Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious activity related to input capturing, keylogging, or credential access, specifically looking for corresponding 'ActionType' events in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (DeviceEvents) logs. It alerts on processes performing these actions on devices.
Detects the AgtaBackup RAT keylogger process, which masks itself as a legitimate Windows service ('Window Security Health Services.exe'), running with SYSTEM privileges and lacking a valid digital signature.
Detects the use of the 'getevent' utility on Android/Linux systems to monitor and capture raw input events from '/dev/input'. This technique is often used by mobile malware to perform keylogging by intercepting touch or physical keystroke event streams, bypassing standard application-level input handling.
Detects Node.js or Python processes exhibiting behavior characteristic of information-stealing malware (such as the WaterPlum suite: BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, StoatWaffle). The rule monitors for these processes accessing sensitive files related to browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, scanned identification documents, or performing collection activities like keylogging and screen capturing.
Detects the execution of the 'getevent' debugging utility within an Android ADB shell context, specifically targeting raw input events from /dev/input. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized input monitoring, such as capturing PINs, patterns, or passwords via touch coordinate tracking.
Detects Node.js or Python processes exhibiting behavior characteristic of information-stealing malware (such as the WaterPlum suite: BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, StoatWaffle). The rule monitors for these processes accessing sensitive files related to browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, scanned identification documents, or performing collection activities like keylogging and screen capturing.
This rule detects potential Quasar RAT post-infection activity by correlating the identification of keystroke logging API usage (specifically SetWindowsHookEx, GetAsyncKeyState, or GetKeyboardState) followed by an outbound network connection from the same process identifier within a ten-minute window, indicative of remote control functionality.
Detects the execution of suspected Hidden VNC (HVNC) backdoor components that demonstrate behaviors consistent with banking credential theft, specifically targeting keystroke logging APIs. The rule monitors for specific process names executing from suspicious directories often used for persistence.
Detects the use of the 'getevent' debugging utility within an Android shell context (UID 2000) to monitor raw touch input events from /dev/input. This technique, often referred to as 'AdbTouchCapture', can be used to capture coordinate data from touchscreens, potentially bypassing system-level security controls like FLAG_SECURE to reconstruct user input, gestures, or PIN/pattern credentials.
Detects the execution of the Android system utility 'getevent' by suspicious processes or in contexts suggesting unauthorized input event monitoring. This may indicate an attempt to capture user input, touch events, or screen interaction data.
Detects suspicious use of Windows API functions (SetWindowsHookEx) often associated with keylogging, correlated with the presence of temporary staging files in common directories (e.g., Temp, AppData). The rule excludes known legitimate applications that frequently utilize system hooks.
Detects the presence of QuasarRAT-related processes combined with the creation of known log filenames associated with its keylogging functionality.
Detects the use of the 'getevent' utility by processes running under the 'shell' user (UID 2000) or accessing '/dev/input' directories, which is indicative of keylogging behavior often utilized by the RatHat Android malware to capture user input.
This rule detects activities related to potential keylogging or unauthorized input monitoring on Android devices. It flags processes, classes, or raw log data associated with 'UniversalInputMonitor' and monitors for keywords commonly used in password or PIN input fields, or when Android accessibility services interact with masked input fields.
Detects PowerShell script activity that leverages low-level Windows API calls, such as SetWindowsHookEx and GetAsyncKeyState, which are frequently used by the LxBaseRAT malware to implement keylogging functionality by monitoring user keystrokes.
This rule detects potential keystroke logging activities on Android devices by monitoring the 'UniversalInputMonitor' accessibility service. This service is abused by the RatHat malware family and similar threats to capture user input, including passwords, PINs, and text entered into masked fields, by intercepting accessibility text events.
Detects the execution of known GoCaracal malware samples, identified by specific file hashes or staging file paths, occurring in conjunction with low-level keyboard hook installations using SetWindowsHookEx. This behavior is indicative of active keylogging activity.
Detects executable files containing XOR-obfuscated strings associated with BabylonRAT capabilities, including browser credential theft, keylogging, HOSTS file manipulation, DDoS, and remote dynamic API resolution. This rule identifies patterns commonly used to evade static analysis.
Detects suspicious use of Windows API functions (SetWindowsHookEx) often associated with keylogging, correlated with the presence of temporary staging files in common directories (e.g., Temp, AppData). The rule excludes known legitimate applications that frequently utilize system hooks.
Detects suspicious use of Windows API functions (SetWindowsHookEx) often associated with keylogging, correlated with the presence of temporary staging files in common directories (e.g., Temp, AppData). The rule excludes known legitimate applications that frequently utilize system hooks.
Detects suspicious use of Windows API functions (SetWindowsHookEx) often associated with keylogging, correlated with the presence of temporary staging files in common directories (e.g., Temp, AppData). The rule excludes known legitimate applications that frequently utilize system hooks.
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