Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
598 detections
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Detects execution of VBScript files that may be malicious
Detects the creation of files with names containing 'winPatch' and extensions of '.zip' or '.vbs' in Windows TEMP directories, originating from PowerShell or WScript processes. This behavior is indicative of potential ingress tool transfer or staging of malicious scripts.
This rule detects instances where Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) initiates a DNS query to 'ip-api.com' within a 5-minute window. This behavior is often associated with reconnaissance activity, where an adversary uses scripts to determine the public IP address or geolocation of the compromised host for C2 registration or environment awareness.
Detects execution patterns associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, specifically its overlay attack technique. The rule monitors for browsers launched in kiosk mode by unauthorized parent processes, the presence of Grandoreiro-specific banking identifier strings in process command lines, execution of unsigned binaries from AppData/Local that spawn browsers in kiosk mode, and the execution of specific known loader binaries spawned by script interpreters.
Detects behavior patterns associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, specifically the use of wscript.exe or cscript.exe to execute VBScript files that perform geolocation checks against ip-api.com, followed by the dropping of an executable file in the user's AppData\Local directory.
Detects artifacts and execution patterns associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan. This includes the identification of known Embarcadero Delphi DLLs (mingwm10.dll, libwebp.dll, libffi-6.dll, libpng15.dll) being dropped into or loaded from AppData local directories, as well as wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawning suspicious executables from the same path, which is consistent with its VBS dropper chain.
Detects indicators of Grandoreiro banking trojan infection, including the loading of associated malicious DLLs from user-writable AppData directories, the execution of the specific binary 'ROt4I@m$etqv1Ns.exe' via script interpreters, and the spawning of unsigned executables from AppData by wscript.exe or cscript.exe.
Detects the execution of processes with command lines containing keywords associated with FormBook RAT, initiated by common scripting interpreters like PowerShell, cmd, or wscript. This rule aims to identify potential FormBook RAT loader activity.
Detects execution of common script interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe) where the command line argument references a file residing on a drive letter path (e.g., C:\, D:\). This pattern is often used in the execution of downloaded payloads or local malicious scripts.
Detects the execution of VBScript or VBE files (.vbs, .vbe) from common temporary or user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, tmp, ProgramData) when launched by common desktop applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, mshta, explorer, cmd, or powershell). This behavior is characteristic of macro-enabled documents or droppers executing staged malicious scripts.
This rule detects the execution of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) to run JavaScript (.js) or VBScript (.vbs) files located in common user-writable directories such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or Documents. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of malicious scripts dropped as part of phishing attacks or initial access vectors.
Detects the creation of files with specific, non-standard extensions (e.g., .a9oc, .lpxQ, .lpXD) within the C:\ProgramData directory by scripting engines like wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe. This activity is associated with the Kimsuky threat group, who use these scripts as loaders to drop NUKESPED DLL payloads.
Detects the execution of JSE files by wscript.exe or cscript.exe followed by the immediate self-deletion of the file from the Downloads folder, a behavior commonly observed in Kimsuky dropper activity.
Detects instances where WScript.exe queries or modifies multiple sensitive Windows Registry keys. This behavior is often associated with script-based malware attempting to modify file associations, persistence mechanisms, or security policies as part of an infection or post-exploitation process.
Detects the creation of files with specific, non-standard extensions (e.g., .a9oc, .lpxQ, .lpXD) within the C:\ProgramData directory by scripting engines like wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe. This activity is associated with the Kimsuky threat group, who use these scripts as loaders to drop NUKESPED DLL payloads.
Detects the creation or modification of the VbaProject.OTM file, which stores VBA macros for Microsoft Outlook, by a process other than the Outlook application (OUTLOOK.EXE). This is a common technique used to deploy malicious macros for persistence or code execution within the Outlook environment.
Detects the specific process chain: wscript.exe -> powershell.exe -> MSBuild.exe, which is characteristic of the SHADOW#REACTOR malware campaign. This chain indicates the use of scripting interpreters (Wscript and PowerShell) to launch MSBuild for malicious purposes, often involving in-memory execution or compilation of malicious code.
Detects the execution of script files (.vbs, .js, .wsf) using Windows script hosts (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) from common user-writable directories such as Temp, Downloads, and AppData. This behavior is often indicative of malicious files being dropped by phishing attachments or drive-by downloads and subsequently executed by an adversary.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, OneNote) launching command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). This pattern is often associated with macro-based malicious code execution.
Detects the execution of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) to run script files (.vbs, .js, .wsf, .hta) located in commonly abused writable directories such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or ProgramData. This behavior is indicative of a malicious actor executing scripts that have been dropped onto the system as part of a phishing campaign or other attack vector.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe running .vbs scripts from within user profile directories. This is a common early-stage infection vector for deploying memory-resident loaders.
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