Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the ServiceModelReg.exe process, a known vector for ResiLoader process hollowing. It monitors for cross-process injection (e.g., process hollowing) and process creation events where ServiceModelReg.exe is spawned by suspicious parent processes (such as scripting engines) or originates from an unexpected location.
This rule detects scenarios where an unsigned process, originating from typical staging areas (e.g., Temp, AppData, ProgramData), performs cross-process injection (e.g., process hollowing) into a signed third-party binary. This behavior is indicative of malware loaders attempting to masquerade their execution by hiding within the context of legitimate, signed software.
Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.
This rule detects potential process injection activities associated with the HijackLoader (IDAT Loader) malware family. It monitors Sysmon event logs for sequences involving process creation, image loading, and inter-process manipulation, specifically flagging the use of CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, and process access patterns (such as writing thread rights) indicative of reflective DLL injection used to deliver payloads like Vidar.
Detects process hollowing behavior where a ClickFix-delivered loader payload targets legitimate Windows host processes like explorer.exe or svchost.exe. The detection looks for a combination of memory operations (NtUnmapViewOfSection, WriteProcessMemory, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE allocation) and thread control (SetThreadContext, ResumeThread) indicative of malicious code injection.
Detects signs of process hollowing targeting ServiceModelReg.exe, a technique used by ResiLoader to execute the StealC information stealer. The rule monitors for suspicious cross-process access (high-privilege handles), remote thread creation, and anomalous module loading patterns within the target process.
This rule monitors for indicators of process hollowing or memory injection targeting ServiceModelReg.exe. It correlates suspicious events including the creation of suspended processes, memory writes, remote thread creation, specific debug strings (e.g., RUNPE, PEB patched), and outbound network connections. This approach aims to reduce noise from legitimate use of ServiceModelReg.exe by requiring multiple indicators of malicious behavior.
Detects anomalous process injection behavior characteristic of the Turb00 operation (e.g., Go-loader/HijackLoader variants). The rule identifies a two-stage signal: first, the mapping of an unbacked or unusually named executable image into a process before the loading of ntdll.dll; and second, the subsequent invocation of sensitive process manipulation APIs like CreateRemoteThread or SetThreadContext on the same host within a 10-minute window, consistent with process hollowing.
Detects evidence of process hollowing involving 'ServiceModelReg.exe', often used to conceal malicious stealer activity. The rule correlates the creation of this process with subsequent unexpected outbound network connections from the same process/host, and also monitors for specific debug/log strings indicative of failed or active process hollowing attempts (RUNPE techniques).
Detects multiple signals associated with potential process injection or hollowing involving 'ServiceModelReg.exe'. The rule correlates process creation in a suspended state, memory injection-related actions, outbound network connections from the process, and specific debug strings often associated with automated process hollowing tools.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that utilize the Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods namespace to resolve native NT API functions (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, etc.) and perform reflective code loading of a headerless PE payload from a staging directory (C:\ProgramData\wt1). This activity is associated with UAC-0226/GIFTEDCROOK threat campaigns.
This rule detects the legitimate Windows filter manager utility, fltMC.exe, performing suspicious activities when launched from temporary directories. It specifically flags cases where fltMC.exe loads modules without a corresponding file path (indicative of reflective DLL injection) or initiates sensitive memory allocation APIs (such as VirtualAllocEx or CreateRemoteThread) that are commonly associated with process hollowing or code injection.
Detects suspicious activity associated with the AdaptixC2 framework, specifically process hollowing or shellcode injection where WmiPrvSE.exe spawns or creates remote threads in WAB.exe (Windows Address Book). This pattern has been observed in Akira ransomware intrusions.
Detects the use of .NET reflection within PowerShell to resolve and invoke native Windows APIs (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) typically used by the GIFTEDCROOK actor to perform in-memory shellcode or PE loading. The rule searches for command line patterns combining native API names with reflection-related keywords.
Detects evidence of AsyncRAT infection involving process hollowing into RegAsm.exe. The rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell activity involving specific artifacts ('cap.ps1', 'ConsoleApp1') used to perform reflective assembly loading, attempts to add Windows Defender exclusions for RegAsm.exe, and subsequent suspicious outbound network connections from RegAsm.exe to known C2 infrastructure.
Detects the execution of ServiceModelReg.exe followed by suspicious network or file system activity. ServiceModelReg.exe is a legitimate Windows utility that may be abused by adversaries for process hollowing or masquerading to evade defenses.
Detects a signed host process (VirtualAr.exe, NeuroManag.exe) loading a .tmp file as an executable image. This behavior is indicative of a process-hollowing variant where a malicious payload is mapped directly into memory from a cached, non-flushed temporary file, a technique observed in campaigns like Operation Turb00 involving Vidar infostealer.
Detects suspicious cross-process activity, such as process hollowing, where an unsigned or unusually located process (e.g., in AppData, Temp, or Downloads) attempts to inject code into legitimate Windows system processes like svchost.exe or explorer.exe.
Detects Remcos RAT using process hollowing to inject into the default browser executable. The loader chain originates from a TuglaInsaatci-masquerading executable and passes through in-memory DLL stages (Optimax.dll / System Optimizer Ultimate.dll) before hollowing the browser. The Remcos_Mutex_Inj mutex confirms successful injection into the browser process.
Detects anomalous process creation where svchost.exe or explorer.exe is spawned by a process other than standard system parents (e.g., services.exe, wininit.exe). This behavior is consistent with SystemBC (Coroxy) reflective DLL loading or process hollowing, where malicious code is injected into core Windows processes to evade detection.
Detects multi-stage cryptojacking campaign: autorun.dll sideload, silent msiexec install, and post-exploitation .NET binary process hollowing
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