Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
597 detections
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Detects the correlation of a file creation event in the user Temp folder (such as t.vbs) originating from browser cache or download patterns, followed shortly by the execution of the script via wscript.exe or cscript.exe.
Detects script execution (such as wscript, cscript, mshta) spawned from a shell parent process (like explorer.exe or cmd.exe) referencing browser cache files (matching f_* in browser profile directories) or copying scripts to the local Temp directory as t.vbs.
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Detects script execution (such as wscript, cscript, mshta) spawned from a shell parent process (like explorer.exe or cmd.exe) referencing browser cache files (matching f_* in browser profile directories) or copying scripts to the local Temp directory as t.vbs.
The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This rule detects the execution of node.exe or a specific binary named 'ProfileQuickHost.exe' spawned by wscript.exe. This activity is indicative of a VBScript-based loader (often referred to as 'ChainScript') executing a staged Node.js RAT or secondary payload from user-writable application folders (AppData).
Detects a potential WMI-based persistence mechanism by identifying the sequential execution of mofcomp.exe to compile a MOF file located in a temporary directory, followed by the execution of a VBScript payload using cscript.exe with the /e:VBScript.Encode flag. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence via WMI event subscriptions.
This rule detects potential unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool installation activities. It looks for common patterns used by adversaries to deploy RMM agents, including silent MSI installations from HTTPS URLs, batch/VBS scripts performing administrative privilege checks prior to silent execution, and PowerShell commands utilizing 'Start-Process' with elevated privileges to download and execute files from the internet.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (winword.exe or excel.exe) spawning shell processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe). This behavior is commonly associated with malicious VBA macro execution in weaponized Office documents used for malware delivery, such as Dridex.
This analytic detects suspicious use of 'mshta.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' invoking 'mshtml.dll'
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a VBScript that uses MSXML2.XMLHTTP and ADODB.Stream to download a file in chunks (using the Range header) to a temporary or AppData location. This technique is often used by malware to evade detection by downloading payloads in smaller pieces.
Detects suspicious command-line patterns originating from the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe). This rule identifies the execution of various scripting engines or utilities like PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, and WScript/CScript when they are used with potentially malicious flags or command-line arguments, including encoded commands, hidden window styles, web-download strings, or direct HTA/scripting invocations, which are common indicators of malicious activity following potential user execution.
Detects instances where the Windows Script Host (wscript.exe) is used to launch node.exe with specific command-line arguments (e.g., executing index.js) or a specific binary name, which is indicative of malicious script-based execution chains often seen in RAT deployment.
Detects the execution of various system binaries (e.g., rundll32.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) launched from a Temp directory where the parent or actor process is identified as rnpkeys.exe or rnp.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity where legitimate tools or utilities (GnuPG/RNP) are being abused to proxy the execution of secondary payloads or scripts.
Detects the execution of VBScript files that use a double extension (.pdf.vbs) via Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This technique is commonly used to masquerade malicious scripts as benign PDF documents to deceive users into executing them.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where the binaries 'COTFileReadApp.exe' or 'DeElevate64.exe' initiate child processes or are themselves parent processes to suspicious binaries such as 'rundll32.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', or script hosts ('wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe'). This pattern is indicative of a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) or sideloading chain dropping and executing follow-on payloads.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
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