Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
598 detections
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Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods embedded within PowerShell scripts or commands.
Threat actors commonly embed VBScript code within PowerShell to perform registry modifications, attempting to evade detection that monitors for direct registry access through traditional tools.
This technique can be used for persistence, defense evasion, and privilege escalation by modifying registry keys without using regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell's native registry cmdlets.
Threat actors commonly embed VBScript code within PowerShell to perform registry modifications, attempting to evade detection that monitors for direct registry access through traditional tools.
This technique can be used for persistence, defense evasion, and privilege escalation by modifying registry keys without using regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell's native registry cmdlets.
Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Detects the execution of WMIC with the "format" flag to potentially load local XSL files.
Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.
Detects suspicious registry modifications made by suspicious processes such as script engine processes such as WScript, or CScript etc.
These processes are rarely used for legitimate registry modifications, and their activity may indicate an attempt to modify the registry
without using standard tools like regedit.exe or reg.exe, potentially for evasion and persistence.
These processes are rarely used for legitimate registry modifications, and their activity may indicate an attempt to modify the registry
without using standard tools like regedit.exe or reg.exe, potentially for evasion and persistence.
Detects a file ending in jse, vbe, js, vba, vbs, wsf, wsh written by cscript.exe or wscript.exe
Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories
Detects when the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) loads the DLL libraries like vbscript, jscript etc which might indicate an attempt
to execute malicious scripts within a trusted system process for bypassing application whitelisting or defense evasion.
to execute malicious scripts within a trusted system process for bypassing application whitelisting or defense evasion.
Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
Detects uncommon child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods via common LOLBINs.
It could be an attempt to modify the registry for persistence without using straightforward methods like regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell.
Threat Actors may use this technique to evade detection by security solutions that monitor for direct registry modifications through traditional tools.
It could be an attempt to modify the registry for persistence without using straightforward methods like regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell.
Threat Actors may use this technique to evade detection by security solutions that monitor for direct registry modifications through traditional tools.
Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine.
NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
Detects the creation of specific VBScript or PowerShell dropper files (6202033.vbs, 6202033.ps1) within temporary directories. This activity is indicative of malware attempting to establish a foothold or execute malicious code.
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawning cmd.exe to decompress a specific archive using the built-in Windows tar utility. This staging behavior is used by the PyLangGhost VBScript loader to unpack required library files before executing the RAT payload associated with NICKEL ALLEY campaigns.
This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
Detects the execution of VBScript files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe originating from the C:\Users\Public\ directory. This behavior is highly suspicious and indicative of malware staging, as observed in the FAUX#ELEVATE campaign.
This rule correlates the creation of a potentially executable or script file by a browser or Microsoft Office application with its subsequent execution within a short time frame. This pattern is highly indicative of a user being tricked into downloading and running a malicious payload, often associated with initial access techniques like spearphishing with malicious attachments.
Detects suspicious process injection attempts where common scripting/proxy execution tools (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, msiexec.exe) are used to inject into other processes (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, vbc.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe) using CreateRemoteThread. The detection is further refined by looking for command-line indicators often associated with malicious activity, such as downloading content or executing scripts.
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