Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

598 detections

Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
005
Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
005
Detects uncommon child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
005
'Detects request to potentially harmful file types (.ps1, .bat, .vbs, etc.).'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
3028
'This query idenifies when rundll32.exe executes a specific set of inline VBScript commands
References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0026
This query surfaces alerts related to Gootkit and enriches with command and control information, which has been observed delivering ransomware.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0025
Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects uncommon child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detect run not allowed files. Applocker is a very useful tool, especially on servers where unprivileged users have access. For example terminal servers. You need configure applocker and log collect to receive these events.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects potential QBot activity by looking for process executions used previously by QBot
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects potential SquiblyTwo attack technique with possible renamed WMIC via Imphash and OriginalFileName fields
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
avatar
Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
avatar
Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects script file execution (.js, .jse, .vba, .vbe, .vbs, .wsf) by Wscript/Cscript
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for keywords observed in emails involved in a Snip3-associated campaign in April and May of 2021. The emails often have an aviation theme, and the campaign primarily targets organizations involved in travel or aviation. Note that keywords may change overtime. These emails were used to send malicious legitimate hosting provider links that redirected to VBS documents hosting loaders. The loaders initiate RevengeRAT or AsyncRAT downloads that eventually establish persistence on targets and exfiltrate data.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0021
Bazacall uses malicious macro-enabled Excel documents to execute their payload.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0118
This query looks for rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe being spawned by abnormal processes: wscript.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, pwsh.exe, cscript.exe.
Blog:
https://threathunt.blog/running-live-malware-for-threat-hunting-purposes/
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0016
BazaCall is a campaign that manipulate users into calling a customer support center, where they are instructed to download an Excel file to unsubscribe from a phony service. When the user opens the Excel file, they are prompted to enable a malicious macro that infects their device with BazaLoader.
This query surfaces connections to the distinctive .xyz domains that the BazaCall campaign uses to host malicious Excel files.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0013
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