Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
94 detections
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Azure REST API Command Execution
Suricata
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the Azure management API (management.azure.com). A high volume of such requests (20 within 10 seconds from the same source) could indicate automated activity, potentially related to command execution or resource manipulation within an Azure environment.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate flows that connect to external services commonly used for data exfiltration or command and control, such as webhooks, Gmail, Dropbox, Google Drive, Slack, RSS feeds, custom connectors, or generic HTTP requests/webhooks. This could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data from the Power Platform environment.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving API key rotation followed by high usage. It correlates audit logs for API key operations (rotate, update, create) with cloud application events showing API requests or token usage. Specifically, it looks for instances where an API key is rotated, updated, or created, and then subsequently used more than 50 times within a day by the same actor. This could indicate an adversary gaining access to an API key and then rapidly utilizing it for malicious purposes.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving API key rotation followed by high usage. It correlates audit logs for API key operations (rotate, update, create) with cloud application events showing API requests or token usage. Specifically, it looks for instances where an API key is rotated, updated, or created, and then subsequently used more than 50 times within a day by the same actor. This could indicate an adversary gaining access to an API key and then rapidly utilizing it for malicious purposes.
Detects suspicious app installations, custom app creation, and bot additions in Microsoft Teams. This includes sideloaded apps, which can bypass Teams store vetting and be used for persistence, custom app creation outside of development teams, which may indicate C2 bots or data exfiltration, and the addition of bots with suspicious names. The rule also flags operations like AppShared and TabAdded as medium risk.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate flows that connect to external services commonly used for data exfiltration or command and control, such as webhooks, Gmail, Dropbox, Google Drive, Slack, RSS feeds, custom connectors, or generic HTTP requests/webhooks. This could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data from the Power Platform environment.
Detects S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance looking for existing IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined then (when found) creating a LoginProfile.
Detects S3 browser utility creating Inline IAM policy containing default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>".
Detects S3 Browser utility creating IAM User or AccessKey.
Detects a Python-initiated process attempting to read Google Cloud Platform (GCP) credentials by looking for command-line arguments containing 'GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS' and 'cat 2>/dev/null'. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting, potentially related to supply chain compromises like the Trivy incident.
This rule detects suspicious activity where an Azure CLI session, initially interactive, is followed by non-interactive access from a different IP address. This could indicate an attacker using a stolen token or session from a legitimate user's interactive login to perform automated actions. The rule specifically looks for a pivot from interactive to non-interactive access where the non-interactive access occurs after the interactive access and from a different IP address, within a 30-day lookback window.
This rule detects inbound HTTP requests containing the User-Agent string 'Salesforce-CLI/1.0'. This activity is considered suspicious as it may indicate reconnaissance or data theft attempts targeting Salesforce instances, potentially leveraging compromised credentials or systems. The presence of this specific User-Agent inbound to a network could be an indicator of malicious activity, as Salesforce CLI is typically used by developers and administrators for managing Salesforce organizations and is not expected to be seen in inbound traffic from external networks to internal systems.
Detects the S3 Browser utility creating an IAM User or AccessKey in AWS. This activity can be indicative of an attacker establishing persistence or escalating privileges within an AWS environment.
Detects the S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance by checking for existing AWS IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined, and subsequently creating a LoginProfile if one is not found. This behavior has been associated with the Guivil threat actor.
Detects the creation of an Inline IAM policy by the 'S3 Browser' utility, where the policy still contains the default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>" instead of a specific bucket name. This indicates a potential misconfiguration or an attempt to create a broad policy that might be further exploited.
KQL Query
KQL Query
Detects when an application or service principal performs sensitive configuration changes, likely via the Microsoft Graph API. This can indicate an attacker using a compromised or malicious application for persistence (adding credentials), privilege escalation (adding owners), or defense evasion (modifying Conditional Access policies). This aligns with the "Consent & Compromise" research where attackers abuse application permissions.
This detection identifies when Microsoft Copilot Studio agents are created in your organization's tenant. This activity is significant as the default behavior in Copilot agent creation is to configure a new service principal with cloud app administrator role.
Copilot agents can be found in the Microsoft Admin Portal https://admin.microsoft.com/Adminportal/Home#/copilot/agents
Copilot agents can be found in the Microsoft Admin Portal https://admin.microsoft.com/Adminportal/Home#/copilot/agents
This detection rule identifies when Microsoft Copilot Studio agent properties are modified in your organization's tenant. This activity is significant as the default behavior in Copilot agent creation is to configure a new service principal with cloud app administrator role.
Copilot agents can be found in the Microsoft Admin Portal https://admin.microsoft.com/Adminportal/Home#/copilot/agents
Copilot agents can be found in the Microsoft Admin Portal https://admin.microsoft.com/Adminportal/Home#/copilot/agents
KQL Query from file: Azure Cloud Security Monitoring
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