Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
598 detections
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Detects instances where wscript.exe deletes a .zip archive from within the C:\Users\Public\ directory structure. This activity is frequently associated with VBScript droppers performing anti-forensic cleanup by removing staged payloads after extraction but prior to execution.
This rule detects the execution of script files (such as .vbs, .vbe, .js, .jse) via wscript.exe when the file name uses a double-extension technique (e.g., .pdf.vbs) to masquerade as a benign PDF document. These files are typically found in temporary or user-download directories, indicating potential malicious activity initiated by downloaded attachments.
Detects potential malicious VBScript behavior where the script queries system language settings via WMI and subsequently launches a decoy message box commonly associated with initial-stage malware loaders or droppers to deceive users before initiating a payload download.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) spawning common LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) child processes. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based malware or malicious document exploitation where Office applications are used to execute shell commands or scripts for payload delivery or execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
Detects the execution of staged scripts (.cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js) from user temporary directories using cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe. This behavior is consistent with the Sauron Loader malware family, which utilizes these interpreters to execute secondary C2-tasked payloads.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via WScript or CScript where the command line contains instructions to remove an environment variable. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to clear sensitive environment data or bypass certain application restrictions.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe with silent (/B) and no-logo (/Nologo) flags, spawned by a process named MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskCore. This pattern is indicative of potential living-off-the-land techniques where an adversary leverages a legitimate system task to execute scripts stealthily.
Detects execution of PowerShell scripts spawned by wscript.exe or cscript.exe that retrieve configuration data or file paths from process-specific environment variables, a technique observed in LausivLoader to evade command-line monitoring.
Detects execution of PowerShell scripts spawned by wscript.exe or cscript.exe that retrieve configuration data or file paths from process-specific environment variables, a technique observed in LausivLoader to evade command-line monitoring.
Detects instances where Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) spawns cmd.exe or wscript.exe to execute batch files (.bat) or scripts with specific filenames. This behavior is often associated with malicious user activity, such as executing payloads disguised as innocuous files triggered via shell interactions.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands originating from scripting engines wscript.exe or cscript.exe. The command line contains indicators of malicious activity such as references to external domains, archive expansion, or specific executable payloads.
This rule detects the creation of specific shortcut files (.lnk) within the Windows Startup folder and monitors for the usage of WScript.Shell to interact with the Startup directory. This behavior is commonly associated with persistence mechanisms where an adversary attempts to automatically execute malicious code upon user login.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects instances where Windows scripting engines (WScript or MSHTA) execute script files (WSF, VBS, HTA) which subsequently spawn a PowerShell process using encoded command arguments. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to mask malicious payloads and bypass execution policy or simple command-line monitoring.
This rule detects malicious activity by monitoring for specific known indicators, including hashes of malicious files (ProcessRollup2), network connections to known C2 infrastructure (NetworkConnectIP4), and URL clicks (UrlClick) associated with malicious domains or paths. It acts as a multi-stage indicator correlation rule to identify execution or communication with known threats.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via script interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or terminal hosts (conhost.exe) where the command line contains specific environment variable lookups and obfuscated string identifiers. This pattern is commonly associated with malware or malicious payloads attempting to execute PowerShell commands indirectly to evade detection.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe spawning a child process of powershell.exe where the command line arguments are highly suspicious, including headless mode, encoded commands, and hidden window parameters. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to execute obfuscated malicious scripts while attempting to avoid detection.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the patching of process memory or tampering with security instrumentation (such as Event Tracing for Windows - ETW) by common scripting host processes. It flags events like 'PatchProcessMemory', 'ProcessInjection', or references to 'AmsiScanBuffer' and 'EtwEventWrite' associated with PowerShell, WScript, or CScript, which are often used in post-exploitation scenarios to evade security controls and telemetry collection.
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