Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

598 detections

Detects the execution of command-line tools (cmd.exe or wscript.exe) spawned by Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) where the command line contains references to .lnk files or specific batch filenames (doxc.bat, config.bat). This behavior is often indicative of malicious shortcut files used to trigger secondary stage payloads.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
This rule detects the execution of suspicious shortcut (.lnk) files or the use of command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) to initiate processes related to specific, potentially malicious filenames often associated with phishing or social engineering campaigns. The rule monitors for these activities occurring in user-writable directories such as Downloads, Desktop, or Temp.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe with VBScript or JScript files from user-writable and temporary directories, such as %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, and Downloads folders. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of malicious droppers and loaders in malspam campaigns.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects potentially malicious command execution initiated by or linked to the Bandizip archive utility. It identifies scenarios where Bandizip launches shells (cmd, powershell, wscript, cscript) to execute scripts or commands (e.g., .lnk files, .bat, .vbs, .js, .ps1), or where suspicious 'cmd.exe /k' commands are executed directly or through an updater process.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms and suspicious execution patterns associated with the ChainScript malware. It specifically monitors for the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell with indicators like 'StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1' or 'ComponentTask33Agent', and the execution of VBScript-based agents via wscript.exe. It also flags tasks configured with specific execution time limits often associated with this malware's behavior.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
101
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms and suspicious execution patterns associated with the ChainScript malware. It specifically monitors for the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell with indicators like 'StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1' or 'ComponentTask33Agent', and the execution of VBScript-based agents via wscript.exe. It also flags tasks configured with specific execution time limits often associated with this malware's behavior.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the execution of PowerShell via script interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or terminal hosts (conhost.exe) where the command line contains specific environment variable lookups and obfuscated string identifiers. This pattern is commonly associated with malware or malicious payloads attempting to execute PowerShell commands indirectly to evade detection.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the creation of a .lnk shortcut file within the Windows Startup folder, which is a common persistence mechanism. The detection logic also flags the usage of WScript.Shell and CreateShortcut methods, which are frequently abused by scripts (e.g., VBScript or PowerShell) to programmatically establish this persistence.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution of WScript via a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskCore'. This pattern is often used to masquerade malicious activity by using the name of a legitimate Microsoft Edge update process to execute scripts silently (using //B //Nologo).
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects instances where the Zoom installer process (zoominstaller.exe) initiates potentially suspicious child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or scripting hosts (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) that are executing script files within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a potential installer hijack or malicious payload execution attempting to leverage the context of a legitimate software installer.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects instances where the Zoom installer process (zoominstaller.exe) initiates potentially suspicious child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or scripting hosts (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) that are executing script files within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a potential installer hijack or malicious payload execution attempting to leverage the context of a legitimate software installer.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects the execution of WScript or CScript from a command line containing 'Public' in close temporal proximity (5 minutes) to the creation of directories within 'C:\Users\Public\'. This pattern is often associated with malware staging, where scripts are executed from publicly accessible folders often used as staging grounds for malicious payloads.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' or the execution of a related VBScript, which are commonly used by adversaries for persistence and code execution. This rule monitors process creation events for indicators of malicious task scheduling or script execution mimicking legitimate update processes.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects the Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) executing files with suspicious double extensions, specifically those mimicking PDF documents (e.g., .pdf.js) or utilizing the .jse extension. This pattern is commonly associated with fileless initial execution lures, often seen in ClickFix-style or VEIL#DROP campaigns designed to trick users into executing malicious scripts.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects potentially malicious process execution chains where VBScript or unknown/suspicious binaries (such as ProfileQuickHost.exe) are used to launch Node.js processes, specifically targeting JavaScript files or VBScript agents. This pattern is often associated with the execution of remote access trojans (RATs) or custom malware loaders.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects potentially malicious script execution patterns, specifically targeting Windows Script Host (wscript.exe) invoking .vbs or .wsf files, and PowerShell execution involving suspicious command line arguments such as encoding (-enc), external URL downloading, or attempts to execute or archive files (Expand-Archive, WebClient DownloadFile).
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
006
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
304
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
004
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
003
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
103
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