Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects initial access attempts involving double-extension shortcuts (.lnk) that lead to the execution of VBScript (VBS) files, which subsequently launch PowerShell scripts for decryption. The detection logic specifically looks for a .lnk file executing a command line containing '.vbs', followed within 5 minutes by a PowerShell process executing a command line containing 'Profile.ps1' or '-bxor'. This chain of events is indicative of malicious activity often used in phishing campaigns to bypass security controls and execute obfuscated payloads.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with 'Operation Poisson', specifically focusing on the creation of a scheduled task named 'TaskAdmin1' with highest privileges that launches 'wscript.exe' with 'sys.vbs' at logon, or the use of Registry Run keys to achieve similar persistence with 'sys.vbs'. It also detects the execution of 'wscript.exe' with 'sys.vbs'.
Detects the creation of various payload and configuration files (VBS, BAT, AHK, PS1, or files containing 'Subtitles') inside the 'Microsoft.WindowsSoundDiagnostics' directory, which is a known technique used by malware like AsyncRAT to evade detection.
Detects PowerShell expanding a downloaded archive (winPatch.zip) to %TEMP%\winPatch and subsequently launching the update.vbs bootstrapper via wscript.exe, as observed in the abdrizak PostCSS typosquatting campaign distributing a Windows RAT.
Detects the PostCSS typosquatting campaign VBScript bootstrapper (update.vbs) using cmd.exe to extract dll.zip via tar, then launching the renamed Python executable chost.exe with loader.py to initialize the Windows RAT payload.
This rule detects suspicious execution of VBScript or VBE files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the command line contains keywords commonly associated with financial documents or urgent requests. A high count of such executions within an hour from a single device is flagged to identify potential phishing attempts or malware delivery.
Detects suspicious execution of VBScript (.vbs, .vbe) files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the command line contains keywords commonly associated with financial documents or urgent notifications. This rule specifically looks for multiple occurrences (3 or more) within an hour, indicating potential malicious activity like phishing or malware delivery.
Detects a script process creating files in a specific HP-themed path and then creating a Run key for persistence, indicative of the Turla Kazuar VBScript dropper.
Detects the execution of processes with filenames commonly associated with malicious scripts, exploits, or malware. This rule monitors Windows Security Event ID 4688 (process creation) for specific filenames such as 'malware.ps1', 'payload.vbs', 'exploit.js', 'attack.bat', 'backdoor.cmd', 'dropper.exe', 'loader.exe', and 'injector.exe'.
Detects instances where WScript.exe queries or modifies multiple sensitive Windows Registry keys. This behavior is often associated with script-based malware attempting to modify file associations, persistence mechanisms, or security policies as part of an infection or post-exploitation process.
Detects the simultaneous extraction of at least three different script types (VBS, PS1, JS, or DAT) from archives, followed by their execution by their respective interpreters (wscript.exe, powershell.exe, node.exe, or bun.exe). This behavior is indicative of multi-stage attacks where adversaries use various scripting languages for different phases of their operations, often to evade detection or to ensure compatibility across different system configurations. The inclusion of '.dat' files suggests that the rule is also looking for potentially obfuscated or custom script formats that are then interpreted by one of the listed executables.
Detects the specific process chain: wscript.exe -> powershell.exe -> MSBuild.exe, which is characteristic of the SHADOW#REACTOR malware campaign. This chain indicates the use of scripting interpreters (Wscript and PowerShell) to launch MSBuild for malicious purposes, often involving in-memory execution or compilation of malicious code.
Detects the execution of processes with command lines containing keywords associated with FormBook RAT, initiated by common scripting interpreters like PowerShell, cmd, or wscript. This rule aims to identify potential FormBook RAT loader activity.
This rule detects suspicious loading of common DLLs (mshtml.dll, mscoree.dll, clr.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll) by VBScript interpreters (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This activity can be indicative of phishing attacks or malicious script execution attempting to interact with system components or the .NET framework.
Detects the execution of RegSvcs.exe initiated by a VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This technique can be used by adversaries to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
Detects the execution of VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) with a command line containing common obfuscation techniques such as 'chr(', 'asc(', 'Replace(', 'Split(', 'Join(', or 'char_code_at', and a command line length greater than 500 characters. This pattern is often used in phishing campaigns to hide malicious code.
This rule detects the execution of VBScript files (.vbs or .vbe) by wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the filename contains keywords commonly associated with phishing lures (e.g., 'Invoice', 'Bill', 'Statement', 'Report', 'Debit', 'Credit', 'Notice', 'Alert', 'Urgent', 'Payment'). The rule triggers if three or more such executions are observed within a one-hour window on a single device, indicating potential malicious activity often associated with phishing campaigns.
This rule detects instances where 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' (VBScript interpreters) initiate processes that attempt to download files from the internet (HTTP, HTTPS, FTP) or from network shares, or execute common system utilities often used for file transfer or execution like 'net.exe', 'certutil.exe', or 'bitsadmin.exe'. This pattern is indicative of multi-stage VBScript loaders often used in phishing campaigns to retrieve and execute further malicious payloads.
This rule detects suspicious loading of common DLLs (mshtml.dll, mscoree.dll, clr.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll) by VBScript interpreters (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This activity can be indicative of phishing attacks or malicious script execution attempting to interact with system components or the .NET framework.
This rule detects the creation of executable or script files (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1, .bat, .cmd) by wscript.exe or cscript.exe within common user-writable directories such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, Documents, or Music. This activity can be indicative of malicious VBScript execution attempting to drop and execute secondary payloads, often associated with phishing campaigns.
Detects the execution of RegSvcs.exe initiated by a VBScript (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This technique can be used by adversaries to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
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