts, and specific command-line strings that may indicate malicious activity or tools.
Detects PavokwiLoader behavior where a potentially malicious process spawns a browser or system process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) in a suspended state, followed by cross-process memory allocation and writing, and subsequent thread hijacking or execution resumption, indicating a process hollowing injection technique.
Detects PavokwiLoader behavior where a potentially malicious process spawns a browser or system process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) in a suspended state, followed by cross-process memory allocation and writing, and subsequent thread hijacking or execution resumption, indicating a process hollowing injection technique.
Detects PavokwiLoader behavior where a potentially malicious process spawns a browser or system process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) in a suspended state, followed by cross-process memory allocation and writing, and subsequent thread hijacking or execution resumption, indicating a process hollowing injection technique.
Detects PavokwiLoader behavior where a potentially malicious process spawns a browser or system process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) in a suspended state, followed by cross-process memory allocation and writing, and subsequent thread hijacking or execution resumption, indicating a process hollowing injection technique.
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
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