Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious modifications to Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configurations via `reg.exe` and `netsh.exe`. Specifically, it looks for attempts to enable RDP by setting `fDenyTSConnections` to 0, modify the `UserAuthentication` setting in `RDP-Tcp` to 0, or add a firewall rule to allow RDP traffic on port 3389. These actions can indicate an adversary attempting to establish or facilitate remote access to a system.
Detects svchost.exe spawning a shell process (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) where its parent is not the legitimate services.exe. This behavior is a known technique used by Moonrise RAT to proxy commands and evade detection. The rule further scopes to commands targeting temp or public directories, which are common malware staging areas.
Detects activity related to OpenClaw (aka Clawdbot or Moltbot) by searching for specific process command line strings, file path keywords, network listeners on port 18789, or scheduled tasks named 'OpenClaw'.
Detects instances where a development environment like VS Code or Cursor spawns a shell process that then uses a download utility to fetch and execute remote content. This is a known TTP for the 'Contagious Interview' campaign which abuses IDE task auto-execution features.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to WebView2 processes interacting with AI webchat domains, potentially indicating covert command and control (C2) proxying or other malicious use. It looks for WebView2 traffic to specific AI domains (Grok, Copilot) originating from unusual parent processes, WebView2 access to Grok with URL parameter-driven prompt execution, and suspicious child process execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) where WebView2 is the parent process.
Detects the execution of legitimate Windows binaries with command-line arguments containing URL patterns. This is a technique used by the Dohdoor malware campaign to pass C2 information to a sideloaded malicious DLL.
Detects a Java process starting cmd or PowerShell. On an ActiveMQ server this can indicate that someone is running commands after exploiting the service.
This rule detects activity associated with the DYNOWIPER malware. It identifies the malware through specific SHA256 file hashes, known filenames (dynacom_update.exe, source.exe, schtask.exe, dynacon_update.ps1, exp.ps1), and process names (dynacom_update.exe, source.exe, schtask.exe, powershell.exe). Additionally, it flags network connections to or from a set of known malicious IP addresses (185.200.177.10, 31.172.71.5, 193.200.17.163, 185.82.127.20, 72.62.35.76) which are associated with VPN logins or exfiltration reverse proxies used by DYNOWIPER.
Detects csc.exe compiling code from Temp or AppData locations, a common pattern for dropper and loader build steps on compromised hosts.
Detects Microsoft Office applications such as Word or Excel spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe). This behavior is often associated with malicious documents that execute macros to run commands on the victim's system. The MuddyWater group has been observed using this technique in their 'Operation Olalampo' campaign.
Flags csc.exe invocations compiling from Temp/AppData paths, a practical pivot for GTIG-described malware that compiles C# code obtained at runtime (e.g., via LLM API responses).
Detects a Java process spawning a command shell to download a file using the certutil.exe utility. This behavior was observed in the exploitation of Apache ActiveMQ (CVE-2023-46604), where the threat actor used this technique to download a secondary payload.
Detects the execution of common Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) initiated from Windows Explorer. The detection logic specifically looks for command lines that contain indicators of obfuscation or padding, which are common techniques used in malicious LNK (shortcut) files to hide their true purpose. This rule identifies processes like mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, certutil.exe, cscript.exe, and wscript.exe being launched by explorer.exe with suspicious command-line arguments.
Detects a command-line pattern where nslookup is used to query a DNS server, and its output is piped to other commands to parse and execute a payload. This is a technique used by ClickFix campaigns to deliver malware via DNS.
This rule detects suspicious process creation events where `explorer.exe` (Windows Explorer) launches various scripting or utility executables (`powershell.exe`, `cmd.exe`, `wscript.exe`, `mshta.exe`, `rundll32.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `installutil.exe`, `wmic.exe`, `certutil.exe`, `msdt.exe`). The detection is specifically triggered when the command line of the launched process contains indicators of network communication (e.g., `http://`, `https://`, `iwr`, `invoke-webrequest`, `curl`, `wget`, `bitsadmin`, `downloadstring`, `downloadfile`), encoded commands (`-e` or `-encodedcommand` with base64-like strings), or UNC paths (`\\`). It also specifically looks for `certutil` being used with `-urlcache`, `-decode`, or `-f` flags. The rule includes exclusions for common legitimate activities such as downloads from `chocolatey.org`, `nuget.org`, `aka.ms`, `cmd.exe` launching a browser to a URL, and `certutil -hashfile` operations.
This rule detects the execution of specific download utilities (curl, wget, aria2c, fetch, PowerShell, certutil, bitsadmin, mshta) attempting to download 'install.sh' from either 'clawd.bot' or 'openclaw.ai'. This activity is indicative of potential malware or unauthorized script downloads, possibly bypassing network security controls.
Detects a BeyondTrust (Bomgar) process spawning shell or system administration child processes. This activity is highly indicative of OS command injection, potentially related to the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731.
Detects the execution of 'cmd.exe' initiated by common Microsoft Office applications, scripting engines, or msiexec.exe, where the command line includes 'curl' for downloading a '.pdf' file and also attempts to delete files using 'del /s /q'. This behavior is often associated with initial access, download of malicious payloads, and cleanup activities by adversaries. The rule specifically looks for command lines that interact with 'Users\Public', 'conhost.exe', or use the '--headless' flag, which can indicate automated or background execution.
Detects the dynamic creation of a scheduled task where cmd.exe first writes an XML task definition file to disk, which is then immediately used by schtasks.exe to create the task. This is a characteristic behavior of the APT28 "Operation MacroMaze" campaign.
This rule detects various activities associated with the 'CrashFix' variant of the 'Clickfix' malware, which deploys a Python-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The detection logic covers several stages of the attack:
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
1. **Browser Extension Installation**: Identifies the creation of a specific malicious Chrome extension file (.crx) with a unique identifier.
2. **Command and Control (C2) Traffic**: Monitors network connections to known malicious URLs and IP addresses associated with the malware's C2 infrastructure.
3. **Malicious Hashes**: Detects the execution of processes with specific SHA256 hashes known to belong to the CrashFix malware.
4. **LOLBIN Abuse**: Identifies the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) like 'finger.exe' and 'ct.exe' in suspicious command-line combinations, potentially for discovery or execution.
5. **Malicious IP Communication**: Looks for network connections initiated by 'ct.exe' with the 'confirm' argument, indicating communication with potentially malicious remote IPs.
6. **Python TTPs**: Detects Python execution patterns, specifically 'pythonw.exe' running 'modes.py' and making outbound network connections to non-local IPs, indicative of the Python RAT.
7. **Persistence via Registry Run Key**: Monitors for registry modifications related to 'pythonw.exe modes.py', suggesting persistence mechanisms.
8. **Persistence via Scheduled Task**: Identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute 'run.exe' and 'udp.pyw', another persistence method.
Detects the OpenEDR ssh-shellhost.exe spawning a command shell (cmd.exe) or PowerShell with PTY (pseudo-terminal) capabilities.
This may indicate remote command execution through OpenEDR's remote management features, which could be legitimate administrative activity or potential abuse of the remote access tool.
Threat actors may leverage OpenEDR's remote shell capabilities to execute commands on compromised systems, facilitating lateral movement or other command-and-control operations.
This may indicate remote command execution through OpenEDR's remote management features, which could be legitimate administrative activity or potential abuse of the remote access tool.
Threat actors may leverage OpenEDR's remote shell capabilities to execute commands on compromised systems, facilitating lateral movement or other command-and-control operations.
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