Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'breakdown of scripts running in the environment'
'This query identifies matches based on KNOTWEED file hash IOCs across Microsoft Defender for Endpoint tables'
This query identifies the launch pattern associated with wastedlocker ransomware.
Reference writeup: https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wastedlocker-ransomware-us
Reference writeup: https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wastedlocker-ransomware-us
Cloud Hopper
KQL
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_cloudhopper.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
This rule detects when a user, identified as having a high-risk relationship with GCP resources (specifically those containing sensitive data like US Social Security Numbers via GCP DLP context), downloads an executable file. The detection correlates network proxy events showing executable downloads or large file transfers with EDR events indicating Microsoft Excel activity on the same host and by the same user within a 5-minute window. This scenario is indicative of a potential malicious macro in an Excel document downloading and executing malware.
The analytic detects the execution of JavaScript using the JScript.Encode CLSID (COM Object) by cscript.exe. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by ransomware, such as Reddot, to execute malicious scripts and potentially disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface). If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, evade detection, and maintain persistence within the environment.
This analytic detects Microsoft Office applications dropping or creating executables or scripts on a Windows OS. It leverages process creation and file system events from the Endpoint data model to identify Office applications like Word or Excel generating files with extensions such as ".exe", ".dll", or ".ps1". This behavior is significant as it is often associated with spear-phishing attacks where malicious files are dropped to compromise the host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
Detects executions of WScript.exe or CScript.exe that are running scripts with common extensions (e.g., .js, .vbs) from suspicious temporary or public user directories. This behavior is often associated with dropper scripts used in initial access or malware delivery.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by common Windows shell and scripting processes such as mshta.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe, wmiprvse.exe, and regsvr32.exe. The suspicious child processes include schtasks.exe, nslookup.exe, certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and mshta.exe, which are often abused for various malicious activities like persistence, data exfiltration, or further execution.
This rule detects specific command-line parameters and image paths associated with Mustang Panda droppers. It looks for patterns like 'Temp\wtask.exe /create', specific environment variable manipulations ('%windir:~-3,1%%PUBLIC:~-9,1%', '%windir:~-1,1%'), VBScript execution with file paths containing 'C:\Users\' and '.txt', and the execution of 'Temp\winwsh.exe'. These indicators are characteristic of the dropper stage used by the Mustang Panda APT group.
Detects the execution of javaw.exe from an AppData folder, which is a known behavior of Adwind RAT (also known as jRAT). Additionally, it detects the execution of cscript.exe with specific command-line arguments related to 'Retrive.vbs', which could indicate further malicious activity or a different variant/stage of the attack.
This rule detects the execution of script files with extensions such as .js, .jse, .vba, .vbe, .vbs, and .wsf by the Windows Script Host executables, Wscript.exe or Cscript.exe. This activity is often associated with malicious script execution, including those delivered via phishing or used in post-exploitation phases.
This rule detects potential exploitation of CVE-2023-21554, dubbed 'QueueJumper'. The vulnerability allows for unauthorized remote code execution within the MSMQ service. The rule specifically looks for the 'mqsvc.exe' process (Microsoft Message Queuing service) spawning common Windows command-line interpreters or scripting engines, which would indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by "BgInfo.exe" or "BgInfo64.exe". This behavior can indicate an attempt to abuse BgInfo, a legitimate Microsoft utility, for proxy execution of other binaries or scripts, often to bypass application whitelisting or other security controls. The rule specifically looks for common command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe), other executables (calc.exe, notepad.exe, mshta.exe), or executables launched from suspicious user-writable directories (AppData, Users\Public, Temp, PerfLogs).
Detects potential QakBot activity by identifying specific process execution patterns previously associated with the malware. This includes scenarios where WinRAR executes wscript.exe, command lines containing 'ping.exe -n 6 127.0.0.1 & type', or regsvr32.exe executing from 'C:\ProgramData' with a '.tmp' file.
Detects the creation of specific file artifacts associated with Adwind RAT (also known as jRAT). This includes 'javaw.exe' within the AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\java directory and '.vbs' files within a '\Retrive' directory, both known indicators of Adwind/jRAT activity.
Detects potential process and execution activity related to the APT10 Cloud Hopper operation. Specifically, it looks for `cscript.exe` executing VBScripts with a `/shell` argument and `csvde` commands attempting to export data to a log file in `C:\windows\web\`.
Detects potentially suspicious execution of 'csc.exe' (C# compiler) when spawned by common applications like Office programs, scripting engines (cscript.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe), or from suspicious file system locations. This behavior can indicate payload delivery, compilation of malicious code on the fly, or defense evasion techniques.
Detects the creation of script files (JSE, VBE, JS, VBA, VBS) in common user or program data directories by wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This behavior is often associated with malware droppers or initial access techniques.
Detects uncommon child processes spawned by 'BgInfo.exe' or 'BgInfo64.exe'. This behavior can indicate an adversary abusing BgInfo, a legitimate Microsoft utility, to proxy execution of malicious code, potentially via external VBScript, as part of defense evasion or execution tactics.
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